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CHAPTER I 
NEWMAN 1 S CONCERN WITH CERTITUDE 
The Quest for certitude is the central theme in the philosophy of 
John Henry Newman. All of his investigations have a relation to his 
philosophy about certitude. Even his relentless pursuit of the idea of 
development of doctrine is ancillary to his dialogues about certitude, 
for without a philosophy of certitude there could be no legitimate develop-
ment. For Newman certitude is a qualitative enhancement to knowledge, to 
truth, and to understanding. It is, 11 The perception of a truth with the 
perception that it is a truth, or the consciousness of knowing, as 
expressed in the phrase, 11 I know that I knoW. 111 l When I have certitude I 
not only know a truth, but I can know the reason for the truth. I can 
offer a reasonable explanation for my assent. 
A. Newman 1 S Attitude 
To understand Newman 1 s quest for certitude it is necessary to recall 
some highlights of his prolonged controversy with liberalism, since this 
is the movement that denied that there are certitudes in religion. On 
Monday morning, May 12, 1879, Newman was notified that he had been made a 
cardinal. In reply to that appointment he made the customary Biglietto 
speech which is made when the Biglietto or letter of appointment is 
received. He said, 11 For thirty, forty, fifty years I have resisted to the 
best of my powers the spirit of Liberalism in religion. Liberalism in 
l GA, p. 197. 
2 
religion is the doctrine that there is no positive truth in religion.2 
According to him not only is there positive truth in religion, but in 
complete opposition to liberalism he maintains that there is certitude, 
that is, the consciousness of the positive truth. 
Unfortunately the word 11 liberalism 11 is replete with confusing 
connotations. Yet, because of its deep connection with this period of 
history, we have to use it. Newman was not opposed to all forms of 
liberalism. For instance, he had no quarrel with scientific progress pro-
fessed by the liberals. Nor was he opposed to liberalism as a political 
movement, since in this context liberalism generally means the concession 
to popular demands chiefly in politics. 
Newman accepted what he considered philosophically sound in liberal-
ism, and he recognized that some of its adherents, though misguided, were 
trying to protect the integrity of religious beliefs. Thus in his 
Biglietto speech he said, 
... there is much in the liberalistic theory which is good 
and true; for example, not to say more, the precepts of justice, 
truthfulness, sobriety, self-command, benevolence, which, as I have 
already noted, are among its avowed principles, and the natural laws 
of society. 3 
What Newman objected to was the segment of Liberalism which attacked 
religious certitude. 11 It was not till we find that this array of 
2Life, 2:458-460. A great number of Newman 1 s sermons and letters 
concernTngphilosophy can be found only in this 1vork. \Jilfrid 1-Jard was 
the son of William G. Ward, a close friend of Newman. 
3rbid., 2:462. 
F 
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principles is intended to supersede, to block out, religion, yhat we 
pronounce it to be evil. 114 With candid trepidation he looked into the 
bleak future that Liberalism was attempting to construct. Henry Tristram, 
former Birmingham Orator, archivist records: 
One evening he was talking quietly about the progress of 
Liberalism and unbelief. He anticipated a time when the world at 
large \-Jould assume that Christianity had been disproved. Those who 
persisted in believing in it would neither be listened to nor 
reasoned with. What would be said to them amounted to this. It 
has been disproved; we cannot disprove it again. The tone of anger 
and impatience he put into his voice just for the moment it took to 
say these words, is the reason why a not otherwise remarkable 
conversation is remembered by one person who was present, nearly a 
quarter of a century afterwards.5 
Although few of the adherents of Liberalism professed atheism, 
Newman felt that Liberalism had become a halfway house on the way to 
atheism.6 This mixture of good and evil, of true and false in Liberalism, 
was well expressed in a poem which Newman wrote as early as 1833 at 
Palermo. The second verse of the poem, 11 Ye Cannot halve the Gospel of 
Christ, 11 is: 
And you have caught some echoes of the love, 
as heralded amid the joyous choirs; 
Ye mark 1 d it spoke of peace, chastised desires, 
Good-will and mercy,--and ye heard no more; 
But, as for zeal and quick-eyed sanctity, 
And the dread depths of grace, ye pass 1 d them by.7 
4Ibid., 2:462. 
5Henry Tristram, The Living Thoughts of Cardinal Newman, (New York: 
Sheed and Ward, 1957) pp. xi-xii. 
6&?_Q_. ' p. 185. 
7vv, pp. 144-45. 
B. A Description of Liberalism 
What then is Liberalism essentially? Is it definable? Rather than 
define it, Newman in Note A of the Apologia Pro Vita Sua lists a number 
of propositions which are central to Liberalism. I shall cite only the 
first seven of these propositions since only they, of the eighteen, have 
a special reference to the philosophy of religion in regard to the 
relationship of inference and assent. 
l. No religious tenet is important, unless reason shows it to be 
so. 
Therefore, e.g. the doctrine of the Athanasian Creed is r.ot to 
be insisted on, unless it tends to convert the soul; and the 
doctrine of the Atonement is to be insisted on, if it does 
convert the soul. 
2. No one can believe what he does not understand. 
Therefore, e.g. there are no mysteries in true religion. 
3. No theological doctrine is any thing more than an opinion which 
happens to be held by bodies of men. 
Therefore, e.g. no creed, as such, is necessary for salvation. 
4. It is dishonest in a man to make an act of faith in what he has 
not had brought home to him by actual proof. 
Therefore, e.g. the mass of men ought not absolutely to believe 
in the divine authority of the Bible. 
5. It is immoral in a man to believe more than he can spontaneously 
receive as being congenial to his moral and mental nature. 
Therefore, e.g. a given individual is not bound to believe in 
eternal punishment. 
6. No revealed doctrines or precepts may reasonably stand in the 
way of scientific conclusions. 
Therefore, e.g. Political Economy may reverse Our Lord 1 s 
declarations about poverty and riches, or a system of Ethics 
may teach that the highest condition of body is ordinarily 
essential to the highest state of mind. 
7. Christianity is necessarily modified by the growth of civiliza-
tion and the exigencies of times. 
Therefore, e.g. The priesthood, though necessary in the Middle 
Ages, may be superseded now. 
Other propositions of Liberalism as Newman understood it state that 
there is no existing authority competent to aid private judgment; there 
... 
5 
is no such thing as a national or state conscience; the civi~ power may 
dispose of church property without sacrilege; the civil power has the 
right of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and administration; and it is law-
ful to rise in arms against legitimate princes.8 
While Newman in one way or another was concerned with all the facets 
of Liberalism, our interest here is in his prolonged polemic against 
Liberalistic propositions in regard to philosophical certitude. Although 
the ramifications of Liberalism are numerous and interminable, those 
propositions concerning certitude are reducible to two philosophical roots. 
l. There are no certitudes in religion. 
2. Demonstration or formal logic is the only basis for any 
certitude. 
The first tenet that there is no basis for certitude in religion 
reduces religion to opinion or personal sentiments. Newman understood 
this to be a type of anti-intellectualism in religion which holds that: 
Revealed religion is not a truth, but a sentiment and a taste; not 
an objective fact, not miraculous; and it is the right9of each individual to make it say just what strikes his fancy. 
Truth and certitude would thus be foreign to all forms of theology. 
Newman will show that certitudes are attained in theology. 
The second tenet that demonstration or formal logic is the only 
basis for any certitude has been traditionally identified with rationalism. 
Long before existential philosophy even appeared, Newman sensed the folly 
of restricting all true thought to the language of scientific logic. 
8 ~·' pp. 294-6. 
9Life, 2:460. 
p 
6 
He wrote in irony: 
Current language becomes the measure of thought; only such 
conclusions may be drawn as can produce their reasons; only such 
reasons are in point as can be exhibited in simple propositions; 
the multiform and intricate assemblage of considerations, which 
really lead to judgment and action, must be attenuated or mutilated 
into a major and minor premiss. 10 
Newman will show that there is more to logic than formal logic; 
there is also natural and informal logic. These two tenets of Liberalism 
that there are no certitudes in religion, and that demonstration or formal 
logic is the only basis for any certitude--are dramatically described in 
the correspondence which Newman held with the non-believer William Froude. 
Froude wrote that he was searching for scientific certitude in 
religion, that is, certitude that is based on formal logic. To this 
Newman responded that religion is not a science like physics, but rather 
a devotion to a person. Newman then added, he hoped to develop this, and 
Froude encouraged him to do so. 11 Although Froude never accepted the 
Christian faith, he was instrumental, through his skepticism, in urging 
Newman to make the grand experience of his life available to a larger 
public than that which he could reach in his private correspondence. This 
Newman did in his writing of the Grammar of Assent.l2 
We shall now consider how Newman reacted to a Liberalism which limits 
itself to formal logic and sentimentalism .. Newman could not agree with 
10 s ~-' p. 230 
llG. G. Harper, Cardinal Newman and vJilliam Froude, a Correspondence 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1933), p. 127. 
12 A. J. Boekraad, The Personal Conquest of Truth According to 
J. H. Newman (Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1955), p. 64-65. 
p 
7 
the first Liberalistic tenet--that religion is mere sentimen~alism, and 
consequently there is no basis for certitude in religious faith. 
C. Reason in Religion 
For Newman the assent given by religious faith is a rational one, 
and since faith is open to all men,it follows that all men must be able 
to justify that faith, and do so in conformity with reason, even if they 
are incapable of putting their reasons into definite words. 
Accordingly, instead of saying that the truths of Revelation 
depend on those of Natural Religion, it is more pertinent to 
say that belief in revealed truths depends on belief in natural. 
Belief is a state of mind; belief generates belief, states of 
mind correspond to each other; the habits of thought and the 
reasonings which lead us on to a higher state of belief than one 
present, are the very13ame which we already possess in connection with the lower state. 
Newman would not accept that if a person believed simply, he 
believed without any reason whatsoever. Fideism was alien to his mind. 
On the other hand he did not hold with the Liberal rationalist that 
either a believer reasoned through the entire field of faith or else 
there is no faith. In his delicate ''dialogue 11 with John Locke we shall 
study how Newman retained reason or inference, and assent, depicting both 
their relationship to one another and their independence. In all of his 
writings Newman strove for balance between the natural and the super-
natural, between the human and the divine, between what man does and what 
God does. 
He considered Christianity or faith the perfection of nature and is 
thus like and unlike nature at once. Faith is like nature where it is 
the same or as much as nature, and unlike it where it is as much and more. 
l3GA, p. 413. 
p 
8 
The supernatural is the perfection of nature. Only in the ~oil of the 
natural can the supernatural grow. This harmony between the natural and 
the supernatural relate to the doctrine of the analogy of religion, that 
· finding in nature similarities to religious truths. 1 s' 
The assent to revealed truths depends upon the assent to natural 
truths. One state of mind flows into the other. The solution of the 
natural or philosophical problem of how the mind of a particular person 
can reach certitude regarding a practical truth is a reliable criterion 
of how the mind achieves supernatural truth. It is for this reason that 
Newman 1 s thought ranges beyond the limits of theology. In his polemics 
against the Liberalism of his day, he explores many of the regions 
considered in the philosophies of Locke, Butler and Aristotle concerning 
inferences and assents in everyday certitudes. 
Newman held that for everyone, even for children, the certitude in 
religion must be in harmony with the nature of man, it must be reasonable. 
He wrote: 
I would affirm that faith must rest on reason, nay, even in 
the case of children and of the most ignorant and dull peasant, 
wherever faith is living and loving; and of course in a great 
many other cases besides. I start then with a deep conviction 
that that is the case on which the objection I am to answer bases 
itself; viz, that faith not only ought to rest upon reason as its 
human basis, but does rest and cannot but so rest, if it deserves 
the name of faith. Any my task is to elicit and show to the 
satisfaction of others what those grounds of reason are. 14 
In greater detail in one of his essays Newman writes about the 
the function of reason in regard to revealed truth. Here we see how 
Newman can accept the function of reason without falling into Rationalism, 
14Manuscript of Jan. 5, 1860 MS A 46, 3. 
.... 
9 
i.e., the excessive employment of reason which would usurp tbe province 
of faith. 
As regards Revealed Truth, it is not Rationalism to set 
about to ascertain, by the exercise of reason, what things are 
attainable by reason, and what are not; nor, in the absence of an 
express Revelation to inquire into the truths of Religion, as they 
come to us by nature; nor to determine what proofs are necessary 
for the acceptance of a Revelation on the plea of insufficient 
proof; nor after recognizing it as divine, to investigate the 
meaning of its declarations, and to interpret its language; nor to 
use its doctrines, as far as they can be fairly used, in inquiring 
into its divinity; nor to compare and connect them with our 
previous knowledge, with a view of making them parts of a whole; 
nor to bring them into dependence on each other, to trace their 
mutual relations, and to pursue them to their legitimate issues. 
This is not rationalism.l5 
While Newman was aware of the role that reason plays in religious matters, 
he was also keenly sensitive to the limitations of the human mind when it 
proceeds alone along the narrow paths of formal logic. 
D. The Limits of Formal Logic 
Newman did not accept the second Liberalistic proposition, namely, 
that demonstration or formal logic is the only basis for all certitude in 
religion. This was the position of Whately and the Noetics of Oxford who 
attempted a gnosticisation of the faith, and thus reduce all belief to 
reason. The Noetics had excessively exalted formal reason, and thus be-
came provincial in their thinking. In their philosophy there was no more 
place for either free will or for grace. 
The Noetics claimed that no one has the right to believe religious 
doctrines until he has given a formal demonstration of the doctrines 
patterned after the proof required in mathematics and natural science. 
15Ess, 1:32. 
p 
10 
The sincere and honest believer must apply to the sphere of.religious 
thought the same criteria used by the mathematician and the physicist. 
If this were not done, he would be guilty of failing to show the 
rational character of his religious conviction, and his belief would be 
a sham. Conversely, the Noetics held that when the support of formal 
logical argument is obtained, it compels the assent of any rightminded 
person to the claims of revelation and to the articles of Christian 
belief. 16 The religion of the Noetics would then become as impersonal 
as a problem in calculus, and would of necessity be limited to the 
scholarly few. 
Newman acutely wrote ,.r the Noetic position which would exact a 
formal logical demonstration for every revealed truth: 
... it is Rationalism to accept the Revelation, and then to 
explain it away; to speak of it as the Word of God, and to treat 
it as the word of man; to refuse to let it speak for itself; to 
claim to be told the why and the how of God's dealings with us, as 
therein described, and to assign to Him a motive and a scope of our 
own. 17 
Thus it is wrong to attempt to legitimize the articles of faith with 
reason alone. Liberalism, therefore, may be termed false liberty of 
reason. It exercises reason on matters in which the human mind can not 
be brought to any successful conclusion, i.e., the mysteries of faith. 
In the Oxford University Sermons Newman calls this practice the 
Usurpations of Reason or the Encroachments of Reason. 18 
16James Collins, Philosophical Readings in Cardinal Newman. 
(Chi cage: Henry Regnery Co., 1961), pp. 4-5. 
17 Ess, 1:32. 
18us. pp. 54-75 passim. 
r 
! 
b 
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t·Jhere then is reason to be exercised? Here Newman clearly 
delineates the area as a natural or human preparation for faith, an 
area termed in scholasticism as the preambles of the faith. 
The crucial point here, when we find Ne\,rman demanding a rational 
basis for faith and a proper use of reason in studying revealed truths, 
is his refusal to limit all reasoning processes to that of formal logic. 
In his dialogue with Bishop Joseph Butler about probabilities, we see how 
by reason he meant a sort of natural, informal logic. 
Newman considered that the rigid philosophy of his days at Oxford 
which focused exclusively upon formal logic was too impersonal and too 
ethereal. Certitude must be something personal because thinking is a 
personal activity. On the other hand the Liberal dream was erroneous. 
All men can not arrive at certitude on the same scientific, logical level, 
although as we shall see later such explicit logic can be a guide for the 
implicit logic found in these personal certitudes. 
In many ways Newman was more empirical than Locke or any of the 
English Empiricists. He was not concerned with an empiricism that 
dictated and structured how men should think. He was interested in how 
men actually do think. The norm of reasoning is how the mind actually 
reasons correctly. He based his philosophy upon his experience of living 
the life of a Christian in an anti-Christian intellectual milieu, and the 
need he felt of getting behind the accepted theories to the facts. He 
saw the benefits of thinking in the concrete, not in hypothetical contexts. 
Facts would lead to the theories, rather than the theories shaping the 
facts. Thus, he avoided the paper Utopias manufactured-by the use of 
impersonal and unrealistic reason. 
Newman saw the need of a new philosophy in this whole matter. He 
pz 
12 
wanted a more realistic, personal, empirical philosophy. He foresaw 
that educated laymen would be in sore need in the years to come of a 
philosophy of the Christian religion to help them to explain the 
certitude that they have for their faith. On the light of this 
philosophy Liberalism would be clearly shown up as inadequate. 
This audacious hope we find expressed in a poem entitled 11 The Age 
to Corne. 11 In 1833, early in the life of Newman, this poem was written. 
Now I see that men are mad awhile 
And joy the Age to come will think with me 
'Tis the old history---Truth without a home 
Despised and slain, then rising from the tomb. 19 
A large portion of Newman's literary and intellectual life was 
dedicated to the development of this new philosophy of certitude. When 
in 1851 a rumor spread that he was to be made a bishop, he wrote to 
George Talbot in Rome arguing that his great value lay in his literary 
work, not in canon law. He expressed his fear that by assuming the duties 
of a bishop the work of a lifetime would be lost. 11 For tvJenty years I 
have been working on towards a philosophical polemic suited to the 
times. 1120 This ph-ilosophical polemic was directed against a variety of 
attacks on Christianity nearly all of which Newman associated with 
Liberalism. 
E. ~Larger Logic 
Through his philosophical 11 dialogues 11 Newman explored this field 
which consisted in a new view of certitude, and he thus attempted to 
rectify the errors in Liberalism. The basis for this new view of 
1 9vv , p. 148. 
20Letters and Diaries, 14:206. 
p 
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certitude would be personal rather than general, practical (ather than 
theoretical and open rather than structured. Through his philosophical 
dialogue with Locke he attempts to manifest the distinction between 
inference and assent. That such a dialogue be placed at the very begin-
ning of the series of dialogues is most essential and beneficial. For 
without grasping the acceptance of Newman 1 s view of the distinction 
between inference and assent the central thrust of the other dialogues 
would become vapid and inconsequential. 
If there were no distinction between inference and assent, then 
inference would become the assent, and Newman would have to agree that 
rationalistic Liberalism was correct. Every inference would be an assent. 
The degrees of inference would become the degrees of assent. There 
would be no possibility for a group of inferences to be subject to one 
assent. Then it would of necessity follow that the more intelligent a 
person is, the deeper his formal logic penetrated, the greater would his 
assent become. This is the doctrine of rationalistic Liberalism, which 
confines the reasoning processes to formal logic. 
Newman would then be forced to abandon his contention that the 
ordinary, less educated person can give a meaningful and strong assent to 
propositions, and thus obtain certitude. This problem will be explored 
and explained in the next chapter concerning Newman 1 s dialogue with Locke. 
Newman describes how he himself saw the need of initiating his 
pursuit of certitude with the establishment of the distinction between in-
ference and assent. He says that the contemplation of the composition of 
his last work, the Grammar of Assent, had cost him untold trouble, that 
he could not find a satisfactory starting-point, and so at various times 
he had started completely anew. 
14 
However, he says, when he spent some time at Glion over the Lake 
of Geneva, 11 a thought came into my head as the clue, the open Sesame of 
the whole subject, and I at once wrote it down, and I pursued it about 
the Lake of Lucerne. The thought was, 1 You are wrong in beginning with 
certitude--certitude is only a kind of assent. You should begin with 
contrasting assent and inference. 111 21 
This discovered distinction between inference and assent became an 
essential theme in the structure of the Grammar of Assent. Through this 
distinction Newman points to the excessive claims of liberal rationalism 
and opens the door to more accessible and natural sources of certitude. 
We shall meet these sources when we come to Newman 1 s philosophical 
dialogue with Butler. 
In Newman 1 s extensive descriptions concerning natural and informal 
inferences, we find the key to his understanding of inference. He wrote, 
11 The heart is commonly reached not through the reason, but through the 
imagination, by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts 
and events, by history, by description. Persons influence us; voices 
melt us; looks subdue us; deeds inflame us. 11 22 Newman claims that it is 
the whole person that is involved in natural and informal inferences. 
not merely the intellect in the isolation of its nebulous abstractions. 
Reason is seen to include a wide range of powers. It will include the 
feelings, the imagination, the unconscious, the will, as well as the 
21Life, 2:245, 278. 
22 GA , p p . 9 2- 9 3 . 
15 
intellect. It is the complete, living responsible person that 
23 
reasons. 
Again and again Newman states that it is the real, living concrete 
person who reasons concerning that which is real and concrete, and this 
is the evident observation of our daily experience. 
In these dialogues on inference, Newman also recognizes the 
importance of a will that is good, and a moral disposition that is correct. 
The search for truth is a duty to oneself and ultimately a duty toward 
God. This search for certitude finds its deep roots in the concrete, 
realistic experiences of daily life. He uses the term 11 probability, 11 a 
word borrowed from Butler to express such ordered experiences. To 
determine the exact meaning of this word in Newman will be an essential 
part of our task. 
While Newman saw the limits of formal logic, he also saw its valid 
uses toward certitude. On the introductory page of the Grammar of Assent 
we find St. Ambrose•s maxim, 11 Non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum 
facere populum suum. 11 24 Frequently Newman writes about his disenchantment 
23Thus, does Newman solve a problem that has plagued scholasticism--
the problem of how we attain to the knowledge of the singular. He held 
that we become acquainted with concrete material things through our bodily 
senses, memory and imagination. These faculties give us subjective 
impressions of the appearances of things. They include as their chief 
element a non-sensible act of synthesis. ••sy the law of our nature we 
associate these sensible phenomena with certain units, individuals, sub-
stances, whatever they are called, which are outside and out of reach of 
sense, and we picture them to ourselves in these phenomena. 11 GA, 102-3. 
24It was not by argumentation that God willed to save his people. 
F 
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with formal logic which he denounces as 11 paper logic. 11 Yet .be held 
Aristotle in deep respect and recognized the need for such logic. Unlike 
the Noetics and the devotees of Liberalism, he refuses to be confined 
to mechanically manipulated syllogisms, and points out that the logic of 
Aristotle even with its formality can still act as a guide to inferences 
which are informal and natural. He also realized that formal logic at 
times becomes a necessary medium of communication for the sources of 
certitude. 
In these philosophical 11 dialogues 11 we find Newman not only opposing 
the principles of Liberalism in regard to religious certitude, but also 
presenting a basis of certitude for all fields of knowledge and describ-
ing the relationships which the various types of inferences can have with 
certitude. He can thus be seen as a philosopher not only of religious 
knowledge, but also a philosopher of human knowledge, engaged in dialogue 
with such philosophers as Locke, Butler, Aristotle, Pascal, Hume, Plato, 
St. Augustine, Kant, Bacon, and John Stuart Mill. 
However in order to report Newman 1 s response to Liberalism with 
continuity, development and depth, the subsequent chapters of this work 
will treat of his dialogue with Locke in regard to the distinction between 
inference and assent, with Butler in regard to informal and natural 
inference, and with Aristotle in regard to formal inference. Each chapter 
in itself would be an ineffectual response to Liberalism. However, to-
gether they constitute not only Newman 1 S critique of rationalistic 
Liberalism, but his synthetic solution to the certitude proolem encountered 
in both the professional philosopher and the average person. 
A reader of these dialogues will not fail to note the efforts that 
Newman makes to understand the position of the other philosopher 
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accc:i'ately and thoroughly, and his readiness to incorporate into his 
thinking the truths he finds in the study of other thinkers. He 
believed that many disagreements could be avoided if we but correctly 
perceived the position of the one with whom we are in dialogue. In writ-
ing about the philosophy of an imperial intellect, which is the hospital-
ity of the mind that a university endeavors to develop, Newman said: 
If he has one cardinal maxim in his philosophy, it is, that 
truth cannot be contrary to truth; if he has a second, it is, that 
truth often seems contrary to truth; and, if a third, it is the 
practical conclusion, that we must be patient with such appear-
ances, and not be hasty to pronounce them to be really of a more 
formidable character.Z~ 
In the subsequent chapters, we shall see how Newman responded to 
the liberalistic claim that religion is mere sentimentalism, and it is 
devoid of all rationality. To do this we shall explore Newman's develop-
ment of additional forms of logic--natural and informal. In explaining 
Newman's wider view of logic we shall also show how he responded to the 
second tenet of liberalism--that formal logic is the only way to 
certitude. Yet, as we shall see Newman does not de-evaluate formal logic. 
He acknowledges its rightful place in theology, philosophy and science. 
In doing this we shall examine how he developed a more extensive 
and personal empiricism than Locke and yet retained an objective criterion 
for the true and the good. We shall observe how Newman combines an 
evangelical and personal approach to truth in his Butler dialogues with 
that of a rationalistic approach to truth in his Aristotelian dialogues, 
and observe how he synthesized the knowledge that springs from the heart 
with the knowledge that springs from reason. 
25 Idea, p. 461. 
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F. Philosophical Summation 
For Newman certitude is not only the knowledge of the truth, but 
the consciousness of knowing the truth: 11 I know that I know. 11 Through-
out his life Newman was concerned with the quest for certitude. He 
strongly objected to the position of the Liberals who claimed that in 
religious matters there was no basis for certitude which reduces religion 
to mere sentimentalism, and that demonstration or formal logic is the 
only basis for any certitude, which is a type of rationalism. 
Newman always insisted that the assent given by faith should have a 
rational basis. This is true for everyone, even for children. Never 
would Newman say that a person believed simply because he believed. 
Newman strove for a balance between the natural and the supernatural, 
between the human and the divine, between what man does and what God does. 
To ignore the natural rational basis for faith would lead to the folly of 
fidei sm. 
Yet, Newman would not claim that a believer must legitimatize with 
reason each doctrine of faith. Newman recognized the need for reason in 
religion and also its limits. 
He saw the need of preserving both reason and assent depicting both 
their relationship and independence on one another. 
Newman saw the dangers involved in a philosophy such as liberalism, 
which would claim that demonstration or formal logic is the only basis for 
all religious certitude. Such was the teaching of Whately and the Noetics 
who demanded for religious certitude the rigid demonstrations of mathema-
tics and the natural sciences. It can readily be seen how impersonal such 
a scientific religion would become. 
Newman claimed that reason must be exercised in giving a basis for 
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the faith, in interpreting and connecting doctrines and in applying 
doctrines to life. Yet, unlike the rationalistic liberals, Newman does 
not limit himself to formal logic, but he also includes a sort of 
natural and informal logic. Through natural and informal logic reason-
ing becomes personal, concrete, realistic, empirical. To the develop-
ment of this view of reasoning a huge portion of Newman's literary life 
was dedicated. 
In order to comprehend Newman's larger view of logic, it is 
necessary to recognize the distinction between inferences and assent. If 
there were no such distinction then the rationalistic liberals would be 
correct in claiming that a safe assent can only be produced by a formal 
demonstration. Newman claimed that there can be inferences without 
assents, assents without concurrent inferences, and---what is especially 
significant--that there can be true assent without the strictures of 
formal logic. Thus Newman holds that an ordinary person, untutored in 
formal logic, can have a secure basis for his assent of certitude. 
Newman developed a personal, informal, and natural logic. It is 
the reasoning processes of the living concrete person. Although Newman 
saw the limits of formal logic, he recognized its role in the pursuit of 
certitude. Formal logic can be a guide for informal logic, and it is a 
helpful medium for logical communication. 
We shall now study Newman's dialogue with Locke on certitude. 
p 
CHAPTER II 
CRITIQUE OF LOCKE ON CERTITUDE 
We have seen how a segment of the Liberal school had claimed that 
there is no certitude but merely opinion in religion. For this school 
the only basis of certitude is formal inference. In response to this 
position Newman endeavors to show that certitude exists in religion and 
in other fields. In effect he shows that the reasoning processes need 
not be restricted to formal or paper logic. Newman wrote: 
We reason, when we hold this by virtue of that; whether 
we hold it as evident or as approximating or tending to be 
evident, in either case we do hold it because of holding some-
thing else to be evident. In the next place, our reasoning 
ordinarily presents itself to our mind as a simple act, not a 
process or series of acts. We apprehend the antecedent and then 
apprehend the consequent, without explicit recognition of the 
medium connecting the two, as if by a sort of direct associa-
tion of the first thought with the second.26 
To develop this view of a larger logic Newman realizes he cannot 
begin with certitude, but must retreat one step and begin by contrasting 
inference with assent. This has to be done because certitude is a type 
of assent specially relevant to the question here. In other words while 
there is a relationship between inference and assent, the assent of certi-
tude is now always essentially dependent upon this relationship. 27 
26GA, pp. 259-260. 
27The distinction between inference and assent is, according to 
Francis Bacchus, one of the three most original and characteristic features 
of Newman 1 S philosophy. The other tvm are the distinction between formal, 
informal, and natural inference, which will be considered in Newman 1 S 
dialogue with Butler, and the illative sense, which will be considered in 
Newman 1 s dialogue with Aristotle. Francis Bacchus, 11 How to Read the 
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r 21 Inference is required for the notional assent of certitude, but 
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inference in itself does not produce this certitude. Newman accepted 
these basic observations about inference and assent. 
Inference is the conditional acceptance of a proposition, 
Assent is the unconditional; the object of Assent is a truth, 
the object of Inference is the truth-like or a verisimilitude. 
The problem which I have undertaken is that of ascertaining how 
it come2 to pass that a conditional act leads to an uncondi-
tional. 8 
In direct philosophical terms the problem here is the 11 more 11 
seemingly coming out of the 11 less 11 , namely the unconditional from the 
conditiona]. 
A. Locke Represents the Liberals 
In constructing his philosophy on the assent of certitude, Newman 
selected John Locke to be the representative of the Liberal school of 
rationalism. Newman accepted Locke as the reliable representative of the 
thinking of William Froude with whom he had conducted a lengthy and subtle 
correspondence on possible paths to certitude. 
The first philosophical work Newman read was Lock'e Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding. This work was read during the summer vacation of 
1 Grammar of Assent 111 , The Month 143 (January-June 1924) l 06. To these we 
would add one more contribution--the distinction between notional 
apprehensions and notional assents, and real apprehensions and real 
assents. 
28 GA, p. 259. 
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1818 when he was only seventeen.29 
Following his custom in controversy, Newman begins by treating 
Locke with the highest respect, and as far as he is able finding points 
on which he can agree with him. 
About the personality and achievement of Locke, Newman wrote: 
I have so high a respect both for the character and the 
ability of Locke, for his manly simplicity of mind and his out-
spoken candour, and there is so much in his remarks upon reason-
ing and proof in which I fully concur, that I feel no pleasure 
in considering him in the light of an opponent to views, which 
I myself have ever cherished as true with an obstinate devotion. 30 
In general, Newman concurred vJi th Locke • s philosophy on a number of 
points, for instance, that each person is dependent on experience for his 
knowledge; that since all knowledge arises from experience it is 
connected in one way or another with experience; that knowing consists in 
a relation of a knowing subject to an individual object presented in 
experience. Newman wrote: 
The terms of a proposition do or do not stand for things. 
If they do, then they are singular terms, for all things that 
are, are units. But if they do not stand for things they must 
stand for notions, and are common terms. Singular nouns come 
from experience, common from abstraction. The apprehension 
29 Newman possessed the three large and handsome volumes of ''The 
Works of John Locke. Esq. 11 ed. Mr. Desmaizeaux in 1751. They bear 
his Littlemore book plate and thus came from the library he had built 
up for himself at Oriel. It is worth noting that there are very few of 
Newman's pencil markings and marginal remarks to be found in these 
volumes. What there are come only in the fourth book of the Essay. 
Furthermore judging by the handwriting these markings look as though 
they were made at a later date, possibly when he was writing the Grammar of 
Assent.~. 1:192. 
30 GA, p. 162. 
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of the former I call real, and of the latter notiona1. 31 
Once he has made the distinction between the notional apprehension 
and the real apprehension, Newman in agreement with Locke displays a 
persistent predilection for the real, and yet he is not oblivious to the 
function of the notional. Comparing the two modes of apprehending 
Newman wrote: 
Without the apprehension of notions, we should for ever pace 
round one small circle of knowledge; without a firm hold upon 
things, we shall waste ourselves in vague speculations. However, 
real apprehension has the precedence, as being the scope and end 
and the test of notional; and the fuller is the mind 1s hold upon 
things or what it considers such, the more fertile is it in its 
aspects of them, and the more practical in its definitions.32 
Newman was also in agreement with Locke in rejecting innate ideas, 
and in refusing to accept any a priori metaphysical system which puts 
mental concepts in the place of existent things as the basic units of 
reality. Newman approximated Locke 1s manly simplicity of mind when he 
wrote, 11 Let units come first, and (so-called) universals second; let 
universals minister to units, not units be sacrificed to universals. 1133 
B. Ne,'llllan '::!2__. Locke QD.. Degrees of Assent 
Newman, however, strongly disagreed with Locke 1S central theme that 
the lover of truth will render an assent to a proposition that is in 
proportion to the evidence. Locke clearly held that there are various 
degrees of assent which are conceived through various degrees of evidence. 
Now, Newman contended that were this so it would seem that all assents 
would be absorbed by the inferences, because the assents would be 
31 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
33 Ibid., p. 279. 
32GA, p. 34. 
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identified with the inferences and there would be no distinction between 
them. Thus it would be impossible to have a group of inferences accepted 
by one assent. 
Ne~1an could agree with Locke that the search for truth is a 
serious procedure and the person engaged in this search should possess a 
love for truth. Thus the lover of truth would take great pains to gain 
it and be concerned if he should fail. Newman, however, would disagree 
with Locke about the criterion for certitude selected for a lover of 
truth since Locke•s criterion identified inference with assent and 
results in various degrees of assent. The passage that Newman quoted 
from Locke reads: 
How a man may know, whether he be so, in earnest, is worth 
inquiry; and I think there is this one unerring mark of it, viz. 
the not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than 
the proofs it is built on will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this 
measure of assent, it is plain, receives not truth in the love of 
it, loves not truth for truth-sake, but for some other by-end. 
For the evidence that any proposition is true (except such as are 
self-evident) lying only in the proofs a man has of it, whatsoever 
the degrees of that evidence, it is plain all that surplusage of 
assurance is owing to some other affection, and not to the love 
of truth; it being as impossible that the love of truth should 
carry my assent above the evidence there is to me that it is true, 
as that the love of truth should make me assent to any proposition 
for the sake of that evidence which it has not that it is true; 
which is in affect to love it as a truth, because it is possible 
or probable that it may not be true.34 
After quoting this passage Newman summarizes it by saying that 
Locke would claim it is not only illogical, but immoral to carry our 
34John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed: 
Campbell Fraser, 2 vols. (New York: Dover, 1959), 4, 19, l. 
quotes this passage in GA, pp. 162-3. 
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assent beyond the evidence that a proposition is true, and to have a 
surplus of assurance beyond the degrees of that evidence. The only 
exception to this rule would be self-evident propositions. 
C. Locke's Reversal 
Newman thinks there are philosophical problems involved with the 
approach to certitude by Locke, but before that, he cites two additional 
quotations from Locke which seem directly inconsistent with the above 
stated principle. On the passage quoted above, Locke said that we should 
never give a greater assent than the evidence deserves. Now he says that 
there are propositions that border so close to certainty that we can 
assent to them with no fear or error. 
First he says, in his chapter 11 0n Probability, 11 ''Most of 
the propositions we think, reason, discourse, nay, set upon, are 
such as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth; yet some 
of them border so near upon certainty, that we make no doubt at 
all about them, but assent to them as firmly, and act according 
to that assent as resolutely, as if they were infallibly 
demonstrated, and that our knowledge of them was perfect and 
certain. ··3~ 
Commenting on this passage Newman notes that Locke is allowing 
inferences which are so close to certainty, that we can accept them with 
no fear of doubt, and assent to them as if they were infallibly 
demonstrated. Newman confesses that this is the very paradox to which he 
himself has been committed, and which he seeks to clarify. As we shall 
see later the passage quoted above from Locke expresses quite accurately 
a phase of Newman's personal approach to certitude. 
Newman finds another inconsistency in Locke's original position of 
35Essay, 4, 15, 2. Newman quotes this passage in GA, p. 161. 
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reserving absolute assent only to perfect demonstration. IQ his chapter 
on 11 The Degrees of Assent, 11 Newman points out that Locke claims that 
when any particular thing constantly is observed by us to occur, and all 
others give concurrent reports about the event, we receive it easily, 
and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain knowledge, and we 
reason and act upon it as if it were perfectly demonstrated. 11 These 
probabilities rise so near to certainty, that they govern our thoughts 
as absolutely, and influence all our actions as fully, as the most 
evident demonstration; and in what concerns us, we make little or no 
difference between them and certain knowledge. Our belief thus grounded 
rises to assurance. 11 36 
Newman then contrasts this passage from Locke with Locke 1 s state-
ment that the lover of truth will render an assent in proportion to the 
evidence. Newman wonders how Locke is still consistent with right 
reason and the love of truth for its own sake, if he allows certain 
strong probabilities to determine our conclusions, as if they were most 
evident demonstrations. Does not Locke 1 S statement open the door to an 
assurance which exceeds the degrees of evidence? If this is done, are 
we still acting on a strictly rational level? 37 It would seem that we 
are not. 
Newman contends that Locke is guilty here of violating his own 
principle. Still, Newman attempts to enter into the intimate thoughts 
36Essay, 4, 16, 6. Newman quotes this passage in GA, p. 161. 
3 7 GA , p . l 6 3 • 
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of his adversary to see if there might not possibly be ways ,of resolv-
ing this inconsistency. Perhaps, he says, Locke had in view one set of 
instances, when he implied that demonstration was the condition of what 
he would term absolute assent, and another set of instances when he 
said that it was no such condition. But Newman claims this is an 
unsatisfactory sol uti on. 11 Locke surely cannot be acquitted of s 1 ovenly 
thinking in thus treating a cardinal subject. A philosopher should so 
anticipate the application, and guard the enunciation of his principles, 
as to secure them against the risk of their being made to change places 
with each other. 1138 
Newman concludes that no matter what one may think about Locke 1 s 
a priori method and his logical consistency, 11 his animus, fear, must be 
understood as hostile to the doctrine which I am going to maintain. 1139 
A basic disagreement about certitude still remains. There can be no 
doubt that Locke is advocating that there are degrees of evidences which 
contribute to various degrees of assent. This, Newman rejects. 
D. Does Inference Usurp Assent? 
Thus far Newman has been in dialogue with Locke by contrasting 
several inconsistent passages in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 
Next he proceeds to consider the logical implications of Locke 1 S real posi-
tion that there are indeed degrees of assent. 
Newman gives the basis for such a reduction. He claims that if the 
act of assent can only be viewed as the necessary and immediate repetition 
38GA, p. 164. 39 rbid. 
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of another act, if both inference and assent say that a pro~osition is 
somewhat, or not a little, or a good deal, or very much like a truth, 
then the two are identical and it well may be doubted that there is any 
distinct act of assent. Assent would simply be a sort of reproduction 
f f . f 40 and double o an act o 1n erence. 
Degrees of assent would make an assent a redundancy. Assent would 
merely become another name for inference or an echo of an inference. 
Newman thinks that the best way to settle this question is to 
inquire empirically into the experience of daily life to determine the 
relation between inference and assent. This inquiry produces six in-
stances that inference is in fact distinct from assent. 
E. Evidences for the Inference-Assent Distinction 
---
First, we know from experience that assents may endure without the 
presence any longer of the inferential acts upon which they were 
originally elicited. Sometimes we are fully conscious of them; sometimes 
they are implicit, or only now and then come directly before our reflec-
tive faculty. Still they are assents; and, when we first admitted them, 
we had some kind of reason, slight or strong, recognized or not, for doing 
so. Two things, one of which endures while the other ceases, can not be 
one identical thing.4l 
Second, sometimes we give an assent and then it is withdrawn. The 
assent fails, while the reasons for it and the inferential act which is 
the recognition of those reasons, are still present. Our reasons may seem 
to us to be as strong as ever and yet they no longer secure our assent. 
40 Ibid. , p. 16 5 . 41Ibid., p. 167. 
Our assent was no longer a true assent; it had become an assertion. 
Two things, one of which changes while the other remains the same can 
not be one identical thing.42 
The third example is somewhat similar to the second, wit~ this 
exception, that here.the assent is never given. The arguments are 
strong and they are convincing, but the assent is checked. There are 
men who will admire truths which are the result of inference, but they 
will never profess or assent to these truths. Two things, one of which 
can be present while the other is absent can not be one identical thing. 43 
Fourth, a good argument will either receive our assent, or not 
receive it. Granted that the argument is good, it may be wondered, if 
there are degrees of assent as claimed by Locke, why then we do not 
assent at least a little to such an argument. TvJO things, one of vJhich 
can be more or less, while the other is simply absent or present, can not be 
. d . l h. 44 one 1 ent1ca t 1ng. 
The fifth experiential evidence takes a slightly different course. 
To a conclusion which is logically unimpeachable, an assent can be with-
held simply on the basis of moral motives. Here Newman employs the 
ancient addage, 11 A man convinced against his v.Jill, Is of the same 
opinion still. 11 Two things one of which can enter the domain of the 
volitional while the other remains as essentially prescinding from the 
volitional, can not be one identical thing. 45 
42rbid., pp. 167-68. 
44 Ibid., p. 169. 
43 GA, p. 168-169. 
45rbid. 
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For his sixth and final example of the difference between in-
ference and assent Newman uses mathematics. While it is true that the 
evidence of such a distinction may not be manifest in elementary 
mathematics, on the higher levels a mathematician involved in abtruse 
calculations could understandably labor under a rule that he would never 
assent to his conclusions without the corroboration of other judgments 
besides his own. Two things, therefore, one of which man uses as his 
practice rule while not so using the other can not be one identical 
thing.46 Clearly this assent is distinct and other than inference. 
F. Assent Requires Some Inference 
At this juncture Newman suspects that in his efforts,. to refute 
Locke he may be misunderstood. The reader may think that because he is 
proving that inference and assent are distinct, Newman is also claiming 
that between the two there is no relationship whatever, no legitimate or 
actual connection. To prevent this misunderstanding Newman states that 
arguments adverse to an assent can hinder an assent, and that assent 
always implies grounds in reason, implicit or explicit. Assent can not 
be rightly given without sufficient reasons. Between right assent and 
inference, therefore, there is always a relationship, although that 
relationship is not one of identity as we have just seen. 
The problem is if there is such a definite distinction between 
inference and assent, how can an assent have a relationship with in-
ference or a dependence upon inference? Certainly Newman could not 
claim that a man could assent without reason for this would be fideism 
in religion and irrationality in philosophy. Hence the discussion is 
46GA, pp. 169-71. 
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centered in the connection between inference and right asseQt. 
A possible resolution of this apparent dilemma occurs when Newman 
employs the expression conditio sine g.!:@_ non .iD_ regard to inference. 
The inference is not the cause of the assent, but it acts as a condition 
without which the assent can not occur. 47 The relation is like that of 
a catalyst to a chemical change. That is the condition, the inference, 
enables the cause, the person making the assent, to produce his effect. 
The condition or the inference does not actually enter or flow into the 
being of reality of the affect. It has a negative influence in that it 
must be present or the cause can not produce its effect. For instance, 
a father turns on the television set and his four year old daughter 
watches the late movie. He is a necessary condition but not the cause of 
her watching the movie. 
The inference may be compared to scaffolding which is dismantled 
once the building is completed. Thus Bacchus wrote: 
When a proposition is being inferred, the direct object 
before the mind is its relations to the premisses from which it 
is inferred. But when a proposition is assented to, the premisses 
disappear from view, just as scaffolding vanishes when a building 
is completed, and the proposition in itself becomes the direct 
object before the mind. It is true that acts of inference 
normally precede an act of assent, and are a sine qua non condition 
of its being elicited; but they do not form part of the act 
itself. 48 
Such then is the resolution of the pseudo dilemma. 
47Ibid., p. 41. 
48Bacchus, ''How to Read the "Grammar of Assent," pp. 114-115. 
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G. Conditionality Contrasted with Unconditionality 
We come next to what could be termed an internal reason for the 
difference between inference and assent. In the previous section in-
ference has been considered to be a 11 Conditio sine qua non 11 in relation 
to assent. Again we must employ the word 11 COndition 11 in speaking about 
the manner in which an inference 11 arrives'' at a proposition. From what 
has been said about inference it can be seen that a proposition is 
accepted on the basis of an inference conditionally. In other words to 
be a necessary condition for something to take place is not necessarily 
a guarantee that the other will indeed take place since the two are 
distinct as we have seen. If this is true, it follows that the special 
characteristic of inference is that it is conditional. It would then be 
natural to suppose that the special characteristic of assent is by dis-
tinct cbntrast that it is unconditional. Assent excludes the presence 
of any doubt. A doubt would be a lack of assent, or a suspension of 
assent; it is confined to the rugged region of inferences. 
Now Newman draws a clear distinction between a doubt which is a 
11 Suspension of the mind 11 and a difficulty which does not interfere with 
an assent. Difficulties can be the result of a number of variant in-
ferences, but an assent could perdure in the face of these contrary in-
ferences, and this is another example of the difference between inference 
and assent. Difficulties are related to inference; doubts are related to 
assents. With this in mind it is possible to understand a frequently 
quoted maxim of Newman. 11 Ten thousand objections as little make one 
doubt, as ten thousand ponies make one horse. 11 49 
49Apo., p. 214. 
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In commenting on this maxim Newman says that ambiguity arises 
because of a double meaning of some key words. For instance 11 COnclusion 11 
means both the proposition drawn from two premisses, and the state of 
mind in which I find myself after reviewing the argument. By a state of 
mind Newman is referring to an assent which accepts a proposition un-
conditionally or an assent which rejects a proposition unconditionally. 
Newman claims that if the distinction is not made between the conclusion 
drawn from the premises and the assent, as an unconditional state of 
mind, a person is beginning to travel on the road to skepticism. 
In the summer of 1868 he wrote a letter to Henry Wilberforce in 
which he said: 
A great deol of confusion arises from the double sense of a 
lot of cognate words--e.g. 11 COnclusion 11 means both the proposi-
tion drawn from two premisses~ and the state of mind in which I 
find myself after reviewing the argument, the relation of my 
mind to a thing expressed in a certain proposition; and this 
helps the real intellectual mistake made by sceptical thinkers. 50 
If Locke were correct in saying that there are degrees of assent 
and no distinction between inference and assent, then each new possibly 
contrary inference would produce a new doubt, and rarely if ever could a 
secure assent result since inference would be at odds with inference. 
In only one sense would Newman permit a doubt to be associated with 
an assent, mainly the sense in which a person can be said to assent to 
the fact that he is in a state of doubt. The state of doubt becomes the 
object of the assent which itself remains unconditional. The doubt 
itself, however, is not an assent, but it is simply a suspension of the 
mind. 
50Life, 2:250. 
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H. "Half-assent" 
Finally, as if in anticipation of objections formulated by 
linguistic analysts in defense of Locke, Newman considers such phrases 
as 
11
half-assent.
11 
He says that we speak of half-assents as we also 
speak of half-truths and here the implication is that the expression is 
more of a figure of speech than a description of a reality. According 
to Newman a half-truth is a proposition which in one aspect is a truth, 
and in another is not. Then he adds "to give a half-assent is to feel 
drawn towards assent, or to assent one moment and not the next, or to be 
in the way to assent to it. "51 To speak of half-assent, therefore, 
simply means that the proposition in question deserves a hearing because 
it is probable, or attractive, or that it opens important views or is the 
key to perplexing difficulties. 
Newman does concede that it is possible to speak about one assent 
seeming 
11
keener
11 
than another, but he says that in so doing we are not 
referring to degrees of assent, but we are simply admitting there can be 
a variation of vividness in the apprehensions. For instance notional 
apprehension, which is concerned with ideas, will not be as vivid as a 
real apprehension, which is concerned with things. 
As notions come of abstractions, so images come of experiences; 
the more fully the mind is occupied by an experience, the keener 
will be its assent to it, if it assents, and on the other hand, 
the duller will be its assent and the less operative, the more it is engaged with an abstraction.52 
51GA, pp. 175-176. 
52Ibid., p. 35. 
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I. A. Linguistic Plea for Locke 
The English linguistic philosopher H.H. Price in a book based on 
his Gifford Lectures attempted to take the position of Locke in the 
Newman-Locke dialogue. Price claims that 11 if Newman were right and 
Locke wrong on the main point at issue between them (does assent admit 
of degrees?) our human condition would be at once more miserable and 
, more intellectually disreputable than we commonly suppose. 1153 According 
to Price degrees of assent enable us to make assents which otherwise 
could not be made; they save us from an inert intellectual agnosticism. 
Price would certainly be correct if his argumentation were considered 
only in the Lockean frame of reference, which is limited to formal logic. 
But considering his objection in Newman's frame of reference it can be 
answered with little difficulty. As we shall develop more fully in the 
following chapters, logic for Newman is larger than formal inference. 
It also includes informal and natural inference and these present to the 
human mind a rich banquet for assents. 
While Price agrees with Newman's affirmation that Locke is guilty 
of inconsistencies in demanding a correlation between the value of the 
inference and the assent, and at the same time permitting probabilities 
that border on certainty to be the source of a secure assent, he thinks 
that Newman has misunderstood the use of the word 11 0ught. 11 In Bk IV, Ch. 
19, Sect 1 of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke could be 
understood as saying that men ought not JQ entertain any proposition with 
53H. H. Price, Belief (London: Humanities Press, 1969), p. 155. 
greater assurance than the proofs it is built on will warrant prescinding 
from the fact of whether they do or do not. Price offers a distinction 
which is not directly contained in the passage, but it is a serious 
interpretation that cannot be ignored. He says, "Locke maintains two 
distinct, though connected theses. One is concerned with what assent 
is, the other with what it ought to be." 54 Price says that between the 
two, Newman does not seem clearly to distinguish. Thus Price would take 
Locke as probably agreeing with Newman's distinction between inference 
and assent in men's actual experiences, but would hold that Locke's 
point was that they ought not to be so distinguished by one who thinks 
well on this whole matter. 
I think, however, that Newman does take this "ought" into consider-
ation in the conclusion of his dialogue with Locke, but with a bluntly 
different meaning of "ought" which seems to reject Locke's meaning of 
the word. There Newman states that one ought to act in the manner of a 
man and the philosopher ought to examine how a man acts and obtains 
certitudes in daily life. "We must take the constitution of the human 
mind as we find it, and not as we may judge it ought to be." 55 
J. Man Ought to be What he is 
Newman stresses that the human mind should be accepted as it is, not 
as we think it should be, or as we would like it to be. He claimed that 
Locke had an a priori view of the human mind. He took a view of the mind 
which was theoretical and unrea1. Reasonings and convictions which 
54rbid., p. 135. 55GA, p. 216. 
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according to Newman were natural and legitimate, Locke would,seem to call 
irrational, enthusiastic, perverse and immoral. Newman felt that Locke 
was too idealistic. He ignored the testimony of psychological facts and 
refused to accept the human mind as God made it . 
. . . he would form men as he thinks they ought to be formed 
into something better and higher, and calls them irrational and 
indefensible, if (so to speak) they take to the water, instead of 
remaining under the narrow wings of his own arbitrary theory.56 
Because of his empirical investigations Newman believes that Locke's 
theory of the duty of assenting more or less according to the degrees of 
evidence, ''is invalidated by the testimony of high and low, young and 
old, ancient and modern, as continually given in their ordinary sayings 
and doings."57 In support of such a sweeping statement, Newman offers 
several illustrations. 
It must be remembered that Locke is claiming that an absolute assent 
can be given only to a series of select intuitions and ideal demonstrations. 
The illustrations of Newman show that all men do give unconditional 
assents to propositions which have not grown out of formal demonstrations. 
For instance we all believe without any doubt at all that we exist; 
that we have an individuality and identity all our own. Nor is the assent 
which we give to facts limited to the range of self-consciousness. We 
are sure beyond all hazard of a mistake, that our own self is not the only 
being existing; that there is an external world. We laugh to scorn the 
idea that we had no parents though we have no memory of our birth; that 
we shall never depart this life, though we can have no experience of the 
future. All of these and many other truths have an immediate and an 
56GA, p. 164. 57rbid., p. 176. 
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unhesitating hold on our minds. We do not think ourselves ~uilty of 
not loving truth for turth's sake because we cannot reach them through 
a series of intuitive propositions. Assent on reasonings not demon-
strative is too widely recognized an act to be irrational, unless man's 
nature is irrational. Newman admonishes philosophers like Locke about 
the danger of compounding two things very distinct from one another--a 
mental act or state which is an interior assent, and a scientific rule 
or a set of logical formulas which is in the sphere of formal in-
ference.58 Another way of stating this distinction would be to employ 
the phrases 
11
human logic 11 and 11 paper logic 11 respectively for these two 
things. 
K. Newman's Empiricism 
In the light of the above it may be seen why Newman may be regarded 
as being even more empirical than the empiricist Locke. Newman considered 
the mind of man as it actually functions. He refused to consider man as 
an isolated reasoning mechanism. Newman recognized that man reasons 
abstractly, but he also feels, remembers, imagines, believes and acts. 
This view would seem to be more in accordance with our own experiences of 
what we find in ourselves and what we notice in others. 
At this point it can be seen why Newman claimed that in the fields 
of metaphysics and ethics 11 egotism is true modesty.u59 The maxim is not 
quite so paradoxical if we understand by the word 11 modesty 11 humility or 
honesty, and by 11 egoti sm 11 the complete person ,---complete because it not 
only includes oneself, but also the relationship of the self to others 
and to God. 
ssrbid., pp. 177-79. 59Ibid., p. 384. 
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Newman believed that the first step in his philosoph~ was to 
accept himself as he is. 
My first elementary lesson of duty is that of resignation 
to the laws of my nature, whatever they are; my first dis-
obedience is to be impatient at what I am, and to indulge an 
ambitious aspiration after what I cannot be, to cherish a dis-
trust of my powers, and to desire to change laws which are 
identical with myself.60 
Newman believed that a philosophy should be an experience of our 
lives and affect our lives, and that our lives should be experienced in 
our philosophy. He believed that a philosophy should exist not only as 
a movement or a system, but first and foremost in the individual person, 
not, of course, the individual isolated from society but the individual 
in his existential situation. Newman did not ignore the importance of 
the abstract. the universal, but he realized that great notions such as 
these are to be reached through the individual person 1 s accepting himself 
for what he is and being influenced by a multitude of concrete individual 
objects. 
Newman observed that we are in a world of facts, and these facts we 
must use since there is nothing else for us to use. We do not quarrel 
with them, but we take them as we find them. He considered it to be out 
of place to demand of fine, water, earth and air their credentials for 
. . . t . t 61 act1ng upon us or m1n1s er1ng o us. 
His approach to certitude could be considered as a deepening and 
an extension of traditional empiricism. D. M. MacKinnon in his introduc--
tion to the Oxford University Sermons divides empiricism into two classes. 
60 rbid., p. 347. 61 I b i d . , p • 3 46 . 
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The first is the more technical, vis., what we traditicnally think 
about when we hear the word empiricism. Reason for such an empiricist 
would mean ordered experience, and reasoning would first involve, the 
process of analyzing our complex sensations and all sense data into the 
elementary units of which they were held to be composed and then account-
ing for every idea of the mind in terms of sensations and sense data 
analyzed into their primitive elements. This would be a brief character-
ization of the empiricism of Locke. 
But MacKinnon also speaks about another type of empiricism. He 
describes it as ''a temper of mind that acknowledges the authority of a 
vast number of very different sorts of intellectual procedures." 62 This 
seems to come nearer to a description of Newman's type of empiricism, 
that clearly goes beyond the empiricism of Locke. 
How the mind can go beyond the empiricism of Locke; how there can 
be a larger logic than formal logic; how the mind passes from the 
condi tiona 1 ity of inference to the uncondi tiona l·ity of assent; how there 
can be a basis for the notional assent of certitude which is not in the 
field of formal logic will be questions for subsequent chapters. 
62o. M. MacKinnon and J. D. Holmes, Introduction to Oxford 
University Sermons, by J. H. Newman, ed.: D.M. 
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L. Philosophical Summation 
As the spokesman for the Liberal school of philosophy which taught 
that tn the field of religion there is no certitude, and that the only 
basis for certitude is formal logic, Newman chose John Locke. Although 
Newman admired Locke in many ways, and could agree with him on many 
philosophical matters, he strongly opposed Locke•s statement that there 
are degrees of assent, and that the degree of assent given to a proposi-
tion should be in proportion to the value of the inference. 
Newman shows that Locke himself does not consistently accept this 
principle throughout his writings, for Locke maintains that there are 
propositions that border so close to certainty that we can accept them 
as certain. Also he says that there are probabilities accepted by our-
selves and by others as if they are certain. In such instances Newman 
charged Locke with inconsistency. 
Newman next claims that if Locke is correct there would be no need 
to speak about an assent. Assents would have to correspond to the in-
ference and thus become absorbed by the inference itself. Numerous 
examples from daily experience are given to prove the distinctions of 
inference and assent. For instance, we can have assents after we have 
forgotten our inference; we can have a strong inference which will never 
induce an assent. 
While Newman has established a difference between inference and 
assent he thinks that in so doing he has called our attention to a basic 
quality of each. Inference is always conditional while assent is always 
unconditional. Inference in involved with doubt in the sense that a doubt 
can be the result of conflicts of inferences. Assent excludes all doubt, 
although it does not exclude all difficulties. A doubt is a suspension 
42 
of the mind while an assent is the unconditional acceptanc~ of a propo-
sition. 
The distinction between inference and assent should not be stressed 
to the extent that it may seem there is no relationship between them. 
At some time or another every assent is based upon some inference of a 
group of inferences. However, Newman disagrees with Locke as to what the 
basis must be. Locke claims that an absolute assent demands absolute 
evidence. Newman endeavors to prove that the ordinary person and the 
professional philosopher have a larger source for inferences than that 
of strict formal logic. It can be seen that if there were no distinc-
tion between inference and assent Locke would be correct in stating 
that there are degrees of assent, and Newman would be compelled to be 
restricted to formal logic. But, claims Newman, the reality is other-
wise. 
In developing his treatment of a larger logic Newman stresses the 
importance of accepting ourselves as we are, as we have been made, and 
as we actually think and act in a world of individual concrete objects. 
This larger logic will have its own structure and laws, which are quite 
distinct from those that obtain in formal logic. What informal and 
natural logic are and how they can become a basis for certitude are 
questions for consideration in subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER III 
CRITIQUE OF BUTLER ON CERTITUDE 
Newman set out to make a completely new start in philosophy by 
laying different foundations on which to build a philosophy of certi-
tude. These foundations would obviate the errors in method which had 
entrapped Locke. The English empiricist, Newman was convinced, had 
created an artificial need for proving by strict demonstration every 
natural certitude. 
In Chapter II we saw how Newman reasoned that there can be no 
degrees of assent and that inference and assent are mutually distinct. 
He thus opened a door to certitude which does not always require formal 
inference as its basis. Now the assent of certitude can throw light on 
other types of inferences. The nature, function and scope of these other 
types of inferences will now be explained as we enter into Newman 1 s 
dialogue with the Anglican theologian and bishop of Durham, Joseph 
Butler. 
A. Newman 1 s Admiration for Butler 
In his Apologia Newman wrote that in 1823, when he was about 
twenty-two, he read Bishop Butler 1 s Analogy of Religion for the first 
time, 11 the study of which has been to so many, as it was to me, an era 
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;n ti1eir religious opinion." 63 
The works of Butler were treasured by most scholars in England in 
the nineteenth century. Newman remarked that at the time of the death 
of his close friend, Hurrell Froude, he was asked to select one of his 
books as a keepsake. The first book that he selected was Butler's 
Analogy, but unfortunately someone else had already chosen it. At the 
suggestion of another friend, Newman picked Hurrell's Breviary. 64 
Newman had a deep respect for the creativity and the profoundity 
of Butler's mind. He mentions him in the same vein as Newton, 
Athanasius, Augustine and Aquinas, and speaks of Butler as a remarkable 
achievement within the Church. "What a note of the Church is the mere 
production of a man like Butler, a pregnant fact which must be meditated 
on!"65 Not only did Newman reverence the mind of Butler, but he read 
him with enjoyment. 66 
Frequently Newman quotes Butler as an authority on solutions to 
difficult problems, and in corresponding with a perplexed person, he 
often suggests that the person resolve the confusion through the reading 
of Bishop Butler's Analogy or his sermons. For instance in trying to 
resolve the problem of whether doctrine comes before practice, or vice 
versa, he accepts the former, and simply states, "Bishop Butler implies 
63Apo., p. 22. Newman's copy of Butler's Analogy, with his initials 
printed Tri'Side, is now in the main library at the Birmingham Oratory. It 
is the first volume of his set of The Works of Joseph Butler, ed. Samuel 
Halifax, Bishop of Gloucester (London: Longman, Hurst, Orme, and Brown, 
2 vols. 1813). Cf. PN, 1:170. 
64Apo., p. 76. 65Ess., 2:56-57. 
66Letters and Diaries, 21:68. 
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In a letter which develops the relationship between Revelation 
and nature, Newman concludes that the reader will find a more complete 
treatment in the works of Butler. 68 
B. Insights from Butler 
In a general way Butler helped Newman build his doctrinal views on 
a broad philosophical basis. He helped Newman avoid an excessively 
emotional religion that was cut off from any type of rational basis. In 
his Apologia Newman cites several specific insights that he acquired 
through his reading of the Analogy. 
him. 
Its inculcation of a visible Church, the oracle of truth, 
and a pattern of sanctity, of the duties of external religion, 
and of the historical character of Revelation, are character-
istics of this great work which strike the reader at once. 
Newman then cites two specific points which especially influenced 
For myself, if I may attempt to determine what I most gained from 
it, it lay in two points, which I shall have an opportunity of 
dwelling on in the sequel; they are the underlying principles of 
a great portion of my teaching. 
First, the very idea of an analogy between the separate works 
of God leads to the conclusion that the system which is of less 
importance is economically or sacramentally connected with the more 
momentous system, and of this conclusion the theory, to which I was 
inclined as a boy, vis. the unreality of material phenomena, is an 
ultimate resolution. At this time I did not make the distinction 
bet1veen matter itself and its phenomena, which is so necessary and 
so obvious in discussing the subject. 
Secondly, Butler 1 s doctrine that probability is the guide of 
lif~, led me, at least under the teaching to which a few years 
later I was introduced, to the question of the logical cogency of 
Faith, on which I have written so much. Thus to Butler I trace 
those two principles of my teaching, which have led to a charge 
against me both of fancifulness and of scepticism.69 
68 Ibid., 14:327. 
696QQ., pp. 22-3. 
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The impression these two points made on Newman become more under-
standable if we bring out their relationship. To Butler probability 
was an all pervading idea, and the analogies he discovered between 
nature and religion seemed to him to be examples of probabilities. We 
shall now consider how Newman understood these ti'JO points. 
C. Nature as a Veil 
To understand the procedure of Butler in the Analogy let us 
consider one of his examples. In speaking about the future life, Butler 
draws an analogy from a child who becomes a grown man. He remarks that 
all of our life on earth is comparable to that of a child, and our life 
with God in heaven is comparable to the life of a grown man.7° 
In giving his opinion of this facet of the Analogy Newman claims 
that the analogy between nature and faith is beneficial in answering 
objections to the faith, but he recognizes the limitations of this 
methodology. It is like a presumption used negatively, that is, once an 
objection is correctly answered a presumption arises in favor of the 
proposition under consideration. For instance, there are objections 
brought against certain characteristics of Christianity, and Butler meets 
them by showing that the Christian doctrines have parallels which are 
discoverable in the order of nature. Butler argues that the objections 
do not tell against the divine origin of Christianity, unless they tell 
against the divine origin of the natural system also, which obviously 
they do not. Newman then adds, "But he could not adduce it as a positive 
70Joseph Butler, The VJorks of Joseph Butler, 2 vols. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1897), 1:89. 
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and direct proof of the Divine origin of the Christian doct0nes that 
theY had their parallels in nature, or at the most as more than a 
recommendation of them to the religious inquirer."7l In other words, 
the argument concludes to no more than a probability. It is merely per-
suasive. 
Newman himself realized that he was charged with being "fanciful'' 
for adopting this method from the Analogy, but he did not think it a 
serious charge since he saw that Butler was in fact following a Platonic 
view of the world. Newman describes this view in his essay, "~1ilman's 
View of Christianity." 
All that is seen,--the world, the Gible, the Church, the 
civil polity, and man himself,--are types, and, in their degree 
and place, representatives and organs of an unseen world, truer 
and higher than themselves.72 
A similar view of the world is expressed in one of Newman's 
Parochial and Plain Sermons. 
We know that to remove the world which is seen, will be the 
manifestation of the world which is not seen. We know that what 
we see as a screen hiding from us God and Christ, and His Saints 
and Angles. And we earnestly desire and pray for the dissolution 
of all that we see, from our longing after that which we do not 
see.73 
It was this type of Platonism in Butler which prepared NevJman for 
the Platonism of the Fathers. 
So much for the first important point in the Analogy, the relation 
of nature with religion which Newman accepted. The other point, namely, 
probability as the very guide of life, he accepted with a number of 
qualifications which led eventually to a sharp break between the two 
71 GA. , p. 382. 
73~, 4:211. 
72Ess., 2:193. 
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philosophers of religion. 
D. Probabi 1 i ty and Doubt 
In writing about probability in the opening pages of the Analogy 
Butler says that probable evidence is essentially distinguished from 
demonstration, s i nee probability admits of degrees away from the highest 
moral certainty down to the very lowest presumption. Probability is 
chiefly constituted by the word 11 likely", i.e. 11 like some truth or true 
event; like it, in itself, in its evidence, in some more or fewer of its 
circumstances. 11 74 
Butler seemed to recognize both the limitations and the necessity 
for probability. He wrote: 
Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an 
imperfect kind of information; and is to be considered as relative 
only to beings of limited capacities. For nothing which is the 
possible object of knowledge, whether past, present, or future, 
can be probable to an infinite intelligence; since it cannot be 
discerned absolutely as it is in itself, certainly true, or 
certainly false, But to us, probability is the very guide of 
life.75 
In effect Bishop Butler is saying that there is evidence in favor 
of faith, but one should not expect the exclusion of all doubt. 
Probability should suffice. Newman had his own theory as to why Butler 
developed this probable approach to certitude. 
He wrote: 
I have sometimes thought that Hume 1 S question at the end 
(I think) of his 11 Essay on MiracleS, 11 1 I would have a man put his 
hand upon his heart and say whether a speaking serpent and Adam 
74Butler, Anaiogy of Religion, 1:5. 
75Ibid., p. 5. 
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and Eve, an apple, is not so unlike the existing ordeR of things 
as to make belief impossible except to Christian faith on which 
our Holy Religion re7~; ' was the stimulus which led to Butler's 
writing the Analogy. 
Newman appreciated greatly Bishop Butler's attempt to produce a 
rational basis for certitude in the field of faith and in other signifi-
cant fields, and he makes every effort to find points of agreement 
between himself and the author of the Analogy. 
For instance, Newman penetrates a historical problem with the aid 
of an example found in one of Butler's sermons. Butler wrote, 
"Supposing that, upon a very slight and partial view which (a spectator) 
had of(a great) work, several things appeared to his eye as dis-
proportionate and wrong, others just and beautiful ... there is a proba-
bility that the wrong appearances were. 11 This example Newman transfers 
to historical facts. He says that 11 if out of a vast number of historical 
facts, 9/lOths go to one conclusion, and the remaining l/lOth neither to 
that one conclusion, nor to any other, the unaccounted and inexplicable 
1/lOth does not destroy the proof from the 9/lOths?? Admittedly the 
residual l/10 makes it only probable. 
76pN, 2:107-8. 
Although this is not a verbatim quotation from Hume, Newman's 
paraphrase accurately presents what Hume wished to express. Hume in 
effect is stating that there is no common ground whatsoever between 
nature and the objects of belief, and that the greatest of all miracles, 
is not the miracle in itself but the very act of believing in what is 
impossible to believe. Newman claims that Hume's statement prompted 
Butler to write the Analogy and to prove that there is not such a vast 
gulf between our knowledge of nature and our objects of faith. The 
complete statement as expressed by Hume may be found in David Hume, 
An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Charles W. Hendel 
Tfndianapolis New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1955), p. 140. 
??Letters and Diaries, 14:349. 
In giving the example about the spectator, Newman is quoting 
Butler's sermon 11 0n the Ignorance of Man, 11 Works of Butler. 2:227. 
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In the Grammar of Assent there is an acceptance of·Bukler 1 S method 
on probabilities which at first may seem somewhat astonishing. On the 
certain and the probable, Newman vJrote: 
As regards the world invisible and future, we have a 
direct and conscious knowledge of our Maker, His attributes, 
His providence, acts, works, and will from nature, and 
revelation; and, beyond this knowledge lies the large domain of 
theology, metaphysics and ethics, on which it is not allowed 
to us to advance beyond probabilities, or to attain to more than 
an opinion.78 
From the context of this passage it is quite evident that Newman 
is employing the ~tJOrd 11 probability 11 in the Butler sense, that is, there 
is almost the possession of certainty but there remain shadows of doubt. 
It is not that Newman means that theology, metaphysics and ethics 
contain only probabilities. He is merely stating that in these subjects 
there are vast or wide areas for probability. 
Just a few pages before Ne~vman made the above remark, he stated 
that with regard to the maxim 11 probability is the very guide of life 11 , he 
could go along some distance with Butler, but not the full distance. 
Properly explained, this saying is true. But one must not carry a true 
maxim to an extreme. It is far from true, if we so hold it as to forget 
that without first principles, there can be no conclusions at all, and 
that thus probability does in a real sense presuppose and require the 
existence of truths which are certain. The maxim is especially untrue 
with respect to the other great department of knowledge, the spiritual, 
78GA, pp. 239-240. By the expression 11 from nature 11 Newman means 
that through the medium of conscience God 1 S existence and some of his 
attributes are known without enduring the labors of formal logic. 
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if taken to support the doctrine that the first principles and elements 
of religion, such as God's existence and man's need of God's friendship, 
which should be universally received are mere matters of opinion or 
probability. Newman then concedes that in this day religion is con-
sidered to be one of those subjects on which truth cannot be discovered, 
and on which one conclusion is pretty much on a level with another. But 
for him the initial truths of divine knowledge ought to be viewed as 
parallel to the initial truths of secular knowledge; as the latter are 
certain, so too are tfle former J 9 
While Newman was deeply sympathetic in regard to the intentions of 
Bishop Butler, he wondered if Butler, had placed too great a priority 
on probabilities. He realized that Butler wished to halt the evil of 
skepticism, but is this to be done by lowering the pegs of certitude, 
and accepting doubt and probability all the way to first principles? 
What especially disturbed Newman about Butler's position on 
certitude was that it made certainty about historical facts or even about 
the basis truths of life unattainable and impossible. Newman becomes 
perplexed when he attempts to apply Butler's theory to the existence of 
God which should be a basic truth for all men. ~Jhile attempting to be as 
tolerant as possible of Butler's views, Newman claims that the author 
of the Analogy should have recognized the absurdity of saying that his 
inward apprehension of the being of a God was only a feeling of the 
greater probability. 
79 Ibid., p. 237. 
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I am sure I never have meant at any time n~self to say I 
was only probably convinced or had an opinion there was a God--
the idea is shocking--What! the object of worship, faith, and 
obedience all one's life long, for which one acted (with what-
ever imperfection) day by day and through sorrow and joy, what 
mind, if ever so little religious would say he only opined 
Its existence?80 
Newman categorically states that there can be no true faith based 
on probabilities, as Butler was understood to teach. But out of a 
profound respect for the Bishop, he added the words, "or misunderstood 
to teach.'' 81 
In the Idea of a University Newman claimed that Butler's 
philosophy of probability which had done so much to bring members of the 
University of Oxford to religious convictions, "appeared to Pitt and 
others who had received a different training, to operate only in the 
direction of infidelity."82 It was seen, by Newman, then that the 
Analogy for some could become a subtle danger to the very faith it 
tried to defend. Although it attempted to eradicate rationalism and 
potential skepticism, it could also engender such movements. While 
Butler tried to stress the importance of a high degree of probability, 
it was difficult for Newman to accept his rendezvous with doubt. For 
clearly, what was probably true, could also be possibly false. 
Butler himself seemed to sense that there were problems with his 
theory, but he said that it was not his design to inquire further into 
80Letters and Diaries, 15:456. 
81 GA, pp. 59-60. 
82 Idea, p. 100. 
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the nature, the foundation, and measure of probability. He.thought 
that to determine when probability could lead to a full conviction, or 
to guard against its errors, belonged to the subject of logic. Then he 
added that probability has not been thoroughly considered in the field 
of logic. 83 
F. Probabi 1 i ty and Certitude 
Newman takes upon himself the task of probing probabilities, and 
surveying ways to find the haven of certitude. As he begins his search 
he makes an important distinction. How it comes about that we can be 
certain is not his business to determine. For him it is sufficient that 
certitude is felt. He hopes that like Butler he will be practical and 
not fall into the field of impersonal metaphysics. The subject of 
certitude will be treated, in the language of the schoolmen, "in facto 
esse,'' in contrast with ''in fieri.'' 
But his approach will also be unlike Butler's. Butler treated of 
probability, doubt, expedience, and duty, while he 1vill confine himself 
to the truth of things, and to the mind's certitude of that truth. 84 
Newman in this passage should not be understood as claiming that duty was 
unimportant. A little later in the Grammar of Assent he lauds Butler who 
had connected together the moral system with the religious. 85 But Newman 
did believe that the basis of duty and of any moral system would be found 
in the truth of things, and in the mind's certitude of that truth. 
Therefore, he set out to probe this prior basis. 
83sutler, Analogy of Religion, 1:7. 
84GA, p. 344. 85Ibid., p. 361. 
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In his efforts to develop a philosophy of certitude, ~ewman con-
siders the solution given by John Keble in his book The Christian Year. 
Before giving Keble's solution he presents once again Butler's teaching, 
that probability is the very guide of life. He then adds that the 
danger of this doctrine, in the case of many minds, is, its tendency to 
destroy in them absolute certainty, leading them to consider every 
conclusion as doubtful, and, resolving truth into an opinion, which it 
is safe indeed to obey or to profess, but not possible to embrace with 
full internal assent. If this were to be allowed, then the celebrated 
saying, 11 0 God, if there be a God, save my soul, if I have a soul! 11 
would be the highest measure of devotion--but who can really pray to a 
Being, about whose existence he is seriously in doubt? 
Newman relates that Keble met this problem by ascribing the 
firmness of assent not to the probabilities which introduced it, but to 
the living power of faith and love which accepted it. It is faith and 
love which give to probability a force which it has not in itself. Faith 
and love are directed toward an Object and it is that Object, received in 
faith and love, which renders it reasonable to take probability as 
sufficient for internal conviction. Thus the argument from probability 
became an argument from personality, which in fact is one form of the 
argument from authority. 86 In other words NeWillan is stating that a 
proposition that is probable is transformed into a certitude not because 
of a motivating force within the probability, but because a person firmly 
believes that God who is good wishes him to accept the probability as a 
certitude. 
Although Newman did not care to dispute this approach to certitude, 
86Apo, pp. 29-30. 
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he was dissatisfied because it did not go to the root of Bu~ler 1 s 
problem. Although it was beautiful and religious, it did not even 
profess to be logical. And so Newman presents his own solution for the 
attainment of certitude. 
My argument is in outline as follows: that the absolute 
certitude which we were able to possess, whether as to the truths 
of natural theology, or as to the fact of a revelation, was the 
result of an assemblage of concurring and converging probabili-
ties, and that, both according to the constitution of the human 
mind and the will of its Maker; that certitude was a habit of 
mind, that certainty was a quality of propositions; that 
probabilities which did not reach to logical certainty, might 
suffice for a mental certitude; that the certitude thus brought 
about might equal in measure and strength the certitude which was 
created by the strictest scientific demonstration; and that to 
possess such certitude might in given cases and to given 
individuals be a plain duty, though not to others in other 
circumstances.87 
In the above passage it can be noted that although Newman continues 
to use the same word used by Butler, 11 probability 11 , the meaning is not the 
same. A convergence or assemblage of probabilities means an ordered 
collection of concrete instances with the special quality of strengthening 
one another. 
Why Newman used the word 11 probabi l itir when he did not intend its 
general connotation, is difficult to analyze. Perhaps it was because he 
had a respect for the attempt that Butler made to defeat skepticism 
through probability. He may have wished to retain a continuity in this 
project. However, it also should be remembered that in Newmanrs day 
11 probabiliti1 had a wider connotation than it now has. 
In a letter to his friend J.D. Dalgairns Newman expressed concern 
about this confusion, which would identify his doctrine on certitude with 
87Ibid., p. 31. 
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Butler's probability. 
Since I wrote, I find the Essay is accused of denying 
moral certainty and holding with Hermes we cannot get beyond 
probability in religious questions. This is far from my meaning. 
I use "probable" in opposition to "demonstrative" and moral 
certainty is a state of mind.88 
This is a crucial dis tinction. The word "probable" as Nev1man uses 
it does not imply any deficiency in the proof. For Butler it does mean 
somewhat less than certain. For Newman probable only indicates the 
particular nature of the proof, as distinguished from another species of 
evidence. It is opposed not to what is certain, but to what admits of 
being demonstrated after the manner of mathematics. 
G. Certitude and Certainty 
The significant distinction implied in this letter is the distinc-
tion between certitude and certainty. In the next to the final chapter 
of the Grammar of Assent, Newman explains this distinction in greater 
deta i1. 
Certitude is a mental state; certainty is a quality of 
propositions. Those propositions I call certain, which are such 
that I am certain of them. Certitude is not a passive impression 
made upon the mind from without, by argumentative compulsion, but 
in all concrete questions (nay, even in abstract, for though the 
reasoning is abstract, the mind which judges of it is concrete) 
it is an active recognition of propositions as true, such as it is 
the duty of each individual himself to exercise at the bidding of 
reason, and when reason forbids, to withhold.89 
It is well to dwell upon this vital distinction. Certainty is a 
quality of propositions and when such certainty is received by the mind 
88Letter of December 8, 1846, cited in Ward, Life of Newman, 1:168. 
Cf. ibid., 2:587-92, and Apo, p. 31. 
89GA, p. 344. 
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it is received passively. On the other hand, certitude is ~state of the 
mind and demands the active participation of the mind. While it is true 
that certitude is dependent upon external influences these influences 
must be actively received by the mind so they become probabilities which 
can eventually become a basis for certitude. 
It is possible to arrive at the certainty of an abstract external 
proposition through formal logic. But it is through informal logic that 
we arrive at the certitude of what is concrete. Informal logic consists 
in the cumulation of probabilities, independent of each other, arising out 
of the nature and circumstances of the particular case which is under 
review. These probabilities taken separately would be of no use, and 
they are too subtle, too circuitous, too numerous and various to be con-
verted into syllogisms. To illustrate the difference between informal 
and formal logic, Newman selects the example of a man 1 s portrait as 
compared to a sketch of him. The portrait with all of its details filled 
in, and with its shades and colors is comparable to informal logic. The 
sketch, having merely a basic outline, is comparable to syllogistic 
treatment or formal logic. 
Informal inference is the real method of reasoning in concrete 
matters. It is not intended to supersede the logical form of inference. 
It differs from formal logic in that it is not an abstraction. Through 
the momentum of the mass of probabilities, which are ordered concrete 
reasonings, it drives home to the individual case. Informal logic is 
semi-conscious and semi-verbal. If the reasoning process is unconscious 
and non-verbal, it is what Newman terms natural inference. Natural 
logic will be treated at greater length in the next chapter. 
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Illustration of the 
Three Logics 
Informal 
Probabilities 
Proposition and their 
Convergence 
Conscious Semi-conscious 
Communication Verbal Semi-verbal 
Result Certainty Certitude 
Analogies Sketch of a Portrait of a 
man man 
Iron bar Cable 
Natural 
Probabilities 
Unconscious 
Non-verbal 
Certitude 
Portrait of a man 
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Informal logic is implicit because it does not have th..e direct and 
full advertence of the mind in exercising it. Once again Newman reminds 
us that although he is contrasting informal inference with formal in-
ference, the inference that he is emphasizing retains its conditioned 
characteristic. It is still dependent on premisses. In informal 
inference the premisses are the probabilities. 90 
In attempting to defend his view of informal reasoning without 
elaborating each probability into a detailed syllogism, Newman turns to 
the celebrated lemma with which Newton opens his "Principia." He v1rote: 
We know that a regular polygon, inscribed in a circle, its 
sides being continually diminished, tends to become that circle, 
as its limit; but it vanishes before it has coincided with the 
circle, so that its tendency to be the circle, though ever nearer 
fulfilment, never in fact gets beyond a tendency. In like manner, 
the conclusion in a real or concrete question is foreseen and 
predicted rather than actually attained; foreseen in the number 
and direction of accumulated premisses, which all converge to it, 
and as the result of their combination, approach it more nearly 
than any assignable difference, yet do not touch it logically 
(though only not touching it,) on account of the nature of its 
subject-matter, and the delicate and implicit charQcter of at 
least part of the reasonings on which it depends.91 
To support the logic of this illustration Newman quotes Butler, who 
said, if the antecedents "could not in reason be supposed to have happened 
unless it were true," an event is proved. 92 
Another example that Newman gives to illustrate that out of a 
convergence of probabilities certitude can be attained is that of the 
cable. He thought that it was important to respond to certain scholastic 
critics in regard to his phrase "probable evidence'' as the basis for 
90GA, pp. 288-293. 
92Ibid., pp. 321-323. 
91Ibid., pp. 320-321. 
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certitude. He was also challenged on this point by a numbeK of scien-
tific friends who be 1 i eved that he was employing the word 11 probab 1 e '' 
in Butler's sense. On July 6, 1864 Newman wrote the following thoroughly 
popular explanation to his friend Canon Walker: 
The best illustration of what I hold is that of a cable, 
which is made up of a number of separate threads, each feeble, 
yet together as sufficient as an iron rod. 
An iron rod represents mathematical or strict demonstration; 
a cable represents moral demonstration, which is an assemblage of 
probabilities, separately insufficient for certainty, but, when 
put together, irrefragable. A man who said 'I cannot trust a 
cable, I must have an iron bar,' would in certain given cases, be 
irrational and unreasonable;--so too is a man who says 'I must 
have a rigid demonstration. ,93 
Newman claims that the convergence of probabilities is the source 
of most of our most obstinate and reasonable certitudes. He mentions 
various examples: England being an island; I was born; I will die. 
These are accepted on the basis of informal inference, since a formal 
demonstration of these truths is impossible.94 
Taking an example from astronomy Newman shows how informal in-
ference can be a means of acquiring certitude even in the sciences. He 
notes that S. Vince, the eighteenth century mathematician and astronomar, 
in his treatise on astronomy after speaking of the proofs of the earth's 
rotatory motion remarks, 11 When these reasons, all upon different prin-
ciples, are considered, they amount to a proof of the earth's rotation 
about its axis, which is as satisfactory to the mind as the most direct 
demonstration could be.'' The astronomer is speaking about independent 
probabilities in cumulation, that is, informal inference. By the phrase 
11
amount to a proof,'' Newman understood that Vince meant that the mind 
9 3 Life, 2: 43 . 94GA, pp. 294-301. 
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feels as if the matter was strictly proved, that is, there is the 
equivalent of proof. 
Immediately Newman compares this passage with a passage from 
Butler. Butler wrote: 
Probable proofs by being added, not only increase the 
evidence, but multiply it. The truth of our religion, like the 
truth of common matters, is to be judged by the v1hole evidence 
taken together ... in like manner as, if in any common case 
numerous events acknowledged were to be alleged in proof of any 
other event disputed, the truth of the disputed event would be 
proved, not only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of it-
self clearly imply it, but though no one of them singly did so, 
if the whole of the acknowledged events taken together could not 
in reason be supposed to have happened, unless the disputed one 
were true.95 
Although Newman gives no commentary on this quotation from Butler, 
from the context it is evident that he felt that it gave a vague support 
to his own approach to the convergence of probabilities. It is interest-
ing to note that Butler mentioned that probable proofs not only 11 increase" 
the evi de nee but "multi ply 11 it. Note a 1 so how the texts from Vi nee, 
Butler and Newman himself are loaded with quantitative, numerical terms 
like 11numerous 11 etc. The key term seems to be 11 Whole 11 --at once quanti-
tative and with Newman clearly qualitative. For the nub of the problem 
is how the transformation is made from quantity and accumulation to a 
higher state (not just to a higher grade of mind). 
So, it seems that between Butler and Newman there is still a vast 
difference. Butler is still maintaining that a number of probabilities 
is merely a likeness of the truth; mingled with them is still the element 
of doubt. The enhancement of evidence merely increases the degree of 
95Ibid., p. 319. Nevvman is quoting from Butler's \~orks, 1:287-88. 
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probability. 
According to Newman with the increase of the number of probabili-
ties there is more than an increase in the degree of probability; there 
is not just a quantitative change but a qualitative change. There is 
not only a difference in degree, but a difference in kind, and this 
occurs each time a convergence of probabilities is perceived by a person 
as a certitude. In such a case the various 11 parts•• converge tm<Jards a 
qualitatively different whole--something for which there seems to be no 
completely satisfactory analogy in the realm of non-mental realities. In 
non-mental beings 11 more of the same 11 results in exactly that 11 more of the 
same. 11 How then does it happen that in mental reality 11 more of the same 11 , 
namely probabilities, end up in a different reality, namely, certitude? 
Just what is this 11 informal inference 11 that enables the mind to move on 
and transform the parts into a higher whole? 
As Newman speaks about informal inference, two characteristics come 
into view again and again. First, that informal inferences are composed 
of concrete components. Second, that there is not merely one concrete 
instance, but a multitude of them. 
H. The Concrete 
Newman approached certitude through the person apprehending what is 
individual. Butler•s approach to a high degree of probability was on a 
lofty intellectual basis. It involved the weighing of probabilities; it 
involved the consideration of doubt. Ne~nan was convinced that truth is 
reached by a person living in an existential situation. 
He claimed that the heart is commonly reached, not through the 
reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct impressions. By 
direct impressions Newman means real apprehensions, i.e. an experience 
111'1 
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or an information about the concrete. These impressions ar~ presented 
to us by our bodily senses. Direct impressions are the testimony of 
facts and events. 
Newman felt that no one would die for his own calculations, but he 
would die for realities. A life which is completely devoted to the 
pursuit of formal inferences and conclusions, would become a life of 
inaction. Life is for action. If we insist on formal proofs for every-
thing, we shall never come to action. It is necessary to assume and to 
accept the insights of informal inferences which lead to action. And man 
does act since he "is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal. 
He is influenced by what is direct and precise."96 
It is this character of man as a contemplating animal who surges 
forward to action that provides the key to understanding vJhy he moves 
from "probabilities" to certitude. Here we should recall that in Newman 
the discussion is about certitude as facto esse,not its fieri. 
L _A Multiplicity of Instances 
The second point to be considered about informal inference is that 
it consists in not just one instance but in a number of instances and 
circumstances of probabilities converging to engender certitude. It is 
true that Butler mentions a number of examples which are bound together to 
constitute a strong probability. But in Butler these examples are 
external, they are on paper, they are outside the person. For instance 
Butler writes in this manner about evidence. 
96GA, p. 94. 
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Now in the evidence of Christianity there seems to be 
several things of great weight, not reducible to the ~ead, either 
of miracles or of the completion of prophecy in the common accep-
tance of the words. But these two are its direct and fundamental 
proofs; and those other things, however considerable they are, 
yet ought never to be urged apart from its direct proofs, but 
always be joined to them.97 
In Newman the concrete instances are personal, minute and numerous. 
He wrote, 11 Conviction for the most part follows not upon any one great 
and decisive proof or token of the point in debate, but upon a number of 
very minute circumstances together, which the mind is quite unable to 
count up and methodize in an argumentative form. 11 98 
A significant distinction is made by Newman between the original 
process of reasoning and a subsequent process of investigating those 
original processes of reasonings themselves. All men reason. For to reason 
is nothing more than to gain truth from former truth. However, all men do 
not necessarily always reflect upon their own reasonings, so as to do 
justice to their own meaning. In other words, all men have a reason, but 
not all men factually speaking, can give a reason.99 Why? Because in-
formal reasoning or inference is implicit, and since we are only partially 
conscious of its numerous labyrinths, we can express this type of in-
ference with words only with great difficulty, or not at all. This shows, 
as Newman wrote, that 11 The human mind in its present state is unequal to 
its own powers of apprehension. It embraces more than it can master. 11 100 
9 7 B u t 1 e r , An a 1 o gy of R e 1 i g i o n , ; 11 2 4 7-8 . 
98~, p. 274. 
1 00r·1ox, 2:311. 
99Ibid., pp. 258-259. 
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NevJman thought it unwise to attempt to measure though.t with 
language alone. Language is a sort of analysis of thought. Ideas are 
infinite, and infinitely combined, and infinitely modified, while 
language is a method which is definite and limited, and confined to an 
arbitrary selection of a certain number of materials. Newman claimed 
that, 11 mul ti tudes of ideas expressed in one 1 anguage do not even enter 
into the other languages, and can only be conveyed by some economy, or 
accommodation, by circumlocutions, phrases, limiting words, figures, or 
some bold expedient. 11101 
On the level of informal inferences people could be in agreement. 
But we see every day how when they attempt to express in words what is 
in their hearts, disagreements often arise. The trouble is clearly 
language. 
Half the controversies in the world are verbal ones; and could 
they be brought to plain issue, they would be brought to a 
prompt termi nation. Parties engaged ·in them would then perceive, 
either that in substance they agreed together, or that their 
difference was one of first principles.l02 
In the light of all this, we begin to see why Ne~vman chose as the 
motto for his coat of arms, Cor i1 cor loquitur. 
Newman then has gone beyond Butler. Butler made many efforts to 
explain the attainment of certitude, but at best he reached a high degree 
of probability, and his methods for the most part were limited to the 
erudite and trained minds. Newman, on the other hand, through informal 
inference and a convergence of probabilities, not only presented a means 
for reaching certitude; but made that means accessible to both the 
1 0 1 ~. p. 341- 2 . l02Ibid., p. 200. 
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educated and to the uneducated, to the professional philosopher and to 
the ordinary person. 
Newman has thus made progress in solving the question of how a 
person acquires certitude. He must, however, still explain how a con-
vergence of probabilities can be changed from a degree of high probabi-
lity to a certitude. What is it in man that enables him to do this? 
Also if a man is guided by these probabilities, does this mean that he is 
abandoning the superiority of his intellect? In the terminology of 
Newman,do real apprehensions of concrete things leading to real assents 
entail a detour of i nte ll ectua l activity? The answers to these problems 
will be sought in Newman 1 S dialogue with Aristotle in the following 
chapter. 
K. Philosophical Summation 
The writings of Bishop Butler had a profound influence on the think-
ing of Cardinal Newman. The crux of Butler 1 s philosophy is found in the 
maxim, probability is our very guide of life. By probability Butler 
meant that which is like some truth; or that for which we almost have 
complete evidence. Probability always included doubt, but Butler attempted 
to prove that every doubt included some evidence to assent. 
Newman was convinced that the great issues in our life should not 
be founded on probability. Butler may speak of a high degree of probabil-
ity, but Newman still believed that man 1 s life should be founded on 
certitudes. 
According to Newman man did have certitude about such basic truths 
as England is an island, I was born, I shall die. These certitudes were 
not the result of a process of formal demonstration. They were the re-
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sult of informal demonstration; that is a number of probabil,ities con-
verging as a proof. 
While Newman uses the same word as Butler, 11 probability, 11 he does 
not use it in the same sense. Newman does not use probabi 1 i ty as opposed 
to what is certain, but as opposed to formal demonstration. 
Probabilities are based on concrete facts. Because they are 
personal and therefore real, they are impressions which lead to action. 
Formal inferences on the other hand being impersonal and notional, 
usually do not lead to action; they lead to more formal inferences. 
Because these probabilities are so numerous, so involved, and so 
minute it is difficult to express them with words. Yet they remain a 
valid, rational methodology, which is accessible to both the educated and 
the uneducated. 
The probabilities of Butler do not lead to certitude, nor would 
they lead to action, nor are they accessible to the average person. 
Among the questions which still remain are how does man find 
certitude in these assemblies of probabilities? Is there any intellectual 
action involved? These problems will be considered in Newman 1 s dialogue 
with Aristotle. 
II 
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CHAPTER IV 
CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE ON CERTITUDE 
In the previous chapter Newman claimed that through an ordered con-
vergence of probabilities certitude can be attained. That theory 
produced two problems. 1. Does such a reliance on probabilities result 
in an anti-intellectual approach to certitude? 2. How does the accumula-
tion of probabilities produce certitude? Through Newman 1 s dialogue with 
Aristotle we shall face up to these problems. 
A. Newman 1 s Contact With Aristotle 
Aristotle was a significant influence on Newman as he shaped the 
foundations of his own philosophy during his early Oxford years. This is 
a fact that has been overlooked until quite recently. 103 
Newman made his first acquaintance with Aristotle when he was an 
undergraduate at Trinity College. There he did source readings in both 
the speculative ana the practical parts of Aristotle 1 s philosophy, but 
unlike the Schoolmen, he did not focus mainly upon the Aristotelian logic, 
103£~, 1:150. The influence of Aristotle was recognized by various 
authors (e.g. Boekraad, Cronin, and Harrold) and the harmony between 
Newman and St. Thomas was considered by Zeno. But the first Nemanist to 
write extensively on this subj~ct was Franz Michel William in his book 
Aristotelische Erkenntnislehre bei Whately und Newman, (Freiburg: Herder, 
1960.) l~illiam believed that Newman preserved throughout his life the 
basic Aristotelian outlook he had absorbed during his days at Trinity 
College, and his early years at Oriel under Dr. Whately. However, a mis-
leading implication in this work is that in Newman 1 s writings there is no 
Platonic influence via Butler. William rectified this erroneous im-
pression in a later work, Die Erkenntnislehre Kardinal Newman, (Bergen-
Enkheim bei Frankfurt: Verlag Gerhard Kaffke, 1969). 
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philosophy of nature and metaphysics. Rather he became engr..ossed with 
Aristotle 1 s practical philosophy--specifically the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Poetics, and Rhetoric--not only for its own sake, but also for whatever 
:......::--:---
hints it might furnish about the general structure of human knowledge.l04 
In preparation for a degree Oxford students were required to have a 
thorough knowledge of these books.l05 
In 1822 Newman became a Fellow of Oriel College, and for the next 
six years he was working in close collaboration with Dr. Richard Whately, 
who at that time was nearing the height of his influence as the leader of 
a group intent on restoring the philosophy of Aristotle to a position of 
honor and respect in the university curriculum. 
B. Admiration for Aristotle 
Some of the finest acclamations ever paid to Aristotle are found in 
the works of Newman. In one of his Oxford University sermons, preached 
in 1840, he paid tribute to Aristotle as a logician, for he gave the 
world, 11 the boldest, simplest, and most comprehensive theory which has 
been invented for the analysis of the reasoning process. 11 106 
104collins, Philosophical Readings in Newman, p. 15. 
l05p N, 1:150-53. Among the most valuable volumes preserved in 
NevJman 1 s Library are his Greek and Latin text of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
edited with notes by William Wilkinson. (London: Clarendon Press, 1818). 
The blank pages opposite each page of the Greek text are filled with 
notes that show that Newman had studied the entire text from cover to 
cover. Also in his library are the Poetics and the Rhetoric, both of 
which are copiously annotated. 
l06l!.i, p. 258. 
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We find that, when Newman became a Catholic in 1845, ~s regard 
for Aristotle became even more intense and extensive. 
For instance, in the fifth Discourse in The Idea of~ University 
he wrote: 
While we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being 
Aristotelians, for the great master does but analyse the thoughts, 
feelings, views, and opinions of human kind. He has told us the 
meaning of our own words and ideas, before we were born. In many 
subject-matters, to think correctly, is to think like Aristotle, 
and we are his disciples whether we will nor no, though we may not 
know it. l 07 
In his lecture on 11 Christianity and Scientific Investigation 11 , 
written for the School of Science at Dublin, he wrote of the manner in 
which St. Thomas had changed the view of theologians towards Aristotle: 
From Tertullian and Calus to the two Gregories of Cappadocia, 
from them to Anastasius Sinaita, from him to the School of Paris, 
Aristotle was a word of offense; at length St. Thomas Aquinas made 
him a hewer of wood and a drawer of water to the Church. A strong 
slave he is; and the Church herself has given sanction to the use 
in theology of the ideas and terms of his philosophy.l08 
In his Essay on Abelard he praised the depth and the extension of 
Aristotle 1 s analysis of knowledge: 
As the inductive method rose in Bacon, so did the logical in the 
medieval schoolmen; and Aristotle, the most comprehensive 
intellect of Antiquity, as the one who had conceived the sublime 
idea of mapping the whole field of knowledge, and subjecting all 
things to one profou9d analysis, became the presiding master in 
their lecture halls. 09 
Concerning the construction of his own doctrine about certitude, 
Newman wrote, 11 as to the intellectual position from which I have con-
templated the subject (of human knovJledge), Aristotle has been my 
master. 11 ll0 
l07Idea, pp. 109-10. 
109HS, 3:195. 
108Ibid., p. 470. 
llOGA, p. 430. 
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Yet, although Newman respected the numerous and profound contribu-
, 
tions of Aristotle, he had serious reservations about confining philo-
sophical investigations to Aristotelian formal logic. This was one of 
the tenets of Liberalism, which we previously saw him challenge. 
C. Anti-Intellectual? 
We are here led to the first problem of this chapter: Does Newman's 
attitude towards Aristotelian formal logic and his reliance on informal 
logic indicate that he is anti-intellectual? In other words does Newman 
categorically eschew formal logic in his search for certitude? 
Newman identified formal logic with the logic of Aristotle. By 
formal logic Newman meant the Aristotelian syllogism. This type of in-
ference must be verbal and it requires two propositions compared to each 
other so that an inevitable conclusion results. This is a prime example 
of 11 intellectualism. 11 
Newman described the syllogism in this way. 
The first step in the inferential method is to throw the 
question to be decided into the form of a proposition; then to 
throw the proof itself into propositions, the force of the proof 
lying in the comparison of these propositions with each other. 
When the analysis is carried out fully and put into form, it 
becomes the Aristotelic syllogism. However, an inference need not 
be expressed thus technically; and enthymeme fulfills the require-
ments of what I have called inference. So does any other form of 
words with the mere grammatical expressions, 11 for 11 11 therefore, 11 11
SUpposing, 11 11 SO that, 11 11 Similarly, 11 and the like.lll 
In this procedure the syllogistic process becomes the most influen-
ti a 1 factor in the determination of truth. About this Newman wrote: 11 Let 
the authority of nature, common sense, experience, genius, go for nothing. 
lllGA, p. 263. 
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Ratiocination thus restricted and put into grooves, is what J have called 
inference, and the science which is its regulating principle is logic. 11112 
It is important to note that when Newman uses the ~<Jord 11 ratiocination 11 
he is speaking about a mental process which is far more extensive and 
richer than formal reasoning. He cites the advantages and the dis-
advantages of formal logic. 
D. Benefits of Formal Logic 
In praise of formal logic Newman wrote: 
It is the great principle of order in our thinking; it 
reduces a chaos into harmony; it catalogues the accumulations of 
knowledge; it maps out for us the relations of its separate 
departments; it puts us in the way to correct its own mistakes. 
It enables the independent intellects of many, acting and re-
acting on each other, to bring their collective force to bear 
upon one and the same subject-matter, or the same question. If 
language is an inestimable gift to man, the logical faculty 
prepares it for our use.ll3 
Two further specific advantages of formal logic are cited, 
1. Formal logic is a test for truth. It 11 Secures us against hopeless mis-
takes and the capricious~ dixit of authority. 11 114 2. Formal logic is 
an effective and satisfying means for communication. It is natural to 
place thoughts in words and to think logically for our own satisfaction 
and for our justification with others. 115 
ll 2Ibid., p. 263. 
114Ibid., p. 262. Cf. p. 264. 
113GA, pp. 285-86. 
ll5rbid., p. 286. 
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E. Limits of Formal Logic 
Newman then grants that formal logic proposes to be c1 test for 
truth and a common measure for reasoning. Yet, he is still concerned 
about its limitations. He says that even as it renders these services, 
it partly succeeds and partly fails. It can succeed only so far as words 
can be found for representing the endless varieties and subtleties of 
human thought. It would be an erroneous assumption to claim that what-
ever can be thought can be adequately expressed in words. ll6 Since formal 
logic mechanically places thought into words, and words into impersonal 
premisses and conclusions, it can only reach probabilities in the concrete 
because its premisses are assumed and its conclusions are abstract. 117 
This is true no matter how correct its procedures may be. Newman thus 
indicated two weaknesses of formal logic. l. It assumes its premisses. 
2. Its conclusions do not reach certitude in the concrete. Each of 
these points calls for some consideration. 
F. Assumed Premises 
r~ewman's first objection to the syllogisr:J is that formal inference 
comes short of proof in concrete matters because it has not complete 
command over the objects to which it relates. It merely assumes its 
principles. To complete the proof, we must move to a previous syllogism 
116GA, p. 264. In a different context Ludwig Wittgenstein writes 
regarding the limits of language. He wrote, 11 There are, indeed, things 
that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are 
what is mystical. 11 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Proposition 6.522 
(London: Rout 1 edge & Keg an Pau 1 , 1960), p. 51. 
117 GA, 268-69. 
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or syllogisms in an attempt to prove the assumptions. This results in 
new assumptions in the second order of syllogisms, and they too must be 
proven. Attempts to prove these assumptions lead us on to a multitude 
of separate and divergent paths. At length, there are a number of 
propositions all of which are to be proven by propositions more evident 
than themselves. 
To this Newman added: 
But even now the difficulty is not at an end; it would be 
something to arrive at length at premisses which are undeniable, 
however long we might be in arriving at them; but in this case 
the long retrospection lodges us at length at what are called 
first principles, the recondite sources of all knowledge, as to 
which logic provides no common measure of minds,--which are 
accepted by some, rejected by others,--in which, and not in the 
syllogistic exhibitions, lies the whole problem of attaining to 
truth,--and which are called self-evident by their respective 
advocates because they are evident in no other way. 118 
These self-evident propositions, Newman claims, can. not be proven 
through syllogisms, but they do prepare the way for syllogisms, and 
perform the major function in attaining truth. Syllogisms while they 
have their use do only the minutest and easiest part of the work in the 
investigation of truth. When there is a difficulty, that difficulty 
usually lies in determining the first principles. The difficulty seldom 
is concerned with the argumentation or proofs. The conclusions of a 
syllogism, therefore, to a great extent depends on assumptions which may 
or may not be reliable. If they are reliable, the question of just how 
their reliability is seen still persists--the verdict of "self-evidence'' 
llsrbid., pp. 269-270. 
I ~ I I1:i 
~ 
I 
/5 
notwithstanding. 
Thus Newman claims that no matter how direct or severe an argument 
may be there must be assumptions involved. These assumptions can be 
both subtle and numerous and accompany the course of reasoning step by 
step. The basis for these assumptions are often hidden deep in our 
nature, not necessarily always in the finished form of articulated 
propositions. Thus they may simply be the personal peculiarities of age, 
country, religion, social habits, and ideas. At times they could be 
objective, if really based on human nature. But then too at times they 
could be quite subjective if based on personal peculiarities.ll9 
Under the general heading of notional assents Newman refers to 
these assumptions as professions, if they are so feeble and superficial as 
to be little more than assertions. Examples of professions would be 
such shallow slogans and jargon as, "He is a liberal." 11 This music is 
re 1 evant. ul20 The assumptions are termed credence, if they are the 
spontaneous acceptance of propositions, which are presented to us as the 
common property of modern civilization. Examples of credence would be in-
formations received from conversations, discussions, newspapers, and 
travels, which comprise the furniture of the mind.121 Opinion would be 
an assent to a proposition not as true, but as probably true. For 
instance, I can be of the opinion that we shall have a fine hay-harvest 
this year. This assent is based upon the inference that there has been 
pleasant weather. While credence is an implicit, non-reflective assent 
ll9Ibid., p. 270. l20rbid., rr. 42-52. 
121 Ibid. , pp., 53-58. 
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to the truth of a proposition, opinion is a reflexive assent to the 
'l't f 't' 122 probabl 1 y o a propos1 10n. 
Newman refers to these notional assents as presumptions, if they 
have as their objects first principles, viz., the propositions with 
which we start in reasoning on any given subject. For instance examples 
of such first principles would be our trust of our reasoning powers and 
memory, our instinctive acceptance of the external world, our awareness 
of the beautiful and the deformed.l23 
Finally these assumptions are termed speculations if they are 
mental insights, viz., the contemplation of mental operations and their 
results as opposed to experience, experiment or sense. Here there is a 
firm and conscious acceptance of propositions as true. Examples of 
speculation are proverbs, aphorisms, and mathematical truths. 124 These 
five classes of assumptions are notional assents and not inferences; that 
is, they are maintained on their own merits and not conditionally, as 
depending on previous propositions. 
The chart on the next page will help in understanding and comparing 
these divisions. 
122Ibid., pp. 58-6d. 
l23Jbid.' pp. 60-72~ 
124Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
ASSUf~PT IONS 
Professions 
Credence 
Opinion 
Presumption 
Speculation 
17 
DESCRIPTIONS 
So feeble and superficial 
as to be little more than 
assertions. 
The spontaneous acceptance 
of propositions which are 
presented to us as the com-
mon property of modern civ-
ilization. This notional 
assent is non-reflective. 
The assent to a probability 
as true. This notional 
assent is reflective. 
An assent to first princi-
ples. 
~~ental insights 
EXAMPLES 
Rock music is 
relevant. 
I am informed by a 
newspaper that there 
is a war in India. 
We shall have a fine 
hay-harvest for the 
weather has been mild. 
Trusting my reasoning 
powers and memory. 
Trusting my experience 
of the external world. 
Proverbs, aphorisms, 
mathematical truths. 
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Newman con so 1 ida tes his view about assumptions thus: ~ 
How little syllogisms have to do with the formation 
of opinion; how little depends upon the inferential proofs, 
and how much upon those pre-existing beliefs and views, in 
which men either already agree with each other or hopelessly 
differ before they begin to dispute, and which are hidden 
deep in our nature, or, it may be, in our personal 
peculiarities.l25 
We move now to consider the second limitation that Newman finds in 
the Aristotelian syllogism--its conclusions do not lead to certitude in 
the concrete. 
G. Abstract Conclusions 
Newman contends that the Aristotelian syllogistic conclusions are 
not concrete and thus are wanting in precision. To prove this contention 
Newman reminds us that in this world of sense we have to do with things 
far more than ~ith notions. We do not live alone in a world of our ideas. 
We reason in order to increase our knowledge of matters which do not 
depend upon ourselves for being what they are; they are beyond us. 
The syllogism which is for the most part occupied with notions, not 
things, is not competent to deal with these matters, except partially 
and indirectly. Newman states, 11 As I have already said, arguments about 
the abstract cannot handle and determine the concrete. They may approxi-
mate to a proof, but they only reach the probable, because they cannot 
reach the particular." 126 
Newman grants that abstract reasoning can arrive at certitude in 
the concrete, but always there is the possibility of error. He gives the 
125GA, 277 p. . 126Ibid., p. 277-8. 
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example of the planet Neptune being discovered. 
It was deservedly considered a triumph of science that 
abstract reasonings had done so much towards determining the 
planet and its orbit. There would have been1o9 triumph in success had there been no hazard of failure. L 
He concedes that, 11 Science working by itself reaches truth in the 
abstract, and probability in the concrete, but what we aim at is truth 
in the concrete. 11 l28 This assertion applies not only to mathematical 
inferences but also to all formal inferences. 
For instance in the syllogism, 11 All men have their price; Fabricus 
is a man; he has his price. 11 Yet, as a matter of concrete fact, 
Fabricus did not have his price. He was in the concrete an exception. 
To avoid nebulous universals, therefore, Newman counsels, 11 Let units come 
first, and (so-called) universals second; let universals minister to 
units, not units be sacrificed to universals. 11 129 In other words, 
Fabricus should be the starting point, not a syllogistic major proposi-
tion as the starting point. 
It may seem that Newman 1 s position about abstract conclusions can be 
refuted through the employment of inductions and analogies. In other 
words, some may claim that through the use of inductions and analogies 
concrete conclusions may be reached; the inductions and the analogies will 
specify the conclusion in time and in place. But Newman makes it clear 
that the principle he is stating is, on the contrary, also applicable to 
inductions and analogies. 
l27Ibid., p. 278. 
l29Ibid., p. 279. 
l28Ibid., p. 279. 
' ! ~1!1 
,' 
',I, 
I 
I 
so 
He argues, '''This place will have the cholera, unless~it is drained, 
for there are a number of well-ascertained cases which point to this 
conclusion;' or, 'The sun will rise tomorrow for it rose today;' in 
either method of reasoning I appeal in order to prove a particular case, 
to a general principle or law, which has not force enough to warrant 
more than a probable conc1usion.'' 130 Newman, therefore, is saying that 
although inductions and analogies can aid in establishing a general 
principle or law, exceptions can be expected on the ground level of con-
crete cases. In other words inductions and analogies can produce a 
general principle, but when this principle is later employed to discern 
certitude in concrete instances, exceptions can occur. This can happen 
in propositional or formal logic, but not in informal or natural logic, 
since the living mind supplies more than the propositions. 
Thus we have seen that Newman disapproves of a complete and un-
reserved reliance on the syllogism of the Aristotelians because (1) its 
premises are not proven, and (2) its conclusions do not reach certitude 
in the concrete. He summarizes his contention about this type of 
Aristotelian logic by writing: 
As to logic, its chain of conclusions hangs loose at both 
both the point from which the proof should start, and the 
at which it should arrive, are beyond its reachi· it comes 
both of first principles and concrete issues.l3 
ends; 
points 
short 
As a final verification of his views on formal logic failing to 
arrive at certitude in the concrete, Newman cites the attitudes and 
claims of the very men who are almost constantly engaged in this type of 
argumentation. He has no intention of disparaging the proper value of 
130Ibid., pp. 283-284. 131Ibid., p. 284. 
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formal reasonings. That they cannot proceed beyond probabiljties is 
readily admitted by those who use them frequently. Philosophers, 
scientists, and lawyers have the reputation of being hard of belief. 
They are accustomed to proceed by the analytical method of verbal 
inference. Thus, they find within these limits no sufficient resources 
for attaining a conclusion. Even when within their hearts they have no 
doubt about a conclusion, still often from the habit of their minds, 
they are reluctant to accept it. They dwell upon the deficiencies of the 
evidence, or the possibility of error. While they speak by rules and 
books, they judge and determine by common-sense. 132 
Newman has thus stated that logic does not really prove on the 
level of the concrete, but it does enable us to communicate argumentatively 
with others. It suggests ideas; it opens views; it maps out for us the 
lines of thought; it verifies negatively; it determines when differences 
of opinion are hopeless, and when and how far conclusions are probable. 
At this point he presents a salient solution. 11 For genuine proof in con-
crete matters we require an organon more delicate, versatile, and elastic 
than verbal argumentation.ul33 This organon is the illative sense. And 
here we finally enter into the second question under consideration in this 
chapter. How does the ordered accumulation of probabilities produce 
certitude? How does this new organon enable the mind to account for 
certitude in concrete matter? 
132rbid., PP· 284-85. 133Ibid. 
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H. The Illative Sense 
The new organon as we have said is the illative sense. ''Illative'' 
is taken from the Latin 11 inferre'' from which the adjective 11 illative'' 
II t 1 d II means o cone u e . Newman explains his use of the word sense. It is 
parallel to our use of sense in ''good sense 11 , ''common sense 11 , and a 
''sense of beauty 11 • 134 
It is important to note that Newman begins his remarks about the 
illative sense in relation to inference by saying that ordinarily it is 
a simple, spontaneous, unconscious, instinctive act. He wrote: 
I commenced my remarks upon inference by saying that 
reasoning ordinarily shows as a simple act, not as a process, 
as if ther~ were no medium interposed between antecedent and con-
sequent, and the transition from one to the other were of the 
nature of an instinct,~-that is, the process is altogether 
unconscious and implicit. 135 
Here NevJman is speaking about what he terms natural inference 
which differs from the illative sense only as the act differs from the 
faculty. The act is the illative sense, and the faculty is natural in-
ference. After giving various examples of natural inference such as a 
peasant who is able to predict the weather; a physician who excels in the 
diagnosis of complaints; Napoleon who could at a glance through a tele-
scope immediately form a clear conception of the position, forces, and 
intention of the whole hostile army; Newman remarks that it is difficult 
to avoid calling such clear presentiments by the name of 11 instinct. 11 
His counsellor in scholastic philosophy, Dr. Meynell of Oscott, 
often objected to the use of the word 11 instinct. 11 Newman, however, vJas 
l34Ibid., p. 345. 135Ibid., p. 330. 
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reluctant to relinquish this word.l36 When Newman described the action 
' 
of the illative sense as an instinct he simply meant that it acted 
spontaneously in bringing us to a realization of things in the concrete.l37 
He had no intention of excluding intellectual activity when he used this 
word. He wrote that instinct 11 iS a force which spontaneously impels us, 
not only to bodily movements, but to mental acts. 11138 He also said that 
the word instinct means 11 a spontaneous impulse physical or intelligent, 
in the individual, leading to a result without assignable or recognizable 
intellectual media. 11139 
The intellectual character of the illative sense is really nothing 
but the capacity of the mind to think naturally and spontaneously about 
real, concrete things in the light of laws of being, and it is due to 
the higher logic of such real thinking that we so often obtain a 
certitude on matters of fact which we find the greatest difficulty to 
justify by an abstract process of analysis and demonstration.l40 We shall 
now analyze this description of the illative sense by considering its 
sanction, nature and scope. In so doing we shall consider its relation-
ships with the formal logic of the Aristotelians. 
l36u Correspondence between ~1eyne 11 and Newman, 11 in Our l1ay to 
Certitude, by Zeno. (Leiden: Brill, 1957), pp. 240-41. 
137GA, p. 260. l38Ibid., p. 62. 
l39 11 Letter of August 18, 1867, cited in Ward, Life of Newman, 
2:258. 
l40Boekraad, The Personal Conquest of Truth, p. 300. 
:1'1!' 
'" 
,,, 
"'I !'',•,' 'II
,,'I, 
84 
I. Sanction of the Illative Sense 
As Newman describes the illative sense the question occurs, how 
can we be sure of its credentials? Whence comes its authority? Hhat is 
its guarantee? 
To answer this question Newman points out some obvious facts--so 
obvious that they could be ignored. First of all I must accept myself as 
I am, not as I think I am, or wish that I could be. He wrote, 11 ! am what 
I am, or I am nothing ... ! cannot avoid being sufficient for myself, for 
I cannot make myself anything e 1 se. 11141 He next contrasts man with 
animals and claims that what is peculiar to our nature is that man is a 
being of progress. 11 Though man cannot change what he is born with, he is 
a being of progress with relation to his perfection and characteristic 
good. ~~142 
This law of progress is carried out by the acquisition of knowledge. 
Newman concludes that the acquisition of knowledge occurs through the 
operation of the illative sense, and not through some complex, indirect, 
and recondite science such as formal syllogistic reasoning . 
... There is no ultimate test of truth besides the testimony 
born to truth by the mind itself, and that this phenomenon 
perplexing as we may find it, is a normal and inevitable 
characteristic of the mental constitution of a being like man 
on a stage such as the world. His progress is a living growth, 
not a mechanism, and its instruments ale mental acts, not the 
formulas and contrivances of language. 43 
Newman is thus stating that man fulfills his role as a being in 
progress not through a daily diet of the formal syllogisms of the 
Aristotelians, but through the activity and cultivation of the illative 
sense. By so doing man is not only accepting the laws of his mind as an 
l41GA, p. 347. 
l43Ibid., p. 350. 
142Ibid., p. 349. 
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expression of the constituted order of nature, but also he is accepting 
the plan of God who created and constituted the laws of the mind.l44 
It would seem, therefore, that the sanction for the illative sense is 
quite similar to the sanction for formal logic, viz. this is the way 
the mind of man functions. 
J. The Nature of the Illative Sense 
To explain the nature of the illative sense Newman has recourse to 
what he terms 11 parallel faculties 11 which can be recognized without 
difficulty. He considers operations of the mind in social intercourse 
such as the caring for one's family, or the debating of a case in 
parliament in which there is a need for sagacity, skill, tact or prudence. 
Another parallel faculty he considers is that which is involved in the 
fine arts. For such acts it is possible to present true and scientific 
rules. Yet, how much more necessary and significant are subtle standards 
of taste such as a Raphael possessed and the versatile power of embodying 
such taste in works of art. 145 
He also considers proficiency in engineering, engraving, singing, 
playing instruments, acting, or gymnastic exercises. In such useful arts 
what is important is instinct or inspiration and not obedience to 
external rules of criticism or of science. 
Newman categorically disagrees with the Aristotelians who would 
make formal logic an instrumental art for all of one's activities. 
Genuine reasoning is not an instrumental art but formal reasoning might be. 
144Ibid., p. 351. 145Ibid., pp. 357-58. 
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He believed that ratiocination should be identified with particular 
subject-matters. 
It is natural, then, to ask the question, why ratio-
cination should be an exception to a general law which 
attaches to the intellectual exercises of the mind; why it 
is held to be commensurate with logical science; and why 
logic is made an instrumental art sufficient for determining 
every sort of truth, while no one would dream of making any 
one formula, however generalized, a working rule at once for 
poetry, the art of medicine, and political warfare?l46 
On this topic he also remarked, 11 In spite of Aristotle, I will not 
allmv that genuine reasoning is an instrumental art.ul47 The ratio-
cinative faculty has its province, it is 11 departmental. 11 It is not so 
much one faculty, as a collection of similar or analogous faculties under 
one name. There are as many faculties as there are distinct subject 
matters. He grants that one person could possess several of these facul-
ties. In fact some men may have a literary power in arguing in all 
subject-matters, but only in a style that is superficial and unreal. This 
is the conclusion to which we are brought by our ordinary experience with 
men. 
For instance, a hard-headed mathematician may have no appreciation 
whatsoever for the delicate beauty of poetry. A successful scientist may 
have no talent for playing a musical instrument. A shrewd business man 
146 rbid., p. 358. 
147rbid., p. 338. By the expression ''instrumental art 11 Newman means 
that in the abstract reasoning could be studied as a tool for attaining 
truth in every field of knowledge. But in practice Newman believes that 
reasoning is attached to definite subjects. 
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may have an inept perception for philosophical questions. An.d it is 
notorious how ridiculous a clever man may make himself, when he ventures 
to argue with professed philosophers, lawyers, or geologists. In these 
instances the defect lay, not so much in an ignorance of facts, as in an 
inability to handle those facts suitably. A specific talent, and an 
ability to exercise the talent is lacking. 
In order to illustrate the point that reasoning in practice is 
departmental Ne~vman offers an analogy from the faculty of memory. vlhile 
it is possible to speak in the abstract about universal memory, in practice 
the ability to remember is departmental. Memory, as a talent, is not one 
individible faculty, but a power of retaining and recalling the past in 
this or that department of our experience. Two memories, VJhich are both 
specially retentive, may also be incommensurate. For instance, a man can 
recite a lengthy poem, or a good part of a speech, after once reading it, 
but he has no memory for dates. Another man may have a great capacity for 
the vocabulary of languages, but recollect nothing of the small occurrences 
of the day. Others never forget any statement which they have read, and 
can give volume and page, but have no memory for faces. 
Newman concludes the comparison with departmentalized memory by 
writing, 11 So it is ~vith ratiocination, and as we should betake ourselves 
to Newton for physical, not for theological conclusions, and to Wellington 
for his military experience, not for statesmanship, so the maxim holds good 
generally, 1Each person is to be believed in his own speciality. 111148 
148GA, 339-341. 1'Each person is to be believed in his own speciality.~~ 
The Latin for this expression as quoted by Newman is, 11 Cuique in arte sua 
credendum est. 11 This expression also appears in ibid., p. 45. 
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Although the illative sense is in fact attached to de~inite subject-
matters, so that a given individual may possess it in one department of 
thought and not in another, "viewed in its exercise it is one and the 
same in all concrete matters, though employed in them in different 
measures." 149 
K. Phronesis 
Finally Newman considers judgment in moral duty as a parallel 
faculty to the illative sense. Just as in social intercourse and in the 
fine arts the individual is supreme and responsible to himself, so also 
with moral duty. The rules obtained through syllogistic reasoning, 
authority and assumptions are helpful for the formation of a moral judg-
ment, but they can only go so far. In his consideration of moral duty 
Newman turn to but one author, Aristotle. He explores the analysis of 
phronesis presented by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. Phronesis or 
moral judgment according to Aristotle is the faculty which guides the 
mind in matters of conduct. 150 
149rbid., pp. 358-59. 
l50Aristotle describes phronesis or practical wisdom in this way. 
"That practical wisdom is not scientific knm'lledge is evident, for it is, 
as has been said, concerned with the ultimate particular fact, since the 
thing to be done is of this nature. 11 AriStotle. Nicomachean Ethics, 
1142a, 23-25. St. Thomas Aquinas commenting on this passage, writes about 
an "inner sense". "It was previously pointed out that understanding con-
cerns certain principles or ultimates, that is, indemonstrables for which 
there is no proof, because they cannot be established by reason but 
immediately become known by themselves. But prudence is concerned with 
an ultimate, i.e., a singular practicable that must be taken as a princi-
pal in things to be done. Yet there is no scientific knowledge of the 
singular ultimate, for it is not proved by reason; there is, though 
sensitive knowledge of it because this ultimate is perceived by one of the 
senses. However, it is not apprehended by that sense which perceives the 
species of proper sensibles (for instance color, sound, and so on--that 
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In just a few sentences Newman explains Aristotle's philosophy of 
ethics as it is centered in phronesis. 
This (phronesis) is the directing, controlling, and 
determining principle in such matters, personal and social. What 
it is to be virtuous, how we are to gain the just idea and standard 
of virtue, how we are to approximate in practice to our own stand-
ard, what is right and wrong in a particular case, and similar 
questions, the philosopher refers to no code of laws, to no moral 
treatise, because no science of life, a~Rlicable to the case of an 
individual, has been or can be written.l51 
For an illustration of this principle Newman reiterates Aristotle's 
description of a mason's rule or lesbos. State or public law, Aristotle 
observes, is inflexible. Not so the mental rule of phronesis which has 
an elasticity. Just as the mason's rule is made not of wood or iron but 
of lead, so as to allow adjustments to uneven surfaces, so does equity 
possess a quality of individual elasticity in relation to lav-1, and 
phronesis possesses the same quality in relation to moral principles. 152 
Newman has no quarrel with Aristotle's doctrine on phronesis. He 
acknowledges that an ethical system may supply laws, general rules, even 
examples, suggestions, landmarks, limitations, cautions, distinctions, 
solutions of critical problems. But in a particular case, the final I 
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is the proper sense) but by the inner sense which perceives things sensibly 1, 
conceivable. Aquinas, Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics Vol. II VI L. 
VII:Cl214-3. trans. C. I. Litzinger, O.P. (Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 
1964). 
151 GA, p. 354. 
152Ibid., p. 355. NeMnan is quoting from the Nicomachean Ethics, 
1137625-31. 
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appeal must be made to our living intellect. The authoritative oracle 
is seated in the mind of the individual, who is his own law, his own 
teacher, his own inspiration, and his own judge in those special cases 
of futy which are personal to him. It comes as an acquired habit, 
though it has its first origin in nature itself, and it is formed and 
measured by practice and experience. 
L. Phronesis and Experience 
l~ewman agrees with Aristotle on the importance of experience for 
the development of phronesis. He wrote, "Instead of trusting logical 
science, we must trust persons, namely, those who by long acquaintance 
with their subject have a right to judge."l53 With approval Newman quotes 
Aristotle 1 s observation about how wise it is to trust older persons, 
rather than the young, in matters of practical judgment. 
Newman concedes that young men can become expert mathematicians, 
but they cannot possess practical judgment. To have wisdom in practical 
judgment requires a talent for individual facts, and this is acquired 
only through long experience. Thus a boy may become skilled at mathema-
tics which merely deals with abstractions, but not in philosophy which 
requires the data of experience. While youths can make assertions about 
philosophy, they are unable to give assents. 154 
To emphasize the value of experience in the development of phronesis 
that leads to certitude in moral duty Newman selects another quote from 
153GA, p. 342. 
154GA, pp. 414-5. Newman is quoting from the Nicomachean Ethics, 1142 
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Aristotle 1 s Ethics which shows the advantage the elderly have in making 
practical judgments. 11 We are bound to give heed to the undemonstrated 
sayings and opinions of the experienced and aged, not less than to 
demonstrations; because, from their having the eye of experience, they 
behold the principles of things.ul55 
Notice in the passage cited that Aristotle contrasts the sayings 
and opinions of the experienced seen through phronesis with the conclusions 
obtained through demonstrative logic. While the correct types of 
experiences can enrich phronesis, experiences have but little or nothing 
to do with demonstrative logic. 
Comparisons between Aristotle 1 s phronesis and the illative sense are 
a remarkable aid in understanding Newman 1 s higher logic. Yet, there is a 
difference between phronesis and the illative sense. 
M. Ethical Certitude and Beyond 
The phronesis treated by Aristotle in the Ethics is limited to 
practical moral judgments. Newman 1 S illative sense, however, is the 
organon for attaining certitude in Ell fields of knowledge. 
In a letter to William Froude Newman said: 
There is a faculty in the mind which I think I have called 
inductive (illative) sense, which, when properly cultivated and 
used, answers to Aristotle 1 s phronesis, its province being, not 
virtue, but the 11 inquisitio veri, 11 which decides for us, beyond 
any technical rules, when, how, etc. to pass from inference t? 56 assent, and when and under what circumstances, etc. etc. not. 
l55GA, p. 341. Newman is quoting from Aristotle, Nicomachean 
Ethics, 1143 b 10-15. 
l56Letter of Ap. 29, 1879, cited in Harper, Cardinal Newman and 
William Froude, A Correspondence, p. 203. 
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In this letter Newman emphasizes two points. First, that while 
~ 
there are similarities between phronesis as described in Aristotle's 
Ethics and the illative sense, there is one definite difference. ;._--
Aristotle in the Ethics limits phronesis to practical moral judgments. 
While the illative sense can be employed in practical moral judgments, 
it also functions in the attainment of convictions and certitude in 
every area of investigation. Secondly, Newman states that the illative 
sense decides how we are to pass from inference to assent. This is the 
chief function of the illative sense. It is the determining organon in 
moving the mind from a varied array of informal and formal inferences to 
a state of assent. 
Newman also notes that there is a specious difference between a 
law of truth and a l a\'J of duty. While duties can change, the assent of 
certitude is immutable. But he stresses that he is not comparing the two 
assents, but rather the various types of inferences \'Jhi ch, in ethi ca 1 
matters, lead to the assent of practical judgment called·phronesis, and 
the various types of inferences which, through the vwrk of the illative 
sense, lead to the assent of certitude. 157 
We shall now examine the range of the illative sense in the entire 
field of certitude. 
157GA, p. 355-56. 
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N. The Range of the Illative Sense 
First of all the illative sense is employed in conducting an 
argument. It aids in determining the course of the thesis. For instance, 
prehistoric Grecian and Roman scholars must determine from what point of 
view they will treat the question, they must ascertain the types of 
arguments in the inquiry, and what collateral aids will be used. Such 
assumptions are the function of the illative sense. 158 
Next, it is the illative sense that reaches first principles. It 
sees at a glance what to accept or to reject, what is a safe or a perilous 
assumption, what premisses can be joined and which are unrelated. 
It is the action of the mind or the illative sense which selects 
the first elements of thought which in all reasoning are assumptions, 
principles, tastes and opinions. Often these are of a very personal 
character, but they are half the battle in the inference with which the 
reasoning is to terminate. The mind does this without the use of words, 
by a process thatcan not be analyzed. 
About this extensive action of the illative sense Newman wrote: 
Thus the illative sense, that is, the reasoning faculty, 
as exercised by gifted, or by educated or otherwise well-
prepared minds, has its function in the beginning, middle, and 
the end of all verbal discussion and inquiry, and in every step 
of the process. 159 
When speaking about this function of the illative sense or the moral 
sense, Newman compares it to the~ of Aristotle. He says that while 
the faculty of reasoning is remarkable, it is from its very nature 
158GA, pp. 363-71 . 159Ibid., p. 361. 
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dependent upon other faculties. These faculties give to the reasoning 
faculty the antecedents with which its action starts. The independent 
faculty which is mainly necessary for the reasoning faculty to operate, 
and the ultimate warrant of the reasoning act is the illative sense. 
Included in the scope of the illative sense are intuitions and it is 
what Aristotle calls the nous. 160 
0. Material Certitude 
Newman has thus described how the illative sense functions through-
out formal logic. Finally, as we have seen the illative sense is required 
in informal logic. The illative sense is the faculty which enables the 
mind to pass from the ordered convergence of probabilities in informal 
inference to assent. Thus the illative sense enables the mind to move 
from a flux of inferences to a simple act of assent. This is what Newman 
calls material or interpretative certitude. This occurs when certitude 
is present, but it is not recognized. 161 
He claimed that 11 All men reason, for reason is nothing more than to 
gain a truth from a former truth without the intervention of sense to 
which brutes are limited, but all men do not reflect upon their reasons, 
much less reflect truly and accurately as to judge their 0\'in meaning. 11 162 
Once again Newman is emphasizing that a person can make an assent 
which is based on valid inferences, but he may be unable to put his reasons 
into words. His reasons are potent, and he can appreciate them, but he 
lacks the ability to express them in logical formulae. 
160~, p. 98. 
162us, pp. 258-59. 
1 61 GA , p . 211 . 
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For instance, a mechanic may be strongly opposed to the death 
penalty, but he can not say precisely why he opposes it. He may merely 
remark, 11 After all we are dealing with human lives. 11 
P. Actual Certitude 
If after possessing material or interpretative certitude a man 
enters into a complex assent which is the result of a reflection upon the 
initial act of assent, he will be in possession of formal and actual 
certitude. Truly then he can say 11 I know that I know. 11 Again it is with 
the aid of the illative sense that he makes this second assent which is 
not a real assent but a notional assent for it has as its object notions 
or ideas. The reflection may include a view of the probabilities, formal 
inferences, parallel, cases, testimonies, authorities, circumstantial 
evidencies, associations, and memories. 
About this complex, varied but organized activity of the mind 
Newman wrote: 
The mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances forward 
with a quickness which has become a proverb, and a subtlety and 
versatility which baffle investigation. It passes on from point 
to point, gaining one by some indication: another on a probability; 
then availing itself of an association; then falling back on some 
received law; next seizing on testimony; then commiting itself to 
some popular impression, or some inward instinct, or some obscure 
memory; and thus it makes progress not unlike a clamberer on a 
steep cliff, who, by quick eye, prompt hand, and firm foot, 
ascends how he knows not himself, by personal endowments and by 
practice, rather than by rule, leaving no track behind him, and 
unable to teach another. It is not too much to say that the 
stepping by which great geniuses scale the mountains of truth is 
as unsafe and precarious to men in general, as the ascent of a 
skilful mountaineer up a literal crag. It is a way which they 
alone can take; and its justification lies in their success. And 
such mainly is the way in which all men, gifted or not gifted, 
commonly reason,--not by rule, but by an inward faculty.l63 
163~, 257-58. 
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In attempting to analyze the various types of inferences contribut-
ing to the reflex act of certitude it must be remembered that there is a 
definite relationship between informal inference and formal inference. 
Newman calimed that verbal reasoning differed from mental because of its 
scientific form. "Verbal reasoning of \vhatever kind, as opposed to 
mental is what I mean by (formal) infererence, which differs from logic 
only inasmuch as logic is its scientific form". 164 In other words it 
would be erroneous to think of these two types of reasoning as being 
entirely distinct and independent. Because informal reasoning by being 
placed in a scientific form becomes formal reason, it can be seen why 
there is a rational basis in all informal acts of reasoning. Thus it can 
be understood that informal reasoning because of its nexus with formal 
reasoning is not mere emotionalism. 
In Sermon X II I of the Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University 
of Oxford, Newman stressed the intimate connection between Aristotelian 
formal logic and informal or natural inference. He called the former 
explicit reasoning and the latter implicit reasoning. 165 
164GA, 263-64. 
165~, pp. 251-77. For ins.tance, in this section Newman writes 
about reasons for faith "which, though practically persuasive, are weak 
when set forth as the argumentative grounds of conviction. Faith, then, 
though in all cases a reasonable process, is not necessarily founded on 
investigation, argument, or proof; these processes being but the explicit 
form which the reasoning takes in the case of particular minds. 11 p. 262. 
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Q. Three Characteristics of Certitude 
Once there is a reflection on the various inferences and certitude 
is attained, three characteristics will be in explicit evidence. First, 
certitude follows investigation and proof. It has a rational basis. 
Second, it is accompanied by a specific sense of intellectual satisfac-
tion and repose. Third, it is indefectible or irreversible. Newman 
pointed out the contribution made by each of these characteristics by 
stating: 
If the assent is made without rational grounds, it is a rash 
judgment, a fancy, or a prejudice; if without the sense of 
finality, it is scarcely more than an inference; if vvithout 
permanence, it is a mere conviction. 166 
An example of an assent being made without reason would be the 
assent to the proposition that a woman should never become the president 
of the United States. Since no reasonable basis can be produced for the 
assent, it is a prejudice. 
An example of an assent made without finality would be the assent 
to the proposition that if a traveller from the United States is planning 
to spend a month in Europe he should try to visit as many countries as 
possible since he may not return to Europe for a number of years. But 
there is another inference. If he visits just a few cities in one 
country, he will have the opportunity to obtain a more profound under-
standing of that country. A person planning a European vacation can 
vacillate from inference to inference. There is no sense of finality and 
each assent is barely distinguishable from the inference. 
An example of a conviction would be the assent to the proposition 
l66GA, p. 258. 
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that at times nations must resort to war to preserve the lives and the 
liberties of their citizens. Yet, there can be a lack of permanence in 
such a conviction. It is not a certitude. A generation later the 
person who made such an assent may assent to the proposition that a war 
does not solve problems, but, in fact, it creates more problems. 
R. Reliable Certitude 
Now that we have examined Newman 1 S attitude about formal logic and 
the manner in which the illative sense functions throughout reasoning, 
another problem appears. How reliable is this certitude? Does it seem 
too personal, too subjective? Could it lead to relativism or skepticism? 
What criterion do we have for it? 
Perhaps it may be alleged that the above mentioned characteristics 
of certitude may serve as criteria. But could a person at times be 
deceived about the rationality of his certitude, about his serenity, 
about the indefectibility of his certitude? 
Perhaps the criterion is the formal logic of Aristotle. Is this an 
adequate test? 
Newman stated that formal logic proposes to be a test,l67 but it is 
not a test.l68 This is not a contradiction. Although formal logic does 
not arrive at truth in the concrete, it can act as a negative test. It 
may not tell us where truth is, but it can tell us where truth is not. 
Newman wrote, 11 lt (formal logic) was better adapted to baffle an adversary 
or at most detect error, rather than establish truth. 11 169 
l67GA, p. 264. 
l69A . 29 
_I_}_., p. . . 
l68Ibid., p. 287. 
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Aristotle. 
Newman identified formal logic with the syllogism of Aristotle. 
He acknowledged several benefits in this form of reasoning. It can act 
as a test for certitude, and it is a medium for communication. 
However he also cited several problems with formal inference. It 
assumes its premises and it can not arrive at certitude in the concrete. 
Newman claimed that to obtain genuine certitude in concrete matters we 
require a special organon, the illative sense. He refers to the illative 
sense as an instinct, but in so doing he includes intellectual activity. 
The sanction for the illative sense is simply that the mind works 
in that manner. This is the way God created the mind of man. Man 
progresses through the proper employment of his illative sense. 
Parallel faculties aid us in understanding the nature of the 
illative sense. Among these faculties are debating and a taste for the 
fine arts, but the chief faculty cited by Newman is moral duty. 
Formal rules can help these faculties to operate, but the final 
judgment rests with the individual. In regard to ethical decisions 
Newman turns to Aristotle 1 S ethics for support. There Aristotle speaks 
about phronesis as the faculty which enables a person to make a moral 
judgment about a definite problem at a specific time and place. The 
person has many rules, authorities, and suggestions, but the final 
judgment for moral duty in the concrete is made by the faculty of 
phronesis. 
The illative sense is similar to phronesis. However, in the range 
of the illative sense Newman includes not just truth about moral duty, but 
all truth and certitude. 
The illative sense is also similar to the nous of Aristotle. It is 
1 Gl 
the illative sense that decides the course of an argument, ~ccepts or 
rejects assumptions. It is involved in formal and informal reasoning. 
When the illative sense acts in informal reasoning it moves the 
mind from an occupation with inferences to a real assent. When this 
occurs a person is in possession of material or interpretative certi-
tude. Certitude is present but it is not recognized. 
It is then possible to move from interpretative certitude to 
act::sl certitude. This occurs when a person enters into a complex 
assent by reflecting on the probabilities, inferences, and associations 
in his mind and making a notional assent. Now he can say, "I know that 
I know. 11 He has formal and actual certitude. 
There are three characteristics of this certitude. It is rational; 
it is accompanied by a state of serenity, and it is indefectible. 
How reliable is this certitude? Are the above three criteria a 
reliable test? Perhaps we could be deceived about them. Is formal logic 
an adequate test for certitude? It can tell us where certitude is not, 
but it can not give us certitude in the concrete. 
There is only one final test for certitude--the illative sense. 
Can the illative sense be developed and perfected? These are questions 
for the next chapter--Newman 1 s dialogue with God acting in conscience. 
I 
CHAPTER V 
DIALOGUE WITH GOD IN CONSCIENCE 
In the previous chapter we have seen how a convergence of proba-
bilities can lead to a real assent, and the assent after a reflection 
can lead to certitude. The question was raised, what is the test for 
this certitude? 
We saw that the test could not be formal logic since it is merely 
negative. It tells us where certitude is not. It does not bring us to 
where certitude can be found in the concrete. 
We saw that the test for certitude would not be the characteristics 
of rationality, serenity and indefectibility, since a person at times 
could be deceived about these criteria. 
We concluded that the ultimate test for any certitude was the 
illative sense. However, the question remains. How reliable is the 
illative sense? Can it lead us into error? Is it likely to be correct 
about some issues and erroneous about others? Is it static, or is it 
perfectible? 
According to Newman the i 11 ati ve sense can progress or regress. He 
admonishes that the illative sense in ordinary minds can become 11 biassed 
and degraded, by prejudice, passion, and self-interest. 11 172 But the 
illative sense can also be improved. Commenting about the instinctive, 
spontaneous judgments of weather prophets, lawyers, physicians, and 
1 72 GA , p . 3 31. 
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military strategists, Newman says that the illative sense is capable of 
cultivation. Although it is similar to an instinct, its susceptibility 
to cultivation gives it an additional characteristic. About this 
Newman wrote: 
It is difficult to avoid calling such clear presentiments 
by the name of instinct; and I think they may so be called, if 
by instinct be understood, not a natural sense, one and the 
same in all, and incapable of cultivation, but a perception of 
facts without assignable media of perceiving. 173 
It is through proper and correct practice that the illative sense 
is improved and perfected. 11 It comes of an acquired habit, though it 
has its first origin in nature itself, and it is formed and matured by 
practice and experience. 11174 However, the question remains, what aids 
the illative sense in its journey towards certitude? It would seem that 
the safeguards and monitors for the illative sense are the promptings in 
conscience, and a person actively accepting these promptings. Newman, as 
we shall see, will find these promptings to be the voice of God in our 
nature. 
l73Ibid., p. 334. Ne~<Jman defines instinct as 11 a force which 
spontaneously impels us, not only to bodily movements, but also to mental 
acts. 
11 GA, p. 62. It is a ''spontaneous impulse with no assignable nor, 
recognizable intellectual media. 11 Life, 2:258. It should be noted that 
Newman's use of instinct definitely included mental acts as well as bodily 
actions. This is contrary to the meaning of 11 instinct 11 in the works of 
a number of contemporary psychologists who would limit its scope to 
bodily actions and reactions. 
174GA, pp. 354-55. 
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A. The Argument from Conscience 
Newman sought an approach to God which would not be impersonal, 
irrelevant, and notional--viz., the result of a syllogistic conclusion. 
He wanted to obtain a way to God which would be personal, practical, and 
real. The question that Newman wished to solve v1as, how are we able to 
obtain a personal, practical, and real assent to God? 
Newman wanted to realize what God was. He wished to obtain a 
personal knowledge of God through a real apprehension of the activities 
within his conscience. He had a fear of not coming to grips with 
reality--especially with the reality of God in existential ethical 
decisions. He wanted to realize things. 175 
In attaining a realization of God, Newman will not only arrive at 
the certitude of God 1 S existence, but also attain certitude about some of 
God 1 S attributes, certitude about basic ethical problems, and an endless 
desire and a correct disposition for the attainment of certitude in all 
fields of knowledge. This can be accomplished through awareness of 
conscience. 
B. ~Description of Conscience 
For Newman consciousness of conscience is one of the basic aspects of 
our being. It is possible to reflect upon conscience and to reason about 
it. As Newman points out in the Oxford University Sermons, 11 Its opera-
tions admit of being surveyed and scrutinized by reason. 11176 To show that 
conscience was at the very core of our being Newman made an extensive and 
175r~oz., 1:416-7. 176~, p. 183. 
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profound analysis of its varied functions. He described conscience as 
"the discriminator of acts as worthy of praise or blame. Now such 
praise or blame is a phenomenon of my existence, one of those phenomena, 
through ~'lhich as I have said, my existence is brought horne to me.'' 177 
Conscience for Newman has a legitimate place among our mental acts. 
To deny conscience is tantamount to a denial of a part of our nature. 
Just as we have the action of memory, of reasoning, of imagination, or 
the sense of the beautiful, so also are there actions of conscience 
which we call right or wrong, and which excite in us approbation or 
blame. Such actions enkindle in us pleasure or pain, and are customarily 
referred to as a good or a bad conscience. This being so Newman says 
that he will "attempt to show that in this special feeling, which 
follows on the commission of what we call right or wrong, lie the materi-
als for the real apprehension of a Divine Sovereign and Judge."l78 
C. Moral Sense and Sanction 
In his analysis of the actions of conscience which carries with 
them a certain keen sensibility either pleasant or painful, Newman finds 
two aspects. Conscience is a moral sense and a sanction. By moral sense 
Newman means that conscience exercises a critical office, it is a judg-
ment of reason, a rule of right conduct. By sanction Newman means that 
conscience exercises a judicial office, it expresses a magisterial 
dictate, it is a ratification of right conduct, or a disapproval of wrong 
conduct. It is essential to note that these denotations are two aspects 
177PN, 2:47. 178GA, p. 105. 
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of a single act; the act itself is indivisible. 
Father Boekraad offers an interesting insight about this distinc-
tion. He states that if we stress the sense of duty in such a way that 
the moral sense is neglected we would arrive at an empty categorical 
imperative, which cannot really direct our lives. If, on the other hand, 
we stress the moral sense and neglect the sense of duty we have nothing 
left, but that superficial morality, which Newman found so characteristic 
of rationalism. 179 The ethics of rationalism 11 Creeps, struts, or frets 
on the earth level without wings to rise.ulSO 
To explicate these two aspects of conscience Newman wrote: 
Thus conscience has both a critical and a judicial office, 
and though its promptings, in the breasts of the millions 
of human beings to whom it is given, are not in all cases 
correct, that does not necessarily interfere with the force 
of its testimony and of its sanction: its testimony that 
there is a right and a wrong, and its sanction to that 
testimony conveyed in the feelings which attend on right or 
wrong conduct. Here I have to speak of conscience in the 
latter point of view, not as supplying us, by means of its 
various acts, with the elements of morals, such as may be 
developed by the intellect into an ethical code, but simply 
as the dictate of an authoritative monitor bearing upon the 
details of conduct as they co~g before us, and complete in 
its several acts, one by one. 1 
What Newman means is that conscience not only tells me what is right 
or wrong in specific instances but also forces me onwards to greater good-
ness by threats and promises, and in the attainment of greater goodness 
I acquire greater certitude. A bad conscience fills me with anxiety, 
insecurity, self-reproach, compunction, and a haunting remorse. A good 
179A. Boekraad, Unpublished mimeographed notes, p. 20. 
180DA, p. 272. 
l81GA, p. 106. Cf. PN 2:47-49. 
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conscience, on the other hand, would fill me with self-approval, 
equani rni ty, and serenity. 
While conscience under the aspect of a moral sense or a rule of 
conduct can err, its other aspect is never absent; the sanction and the 
magisterial dictate always remains. About this Newman wrote, "conscience 
is far more imperative in enforcing duty than successful in determining 
duty in particular cases."l82 
Here Newman is emphasizing that conscience as a sanction or a 
magisterial dictate brings into the mind various perturbations, or 
approbations. These feelings we can not control. 
Because conscience in this sense transcends ourselves its sanction 
and magisterial dictate will always be present regardless of our attitude 
tmva rds it. 
It is more than a man's own self. The man himself has no 
power over it, or only with extreme difficulty; he did not 
make it, he can not destroy it ... He can disobey it, he may 
refuse to use it, but it remains. 183 
D. From Conscience to God 
-- ----
To illustrate how the activities of conscience can bring us to an 
encounter with God, Newman takes as his analogy the method by which we 
arrive at a certitude of the external world. 
L 
As from a multitude of instinctive perceptions, acting 
in particular instances, of something beyond tf1e senses, Vle 
generalize the notion of an external world, and then picture 
that world in and according to those particular phenomena 
from which we started, so from the perceptive power which 
identifies the intimations of conscience with the reverber-
ations or echoes (so to say) of an external admonition, we 
l82oev. p. 361. lB3os, p. 7 3. 
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proceed on to the notion of a Supreme Ruler and Judge, ~nd then 
again we imagine Him and His attributes in those recurring 
intimations, out of which, as mental phenomena, our recognition 
of His existence was originally gained.l84 
Newman \'Jould therefore claim that although in the conscience 
argument forrnal inference is not involved, there is an informal or 
natural inference. From the intimations of conscience the mind under 
the direction of the illative sense assents to the existence of God. 
What is found in conscience is like the shadow of God indicating the 
substance. 11 My conscience is to me a proof of God just as the shadow 
is of the substance.•• 185 
Giving additional examples Newman says that, 11 As the sunshine 
implies that the sun is in the heavens, though we may see it not, as a 
knocking at our doors at night implies the presence of one outside in the 
k h k f d . II d . d . G d 186 dar w o as s or a m1ttance, so oes consc1ence 1rect us to o . 
Perhaps the finest description of the conscience argument is found 
in the statement from the novel Callista in which the leading character 
remarks: 
I feel that God within my heart. I feel myself in His 
presence. He says to me, 11 DO this; don't do that. 11 You may 
tell me that this dictate is a mere law of my nature, as is 
to joy or to grieve. I cannot understand this. No, it is the 
echo of a person speaking to me. Nothing shall persuade me 
184GA, p. 1 04. 
l85wilfrid Ward, William George Ward and the Catholic Revival 
(London: Macmillan & Co., 1893), p. 217. 
l86os, p. 74. 
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that it does not ultimately proceed from a person external to 
me. It carries with it its proof of its divine origin. My 
nature feels towards it as towards a person. When I obey it, 
I feel a satisfaction; when I disobey, a soreness--just like 
that which I feel in pleasing or offending some revered friend ... 
An echo implies a voice; a voice a speaker. That speaker I 
love and I fear. 187 
Once the mind assents to the existence of God it can reflect on 
the evidence presented by conscience, and thus attain to the certitude 
that God exists. 
E. God's Attributes 
Conscience not only directs us to God, but it also manifests to us 
some of His attributes. Newman wrote: 
... Thus the phenomena of conscience as a dictate, avail to 
impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme 
Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, re-
tributive, and is the creative principle of religion, as the 
Moral Sense is the principle of ethics. 188 
Conscience brings us into contact with a person who is infinite. 
It brings us into the presence of a person because 11 inanimate things can-
not stir our affections; these are correlative with persons. 11189 This 
person is infinite. If we are faithful to our consciences, we become 
aware that we are in contact with a dynamism which continues to become 
richer and richer in its contents, both in extension i.e. as affecting 
more and more concrete situations of our human existence, and in its in-
tensity, i.e. in accuracy regarding each single occurrence. Nev.Jman 
describes this infinite dynamism: 
l87call., p. 314. Cf. Idea, p. 174; Apo, p. 180; SN, p. 187; GA, 63, 
105-18, 389-91. ~. 2: 18; OS, 64, 65, 74; MD, 496. 
188GA, p . 11 0. l89Ibid., p. 109. 
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And since the more closely this inward monitor is 
respected and followed, the clearer, the more exalted,~ and 
the more varied its dictates become, and the standard of 
excellence is ever outstripping while it guides our obedience; 
a moral conviction is thus at length obtained of the un-
approachable nature as well as the supreme authority of That 
whatever it is which is the object of the mind 1 S contem~lation.l90 
A number of advantages can be found in the argument from conscience. 
Writing about what he termed his chosen proof, Newman said that he was 
led to it by its great convenience and appositeness for his time. He 
cited its several advantages. 
l. It is a proof common to all, high and low, from earliest 
infancy. It is carried about in a compact form in every soul. It 
is ever available--it requires no learning--it is possessed by 
pagans as well as Christians. 
2. And next, it is intimately combined with practice. It is 
not some abstract truth wrought out by the pure intellect, or 
wrought out theoretically, as that from design. It goes to the 
root of the matter, and is the source of practical religion as 
well as speculative. 
3. It explains and refutes the supposed 11 philosophical sin 11 
which, according to it, will be the conversion into a mere taste, 
of that which is the voice of God directing or rewarding. l9l 
To these advantages that Newman explicitly cites, some other ones 
may be inferred. Conscience not only proves God 1 s existence, but also 
tells us about His attributes; it helps us to understand ourselves; and 
as we shall see it provides a guide for certitudes in the field of ethics, 
prepares the mind for certitudes in all fields of knowledge, and disposes 
the mind to expect and to accept divine revelation. 
Newman was convinced that the metaphysical proofs lacked the con-
venience and appositeness of the conscience argument. 
190~, pp. 18-19. l9lfii, 2:67. 
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F. The Metaphysical Proofs 
Newman granted that there was a need for the metaphysical proofs 
for God 1 S existence. It is through the metaphysical arguments that the 
real and personal encounter with God in conscience can be developed. At 
times Newman employed these proofs in his works. For instance he wrote; 
Now first consider that reason teaches you there must be 
a God, else how was this all wonderful universe made? It could 
not make itself, man could not make it, he is but a part of it; 
each man has a beginning, there must have been a first man and 
who made him. 192 
But Newman concluded that no matter how coherent and persuasive 
such proofs may be, they are a l\vays preceeded by a more basic proof--
God acting in conscience. He wrote: 
Or what, again, as others hold, is the popular argument 
from final causes but an 1 Economia 1 suited to the practical 
wants of the multitude, as teaching them in the simplest way 
the active presence of Him, who after all dwells 1n~elligibly, 
prior to argument, in their heart and conscience? 9 
He perceived that syllogistic pronouncements about physical 
phenomena reminded us of the Being of God, rather than logically taught 
us His existence. 11 The question is whether physical phenomena logically 
teach us, or on the other hand logically remind us of the Being of God. 11 194 
The weakness that Ne1vman found in the formal proofs v1as that a 
person relying solely on these proofs was likely to become more enamored 
with his own mental achievements, rather than concerned with his personal 
relationships with God. Newman comments on the merely academic study of 
God in nature. 11 So this is the religion we are to gain from the study 
of Nature; how miserable the God we attain in our own mind, our 
l92Mix., p. 285-6; Ch. p. 294; and_E>_S__, 6:308. 
l93Ari . , p. 76. 194~, p. 194 
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veneration is ever professedly the vwrship of self."l95 
l~ewman recognized the dangers of such argumentation if it obviated 
conscience and was used in syllogistic isolation. Writing about the 
metaphysical arguments in his Sermon Notes, he said: 
About the argument from the external world and why it is 
dangerous at this day; it (the world) was made before sin. Con-
science has been silenced. The only information that they have 
received concerning God has been from Natural Theology, and that 
speaks only of benevolence and harmony. 196 
Newman was convinced that physical theology in itself was too 
impersonal, ethereal, and jejune to produce vital philosophical certi-
tudes. He claimed: 
And in the next place, what on the contrary, are those 
special attributes which are the immediate correlatives of 
religious sentiment? Sanctity, omniscience, justice, mercy, 
faithfulness. What does Physical Theology, what does the 
argument from Design, what do fine disquisitions about final 
causes, teach us except very indirectly, faintly, enigmatical-
ly, of these transcendently important, these essential portions 
l95oA, p. 301. With this Pascal would agree. Contrasting the view 
of God that the heathens and Epicureans had, with the view of God held by 
the Jews and Christians, Pasca 1 wrote, "But the God of Abraham, the God of 
Isaac, the God of Jacob, the God of Christians, is a God of love and of 
comfort, a God who fills the soul and heart of those whom He possesses, a 
God who makes them conscious of Himself to their inmost soul, who fills it 
vJi th humi 1 ity and joy, with confidence and 1 ove, who renders them i ncapab 1 e 
of any other end than Himself" Blaise Pascal, Pensees (New York: E.P. 
Outton & Co., 1958) pp. 153-54. (Fragment 555). 
196sN, p. 29. Cf. pp, 1:317-19. Yet it should be remembered that 
in the spirit of modern phenomenology the viewer can see the world only 
through his own subjective intentionality, which are those of a sinner. 
The consciousness of his sins would, of course, result from his awareness 
of the disturbances within his conscience. Newman, however realized that 
it was possible to look at the world as a metaphysical object, and while 
doing so be devoid of any consciousness of conscience. 
197 Idea, pp. 453-54. Cf. Idea p. 61. 
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of the idea of Religion? Religion is more than theology; it is 
something relative to us; and it includes our relatio~ towards 
the Object of it. lvhat does Physical Theology tell us of duty 
and conscience? Of a particular providence?1~7 
To attain basic philosophical certitudes with personal appropria-
tion Newman presented his argument from conscience. Conscience for 
Newman was the means of gaining a real assent to God's existence, and 
also the means by which ethical certitudes can be acquired through the 
perfection of the illative sense. The illative sense, we recall, is my 
mind working with all the data that I discover, viz., the probable, the 
probabilities, and all of the natural, informal, and formal inferences. 
Under a sense of duty I exercise the illative sense, while conscience 
continues to demand a greater fidelity to this sense. 
G. Conscience and Ethical Certitudes 
It is through our response to the voice of God in conscience that 
the illative sense progresses and is improved so that a person arrives at 
ethical certitudes. Newman describes the pedagogical, regal, and sancti-
fying role of conscience as "The Messenger from Him, the aboriginal Vicar 
of Christ, a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness, 
a priest in its blessings and anathemas." 198 
He also speaks about the voice of God in conscience as an unseen 
Teacher. If this voice is heard and followed we continue to learn more 
and more about correct conduct, and become more skilled in our judgments. 
Thus our ethical certitudes are deepened. He wrote that the voice of 
God within us 
197rdea, pp. 453-54. Cf. Idea p. 61, and Life, 2:269. 
198oiff., 2:248. 
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11 Necessarily 11 raises our minds to the idea of a Teacher, an 
unseen Teacher; and in proportion as we listen to that Word, 
and use it, not only do we learn from it, not only do its 
dictates become clearer and its lessons broader, and its 
principles more consistent, but its very tone is louder and 
more authoritative and constraining. A~d thyg it is, that to 
those who use what they have, more is g1ven. 9 
On this way for Newman God became the source of all ethical certi-
tudes. He, of course, is not referring to a distant almighty power, but 
to a God of love who in His infinitely wise providence acts as a monitor 
towards the illative sense as it discovers certitudes among a convergence 
of probabilities and other inferences. If the illative sense were in 
error about a proposition, it is subject to correction by God's voice. 
in conscience. If the illative sense is correct about a proposition it 
is subject to the approval of conscience. In speculation and in 
practice there can be no better teacher. Newman wrote: 
For what is a higher guide for us in speculation and 
in practice than that conscience of right and wrong, of 
truths and falsehoods, those sentiments of what is decorous, 
consistent and noble~ which our Creator has made a part of 
our original nature.LOO 
If a person accepts the manner that God made his mind and is alert 
to God's voice in conscience he will make continual progress in the 
attainment of ethical certitudes. 
He wrote: 
When once the mind is broken in as it must be, to the 
belief of a Power above it, when once it understands that it 
is not itself the measure of all things in heaven and earth, 
it will have little difficulty in going forth.201 
199os, p. 74. Cf. GA, p. 390. 
201GA, p. 497. 
ZOOApo, p. 140. 
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"Breaking the mind in" means that reason is to be exercised not 
arbitrarily, but in accordance with obedience to conscience. All certi-
tudes about ethics according to Newman are finally founded in God and 
concerning these certitudes 1 God is the ultimate teacher. Conscience 
"is the 1 aw of God as apprehended in the minds of men. 11 202 
Newman explains this point in a letter that he wrote on July 25, 
1870 to t•1oynell. "Hence those instincts (of conscience) come from God ... 
and as the moral law is an influence or generalization from these in-
stincts, the moral law is ultimately taught us from God, whose nature it 
is."203 An ethics completely devoid of the divine would be termed by 
Newman "the philosophical sin 11 204 
Thus it can be noticed how God-centered Newman 1 S ethics is. He 
felt that one of the grave errors of his age was to cut ethics away from 
God, and then to construct an ethical system on the basis of mere taste, 
expediency, or utilitarianism. 
Unless this point is properly understood it is impossible to 
appreciate Newman•s subtle and adroit definition of a gentleman. While 
the gentleman has attained the highest degree of gracious living on the 
rationalistic level, he is guilty of the philosophical sin. He has 
t separated ethics from God. He is a great humanist, an outstanding 
altruist, but he lacks the multiple advantages that accrue when one finds 
I 
I 
I 
l 
ethical certitudes by being attentive to the voice of conscience. For 
the superficial gentleman certitude in morality is found in what is 
expedient, in utilitarianism, or in what promotes the welfare of the 
state. 
203Life, 2:257. 
t 
202oiff., 2:247. 
204_E_tJ_, 2: 6 7. 
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For this gentleman the crime is not the sin. Rather, it is the 
public knowledge of the crime ivhich constitutes the sin. "It is detec-
tion, not the sin, which is the crime." 205 
Newman wrote that for the mere gentleman, "To seem becomes to be; 
what looks fair will be good, what causes offense will be evil; virtue 
will be what pleases, vice what pains. As well may we measure virtue 
by utility as by such a rule."206 
Hhile Newman found many points for admiration in the gentleman and 
felt that his life presented a possible and proper openness to the voice 
of God as found in conscience, he fully recognized the limitations of 
the gentleman's criteria for morality. Newman realized that the ways of 
the gentleman, "partly assist and partly distort the development of a 
Christian." 207 
Morality had to be more than good taste; it could not be consistent-
ly and correctly dictated by social customs. He realized that obedience 
to God in conscience was a duty regardless of whether it is socially 
205Idea, p. 201. Glaucon in Plato's Republic dramatically 
illustrates this point by relating the story about the ring of Gyges. 
When the collet of the ring was turned, a person became invisible. 
Glaucon then argues, contrary to Newman, that if you could imagine any 
one obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing anything 
wrong, he would be thought by the general public to be a fool. Republic 
2.360. In response to this Newman would contend that whether we are 
visible or invisible, we still must answer to our consciences. From con-
science there i ~:. :~o escape. 
206rdea, p. 201. 207rbid., p. 2os-11. 
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unpopular, a disservice to oneself, unpleasant, and hidden from the 
public, 
He has a lively sense of responsibility and guilt, though 
the act be no offense against society,--of distress and apprehen-
sion, even though it may be of present service to him,--of 
compunction and regret, though in itself it be most pleasurable--
of confusion of face, though it may have no witnesses.208 
Thus it can be seen that although there are grounds to respect an 
ethics of good taste, it is difficult to obtain and to retain certitude 
in such an ethic. To acquire certitude it is necessary for ethics to 
have a solid basis, a criterion, a guide, a sanction, a monitor. These 
are provided by the promptings of God in conscience. 
H. Errors in Conscience 
As we contrast the ethics of good taste, with the ethics of con-
science and maintain that certitudes are found in the ethics of con-
science while it is perilous to expect certitudes in an ethics of good 
taste, the question arises, are there not also errors in an ethics based 
on conscience? Is it not possible for a person to accept a certitude 
about an ethical position one week, and then drastically to alter that 
position the next week? If ethical certitudes are attained by listening 
to the voice of God in conscience, vJhy is there not a perfect unanimity 
among people who attempt to follow their consciences? 
Newman would concede that at times we can be mistaken about certi-
tude in ethical matters. This would result when we attribute the title 
of certitude to a jejune statement because of a lack of proper prepara-
tion, or to a prejudice or a bias. On this topic Newman wrote, that the 
multitude of men "make little di sti ncti on between credence, opinion, and 
208GA, p. 108. 
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profession; at various times they give them all perhaps the name of 
certitude and accordingly, when they change their minds, they fancy 
they have given up points of which they had a true conviction. 11209 
Thus Newman is saying that God acting in conscience gives us 
certitudes about ethical questions, but we can mistake a credence, an 
opinion, or a profession for a truth. This mistake can be engendered by 
11 pride, self-trust, unbelief, human affection, narrO\'J self-interest, bad 
education, or other mental agencies, which are found in the world and in 
the individual. 11210 
In the Idea of a University Newman presents a dramatic illustra-
tion of how conscience can fail, and then become rejuvenated. 
The reflection of the sky and mountains in the lake is a proof 
that sky and mountains are around it, but the twilight, or the 
mist, or the sudden storm hurries away the beautiful image, 
which leaves behind it no memorial of what it was. Something 
like this are the moral law and the informations of faith, as 
they present themselves to i ndi vidual minds. vJho can deny the 
existence of Conscience? Who does not feel the force of its 
injunctions? but how dim is the illumination in which it is 
invested, and how feeble its influence, compared with that 
evidence of sight and touch which is the foundation of 
physicai science! 
Newman in the above text is speaking about the new and obvious data 
presented by the physical sciences. As he continues he considers what 
happens to conscience when it encounters reckless rationalism. 
How easily can we be talked out of our clearest views of duty! 
How does this or that moral precept crumble into nothing when 
we rudely handle it! How does the fear of sin pass off from us, 
as quickly as the glow of modesty dies away from the countenance! 
And then we say, 'It is all superstition.' 
2°9Ibid., p. 234. 2lO_g_, p. 100. 
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Finally Newman concludes this passage by describing ho~ conscience 
is restored to its proper position, and the result is a serene 
stability. 
However, after a time we look round, and then to our surprise 
we see, as before, the same law of duty, the same moral precepts, 
the same protests against sin, appearing over against us, in 
their old places, as if they never had been brushed away, like 
the divine handwriting upon the wall at the banquet.2ll 
While Newman grants that a particular conscience, i.e. as a moral 
judgment, not as an imperial dictate, can fail, and fall into error, he 
nevertheless holds that even when a conscience is in error, the complex 
assent is enacted on the basis of some certitude. In the Philosophical 
Notebook Newman claims that even if a conscience is in error there can 
be present in it an element of certitude. 11 It may be asked, How can 
an oracle be divine, which is not infallible in its answer? But con-
science errs, not in principle, but in details. There is always something 
true in its dictates. u212 
It would then seem that when we are in error about an ethical 
question, God is still preserving some certitude in that error and through 
that certitude eventually the error may be extricated if we are faithful to 
our consciences. 
For instance, a person is wrong in advocating the destruction of all 
books which contain any statement in opposition to his system of thought, 
but he nevertheless attains certitudes when he assents to the propositions 
that truth would be preserved and propagated, that a really 
211Idea, pp. 514-15. 
2l2.!1i, 2:58, GA, p. 106, 116, 233-4; Diff., 2:47; 259-60. 
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significant intellectual error is more serious than any phys!cal 
disease, and that falsehoods propagate additional falsehoods. He is, 
however, in error and lacks certitudes when he assents to the proposi-
tions that falsehood can be destroyed through physical force, that the 
average person is allergic to the light of truth, and that a select group 
should be permitted to become the gate-keepers for certitudes. 
Newman is confident that if a person is sensitive and dedicated to 
the promptings of his conscience, his certitudes about ethical questions 
will become clarified and improved and eventually there will be greater 
agreement among such good people. About the voice of conscience he wrote: 
... we believe on the whole, and even in those cases where it 
is ill-instructed if its voice be diligently obeyed, it will 
gradually be cleared, simplified and perfected, so that minds, 
starting differently will, if honest, in course of time con-
verge to one and the same truth.213 
I. Aids for Conscience 
When writing about the manner in which the voice of God in con-
science helps to produce certitudes about ethical matters, Newman recog-
nized that a conscience is not perfected in isolation, but is helped by 
individuals and communities. Such extrinsic sources, he says assist a 
person in the avoidance of philosophical errors. 
We all suffer for each other, and gain by each other 1 s 
sufferings, for man never stands alone here, though he will 
stand by himself one day hereafter; but here is a social 
being, and goes forward to his long home as one of a large 
company.214 
213oev., p. 361. Cf. GA, p. 221, 375: us, pp. 19, 94. 
214GA, p. 406. Cf. p. 390. HS, 3:9-10; Dev. p. 358. 
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Many of the certitudes we possess today are the result of our 
rapport with the written and the oral treasures of the past. Newman 
fully realized how important it was to acknowledge our debt to our 
fathers and to our forefathers who have handed dmvn to us a variety of 
certitudes. 
It has sometimes been remarked when men have boasted of the 
knowledge of modern times, that no wonder we see more than the 
ancients, because we are mounted upon their shoulders. The con-
clusions of one generation are the truths of the next. We are 
able, it is our duty, deliberately to take things for granted 
which our forefathers had a duty to doubt about; and unless we 
summarily put down disputation on points which have already 
been proved and ruled, we shall waste our time, and make no 
advances.215 
However, the principle remains, that the individual conscience is 
the highest court in deciding what to accept or what to reject from the 
wisdom of the past and the present. Newman claimed that conscience is 
an ultimate since any appeal beyond conscience would have to be submitted 
to conscience again. Conscience can not be 11 reso 1 ved into any combi na-
tion of principles more elementary than itself.u216 
If a person is docile to the promptings of the internal monitor, 
viz., his conscience, he would eventually be led to the external monitor, 
viz., divine revelation. 
The gift of conscience raises a desire for what it does not 
itself fully supply. It inspires in them the idea of authorita-
tive guidance, of a divine law; and the desire of possessing it 
in its fulness, not in mere fragmentary portions or indirect 
suggestions. It creates in them a thirst, an impatience, for the 
knowledge of that Unseen Lord, and Governor, and Judge, who as yet 
speaks to them only secretly, who whispers in their heart, who 
tells them something, but not nearly so much as they wish and as 
they need. Thus you see, my brethren, a religious man, who has 
215GA, p. 229. Cf. ~' 3:6-7. 216oiff., 2:248. 
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not the blessing of the infallible teaching of revelatjon, is 
led to look out for it, for the very reason that he is 
religious. He has something, but not all; and if he did not 
desire more, it would be a proof that he had not used, that he had 
not profited by, what he had. Hence he will be on the look-out ... 
It (conscience) suggests to him a future judgment; it does not 
tell him how he can avoid it. Moreover, it does not tell him how 
he is to get better; he feels himself very sinful at the best; 
he feels himself in bondage to a tyranny which, alas! he loves 
too well, even while he hates it .. For all of these reasons then, 
---because he feels his ignorance, because he feels his bondage, 
because he feels his guilt and danger,--a religious man who has 
not the blessing of revelation, will be on the look-out for 
revelation.217 
Conscience and revelation coming from the same author are not to 
be viewed as in conflict, but in harmony with one another. 
Beginning then the subject very far back, I observe that the guide 
of life, implanted in our nature, discriminating right from wrong 
and investing right with authority and sway is our conscience, 
which revelation does but enlighten, strengthen and refine. 
Coming from the same author, these internal and external monitors 
of course recognize and bear witness to each other. Nature 
warrants without anticipating the supernatural, the supernatural 
completes without superseding nature.218 
J. Certitudes Beyond Ethics 
Thus far we have considered that God acting in conscience can guide 
the illative sense in the attainment of certitudes in the field of ethics. 
Let us now consider a further question. Can God acting in conscience aid 
the illative sense in arriving at certitudes beyond the field of ethics? 
Within the framework of Newman•s philosophy this is not an easy 
question to probe. It must be recalled that Newman primarily was con-
cerned with certitudes in the area of the philosophy of religion. He 
217os, ~1 75-77. 
2l8Hs, 3:79. Cf. Dev. p. 86. 
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endeavoured to acquire certitudes about God's existence, th~ attributes 
of ::,,d, and certitudes about ethical problems. It was these crucial 
questions of life which chiefly attracted him. It is for this reason 
that the question of certitude beyond these ethical regions and into the 
area of general certitudes should be considered with some caution. 
However, it would seem that if a person is alert to God's voice 
acting within his conscience, he will be properly disposed to the recep-
tion of certitudes in all fields of knowledge. It would seem too that 
conscience would teach a person that he should not only be receptive to 
certitudes in religious matters, but also in secular matters. 
He wrote, "Obedience to our conscience, in all things, great and 
small, is the vJay to know the truth."2.19 He also remarked. "Even the 
ordinary matters of life are an exercise of conscientiousness."2 20 
The word "conscientiousness" appears only a few times but it harbors 
a wealth of meaning. It means that a person is not only aware of his 
thinking and his actions, but he is aware of them in his conscience. It 
is not merely his body, mind, and feelings which are involved in his life, 
but all of his activity is centered in his conscience. Conscience is the 
very core of life for a conscientious man, and this can not help but be an 
aid in the attainment of certitude in all fields of knowledge. 
In two ways conscience can help a person to acquire certitudes in 
all fields of knowledge, and thus extend the number of certitudes in his 
possession. 
219ps, 1:227. GA, p. 426. ~. 7:199-200. 
220GA, p. 426. Cf. GA, p. 204. 
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First, conscience presents the obligation to search for and to 
inquire about additional certitudes. Conscience exhorts a person not 
to become isolated from further certitudes through indolence. Newman 
admonishes us about people "who make excuse for stifling an enquiry 
which conscience tells them they ought to pursue." 221 
Second, conscience obliges us to accept conclusions that are valid; 
it urges us to accept the action of the illative sense as it arrives at 
a conclusion. 
Newman cites several examples of this. In speaking about such 
truths as 25 being the mean proportional between 5 and 125; or that a 
tangent to a circle at the extremity of the radius makes an acute angle 
with it, or that Great Britain is an island, Newman claims that we have 
accepted such certitudes by the action of our minds, viz., by informal 
inferences and then he adds, "under a sense of duty to those conclusions 
and with an intellectual conscientiousness." 222 
Thus a conscientious person always tries to remove prejudices or 
biasses which will obviate his quest for certitude; he is ever open to 
certitudes in all fields of knowledge. Through his fidelity to con-
science and his responsibility towards the moral imperative of God's 
promptings in conscience, his illative sense is continually being 
developed and improved and among his formal, informal and natural in'-
ferences there is always a harmony. "Then the house is at peace. "223 
He is listening to the voice of God. 
221Ess. 1:217-20. Cf. GA, p. 425. 
222GA, p. 318. 223sE, p. 74. 
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11 lt is He who teaches us all knowledge; and the way by which we 
acquire it is His way.n224 Thus have we seen how God 1 s Kindly Light in 
conscience aids in the cultivation of the illative sense, and enables us 
to attain certitudes about Himself, about ourselves, about ethics and 
exhorts us to search for and to accept certitudes in all fields of 
knowledge. It also leads us to expect a divine revelation. 
In this chapter I have considered Newman 1 s dialogue with God in 
conscience. How would Newman respond to an atheist who would reject such 
a dialogue? Could an atheist have certitude? In the next chapter I 
shall consider these questions. 
K. Philosophical Summation 
The ultimate criterion for certitude is the illative sense. But is 
there any way in which the illative sense can be perfected and improved? 
It can be established that in the philosophy of Newman, God is the 
source of all certitude. When Newman speaks about God in this context, he 
does not refer to the type of contact we have with God as a result of the 
syllogisms of metaphysics. Newman v10uld not deny the validity of such 
proofs, but what he questioned was their practical value--do they awaken 
in people an awareness of their duties towards God? Newman believed that 
they failed to do this. 
The chosen proof for Newman about God 1 s existence was the argument 
from conscience. It is through this proof that a person is able to 
attain to a real apprehension and a real assent to the existence of God, 
and to His attributes. This is the most basic approach to God. 
224GA, p. 351. 
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Consciousness of conscience is in every person. Alth~ugh the 
activity of conscience is indivisible it can be considered under two 
aspects. 
Conscience is a moral sense and a sanction. It is a moral sense 
in that it declares whether specific action is right or wrong. It is a 
sanction in that it is a magisterial dictate; it threatens or it 
promises. 
From the actions of conscience we become aware of God. Newman uses 
the analogy of a person receiving a number of sensations which make him 
aware of the external world. It is from the movements of conscience that 
our minds are directed to God. Conscience directs us to a person, because 
such emotions could not be caused by inanimate objects. This person must 
be infinite because the dynamic activity of conscience is infinite. 
It is through the faithful following of God's promptings in our 
consciences that we are able to attain certitudes in ethics. God's voice 
in conscience perfects and improves the illative sense, through His clear 
and broad lessons. 
For Newman ethics is theocentric. An ethics devoid of God con-
stitutes the philosophical sin which eventually terminates in an ethics of 
chaos. 
Due to prejudices and a lack of preparation on our part, conscience 
can err. But even in the midst of errors there can be present an element 
of certitudes, and if that conscience is followed the certitudes can be 
developed and the errors eradicated. 
Conscience is also dependent on extrinsic sources as it helps to 
develop the illative sense in the attainment of certitudes. Among these 
extrinsic sources are oral and written traditions. If a person pursues 
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certitudes and is faithful to the moral imperatives of his conscience 
~ 
he will be on the look-out for still another extrinsic aid--Divine 
Revelation. 
Can conscience help us to arrive at certitudes beyond the field of 
ethics? While Newman was chiefly concerned with basic philosophical 
questions, it would seem that a fidelity to conscience would lead us to 
search for additional certitudes and dispose us to accept certitudes in 
all fields of knowledge. A person should be conscientious. All of his 
life would be directed by his conscience and in that way he has God 
guiding and strengthening his illative sense so that he can acquire 
certitudes. 
What would Newman's response be to an atheist who claimed certitude 
for atheism? This question will be considered in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER VI 
DIALOGUE WITH THE ATHEIST 
We have seen how the dialogue with God through conscience is 
central in the philosophy of Newman. All that he wrote about real and 
notional apprehensions, the distinction between inference and assent, in-
formal, natural, and formal reason, and the illative sense depend upon his 
certitude for God•s existence. Should he be in error on this crucial 
issue the rest of his philosophy would be nothing but a collection of 
superficial opinions. 
Newman has claimed that he is aware of ••intimations,•• 11 promptings:• 
"definite impressions:~ and 11 dictates and commands 11 in his conscience.225 
He can reflect on these phenomena and say, 11 I have certitude that God 
existS. 11 
To have certitude means that I know that I know. Certitude is a 
reflective act. I not only know, but I can reflect upon the reasons for 
my assent. The atheist therefore in order to be certain, must know and 
reflect on his reasons for denying the existence of God. Let us examine 
his reasons as Newman sees them. 
A. The Atheist•s Objections 
Newman presents two objections in support of the atheist•s position 
---evil in the world, and the claim that the world requires no further 
explanation. 
225GA, pp. 104-10. 
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The atheist sees an abundance of evil in the world. H,~ laments 
the wars, the bigotry, the hatreds, the destitution, the sicknesses, the 
hunger, and deaths, and asks: how can a good God be the author of such 
evils? Newman claims that the atheist would say, '11 You tell me that 
there is one God; and you tell me to look around into the world, and I 
shall see proofs of it. I do look abroad, and I see good and evil. I 
see the proof, then, of two gods, a good God, and another, evil. I see 
t1vo principles struggling with each other. ''' 226 The atheist is thus say-
ing that if there is evil in the world, God is not infinitely good, and 
if he is not infinitely good, he is not God. To Newman this means that 
the atheist denies that a providential God can draw good out of evil. 
The atheist also claims that when he looks around at the physical 
world, he does not see any scientific proof at all for the existence of 
God. 11 It seemed to him that all things would go on quite as well as at 
present, without the Divine hypothesis as with it. 11227 The atheist 
denies the proposition that everything in the world must be explained by 
a cause which requires no further explanation. He denies that the 
sufficient reason for the world is God. 
The atheist demands a scientific proof for God's existence. He will 
accept God's existence if he finds a strict formal proof; he wants 
definite, undeniable evidence for the existence of God. 
In dealing with these objections and the search for a strict formal 
proof, Newman readily admits that he has no simple and satisfactory solu-
tion for the atheist. He wrote, 11 Now I do not see how such an objector 
can be answered satisfactorily, if he is pertinacious. ''2 28 
226 
~. 6:336-7. 227GA, pp. 246-7. 228~, 6: 336-9. 
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B. Newman's Response 
Now Newman held that a strict formal proof for God's existence 
may teach divine power, necessity, skill, and goodness, but it says 
nothing about our duties towards Him. Too, formal physical proofs for 
the existence of God can be of help for some people, but such proofs are 
too deep, subtle, complex, indirect, and delicate to be analyzed and 
brought out into formal argument on a level that can be comprehended by 
the multitude of men. Such strict formal proofs require time for reflec-
tion and study accompanied by learning and cultivation of mind. 
Newman suggests therefore that the atheist, whether highly or simply 
educated, should understand himself reflectively, and become attentive to 
the movements within his conscience, for it is in this way that we can 
all believe there is a God. The activities of conscience may be difficult 
to put into words but the experience is there and available for reflection. 
He wrote: 
There is a voice within us, which assures us that there is some-
thing higher than earth. We cannot analyze, define, contemplate 
what it is that thus whispers to us. It has no shape or material 
form. There is that in our hearts which prompts us to religion, 
and which condemns and chastises sin.229 
This is a claim then that in every person there is a conscience 
which is the voice of God. No one can escape this phenomenon. It is 
beyond one's control. It consistently directs a person to God. 
Still the question could persist: if, as Newman claims, the 
promptings of conscience are present in every person, why does not an 
atheist acknowledge the presence of God in these promptings? If Newman 
229~, 6:339-40. 
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and theists recognize and accept the evidence, why do atheists fail to 
find the same evidence? Indeed, why does the atheist claim the 
evidence points in fact to God's non-existence? It seems there is evi-
dence here from one and the selfsame source for contradictory certitudes. 
This requires an explanation. 
Newman claimed that the atheist cannot help but be conscious of 
"promptings" in his conscience, only he fails to attribute these prompt-
ings to God. 
But then it occurred to him, that this inward moral law was 
there within his breast, whether there was a God or not, and 
that it was a round-about way of enforcing that law to say 
that it came from God, and simply unnecessary, considering 
it carried with it its own sacred and sovereign authority as 
our feelings instinctively testified.230 
How can this be? How is it that the atheist can be aware of these 
promptings in his conscience and not attribute them to God? 
Considering the conscience of an atheist Ne\'1!1lan wrote, "Conscience 
tends to become what is called a moral sense; the command of duty is a 
sort of taste; sin is not an offense against God,. but against human 
nature."23l 
By the phrase "moral sense" Newman means that conscience exercises 
a critical office; it is a rule of right conduct. By the phrase 
"command of duty" he means that conscience is a sanction; it exercises a 
judicial office of approval or disapproval. This sanction involves the 
approval or disapproval of God. It does not merely mean a disharmony 
within ourselves, or a conflict with social customs. 
23°GA, pp. 246-7. 
231Idea., p. 191. 
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The conscience of an atheist is, so to speak, kept within itself. 
It senses no divine influence. Newman wrote: 
Conscience to them is not the word of a lawgiver, as it ought 
to be, but the dictate of their own minds and nothing more; it 
is because they do not look through and beyond their own minds 
to their Maker, but are engrossed in notions of what is due to 
themselves, to their own dignity, and their own consistency. 
Their conscience has become a mere self-respect.232 
Thus, the atheist can act in accordance with his conscience, and 
merely accept conscience as a moral sense. His conscience tells him what 
is right or wrong in a given situation. However, in place of the sanction 
which should direct him to God, he is being directed by self-respect, 
personal dignity, and respect for social customs and opinions. 
It can be noted that the ethics of the atheist is similar to that 
of the gentleman which Newman describes in the Idea of~ University. The 
atheist and the gentleman have this in common; they have separated ethics 
from God. This is not to say that the gentleman is necessarily an 
atheist, but simply to say that if he does believe in God, his belief does 
not enter into his ethical life. 
Yet, the problem remains. The atheistic humanist does not attribute 
the intimations in his conscience to God. He claims to have certitude that 
God does not exist, while Newman claims that he has certitude that the 
promptings in his conscience direct him to God. 
232Ibid., p. 192. Cf. Mix., p. 152; GA, p. 106. For a detailed 
discussion of this matter see Chapter IV, pp. 
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C. The Problem of Conflicting Certitudes 
This is an instance of conflicting and contradictory certitudes. 
Both Newman and the atheist have made the assent of certitude, and have 
advanced reflective reasons for their certitudes. How is this explained 
in the light of Newman 1 S philosophy? 
Newman acknowledges that there can be .conflicting certitudes, and 
that two persons can possess opposite certitudes. He gives a number of 
examples: 
Rival philosophers seize on new discoveries, each as being 
in favour of his own hypotheses; it is not indeed, many instances 
which are critical and decisive. Are we told of some strange 
appearance at night in some solitary place? Those who are fond 
of the marvelous, think of an apparition; those who live in the 
rational and tangible, decide that it has been some gleam of the 
moonbeam, or some wayfarer or beggar, or some trick intended to 
frighten the passer-by. Thus history also reads in one way to 
one, in another to another. There are those who think the French 
at the bottom of all the mischief which happens to England and 
Ireland, others lay it to the Russians.233 
Furthermore, Newman observed that there can even be contradictory 
certitudes about God 1 s existence. He wrote about a professed science of 
atheism whose adherents would claim certitude. 
We have a professed science of Atheism, another of Deism, a 
Pantheistic, ever so many Christian theologies, to say nothing 
of Judaism, Islamism, and the Oriental religions. Each of these 
creeds has its own upholders, it may happen, presently giving it 
up, and then taking up some other creed, and being certain again, 
as they profess, that it and it only is the truth, these various 
so-called truths being incompatible with each other.234 
He realized that not only could there be conflicting certitudes 
among several persons, but there could also be conflicting certitudes 
233Prepos., p. 248. Cf. GA, p. 231,256. 
234GA, p. 241. 
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within the same person. He wrote: 
That I am certain of this proposition today, is no ground 
for thinking that I shall have a right to be certain of that 
proposition to-morro\'/, and that I am wrong in my convictions 
about to-day 1 s proposition, does not hinder my having a true 
conviction, a genuine certitude about to-morrow 1 s proposition.235 
He recognized the perplexing problem. If certitude is indefectible, 
if it can never fail, if it possesses perfection, how can it ever be 
erroneous, and if it has failed how can I ever trust in what I consider 
to be certitude? 
He delineated the problem: 
Now how can security be mine,--without which certitude is not,--
if I know as I know too well, that before now I have thought 
myself certain, when I was certain after all of an untruth? Is 
not the very possibility of certitude lost to me for ever by 
that one mistake? What happened once, may happen again. All my 
certitudes before and after are henceforth destroyed by the 
introduction of a reasonable doubt, underlying them all. Ipso 
facto they cease to be certitudes,--they come short of unconditional 
assents by the measure of that counterfeit assurance. They are 
nothing more to me than opinions or anticipations, judgments on 
the verisimilitude of intellectual views, not the possession and 
enjoyment of truths. And who has not thus been balked by false 
certitudes a hundred times in the course of his experience? And 
how can certitude have a legitimate place in our mental constitu-
tion, when it thus manifestly ministers to error and to 
scepticism?236 
D. Solutions Rejected Qi Newman 
The problem is clear and at this juncture it may seem to some that a 
possible solution v1ould be simply to deny the possibility of objective 
certitude. If there were no objective truths then both sides of con-
tradictory propositions could be correct. 
235Ibid., p. 227. Cf. p. 222. 
236GA, p. 228. Cf. Apo., p. 205. 
Newman, however, never doubted 
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that there were objective certitudes. He stated: 
This, then from the nature of the case, is a main character-
istic of certitude in any matter, to be confident indeed 
that that certitude will last, but to be confident of this 
also, that if it did fail, nevertheless, the thing itself, 
whatever it is, of which we are certain, will remain just as 
it is, true and irreversible.237 
If Newman does not elect to resolve the problem of conflicting and 
contradictory certitudes by a denial of objective certitude, how does he 
resolve the difficulty? Could he simply deny the possibility of con-
tradictory certitudes both objectively true? He could then consistently 
say both the atheist and the theist have subjective certitude seeing they 
both have studied and personal reasons for their respective positions, 
but that only one would have both subjective and objective certitude. 
This, interestingly enough, is not Newman 1 s solution. This would be more 
of an adroit evasion of the problem rather than the solution. In regard 
to such an irrelevant approach Newman wrote: 
I will not urge (lest I should be accused of quibbling), 
that certitude is a conviction of what is true, and that these 
so-called certitudes have come to naught, because, their objects 
being errors, not truths, they were not certitudes at all; now 
will I insist, as I might, that they ought to be proved first to 
be something more than mere prejudices, assents without reason 
and judgment, before they can be taken as instances of the 
defectibility of certitude.238 
Newman, therefore, acknowledges that the problem can not be solved 
simply by saying that one person is objectively correct and possesses 
certitude, while the other person is objectively wrong and possesses a 
237GA, pp. l99-200.Ibid. pp. 195-6, p. 222, p. 243, p. 385; Dev., 
pp. 357-8. 
238GA, p. 252. 
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prejudice, an opinion or a probability. The problem is deeper and goes 
beyond this point. The problematic is how can a person be in error 
about a certitude when certitude is considered to be indefectible? The 
problem occurs because a person who is in error is sincerely convinced 
that he possesses a certitude. 
E. Newman 1 s Solution to the Problem 
--
Newman accepts the full significance of the problem. He admits 
that there are true certitudes and there are false certitudes. He wrote, 
11 I have defined certitude as a conviction of 1-vha t is true. When a con-
viction of what is not true is considered as if it was a conviction of 
what is true, I have called it a false certitude. 11 239 
Newman concedes that a person can possess a certitude that is 
erroneous. For if certitude lacked the possibility of error, it would be 
239Letters and Diaries, 24:375. Certitude or a conviction of what 
is true is also called a true certitude or a genuine certitude. Its 
object is a proposition that is actually true. If the word 11 Certitude 11 
is used without any modifier Newman means a true certitude. When he 
defines certitude as a conviction of what is true, he does not mean that 
certitude is equivalent to universal infallibility. He does not use this 
definition as a universal principle from which he unerringly deduces the 
existence of particular certitudes. The response given to the ontological 
argument can be given here. It would be an illicit transit from the 
logical to the real order. The certitudes treated by Newman are based 
upon real apprehensions experienced by a person. For a detailed discus-
sion of this matter see pp. 29, 85-7 above. Certitudes resulting from 
these experiences are, as we shall see later in this chapter, generally 
true. A conviction of what is not true is termed a false, mistaken, 
putative, wrong, supposed or so-called certitude. Its object is an 
error. We might also note that while it is possible to speak of a true 
or a fa 1 se certitude, it would be redundant to speak of a true certainty, II· 
and a contradiction to speak of a false certainty, since although 
certitude is a state of the mind, certainty is a quality of propositions. I, 
GA, pp. 221 -58. 
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identified with infallibility. This would be inconceivable. Through a 
series of rhetorical questions he proves his point. If we are to insist 
upon certitude in every case being free from the possibility of error, 
he then asked: 
Is certitude then ever possible without the attendant gift of 
infallibility? Can we know what is right in one case, unless 
we are secured against error in any? Further, if one man is 
infallible, why is he different from his brethren? unless he 
is distinctly marked out for the prerogative? Must not all men 
be infallible by consequence, if any man is to be considered to 
be certain?240 
Thus Newman makes a clear distinction between certitude and 
infallibility. Infallibility 11 is a faculty or gift, and relates, not to 
some one truth in particular, but to all possible propositions in a given 
subject-matter. 11241 Infallibility does not allow for any failure in 
regard to truth. 
This he would not claim for his assent to certitude. 
If indeed I claimed to be infallible, one failure would shiver 
my claim to pieces; but I may claim to be certain of the truth 
to which I have already attained, though I should arrive at no 
new truths in addition as long as I live.24c 
Newman explains how his assent to certitude can be fallible. Such 
errors are the result of faulty reasoning. 
It must be recollected that certitude is a deliberate assent 
given expressly after reasoning. If then my certitude is un-
founded it is the reasoning that is in fault, not my assent to it. 
It is the law of my mind to seal up the conclusions to which ratio-
cination has brought me, by that formal assent which I have called 
a certitude. I could indeed have withheld my assent, but I should 
have acted against my nature, had I done so when there was what 
I considered a proof; and I did only what was fitting, what was 
24°GA, pp. 222-3. 
242Ibid., p. 227. 
241 Ibid., p. 224. 
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incumbent on me, upon those existing conditions, in gjving 
it. 243 
Though the idea of an erroneous certitude should perhaps have dis-
comfitted Newman, we find that it did not. Instead, he views the situa-
tion positively. He reminds us that even after ailing from the discovery 
of a putative certitude there can be certitude in the process. He 
points out, "Because I have been mistaken in my first certitude, may I 
not at least be certain that I have been mistaken?'' 244 Here Newman is 
stating that even an erroneous certitude can eventually reside at the 
oasis of true certitude. It is the certitude that occurs with the 
recognition of the error. 
In addition to faulty reasoning he offers another explanation for 
an erroneous certitude. This would be a failure to reason at all, and 
thus to assent arbitrarily. 
He wrote, "The multitude of men confuse together the probable, the 
possible, and the certain, and apply these terms to doctrines and state-
ments almost at random. They only assert." 245 The above indicates that 
the \vord "certitude" has several uses. This is described in the chart 
below. 
Although Newman grants that there can be putative certitudes, he 
claims that this factor should not be a motive for relinquishing our 
hopes of attaining genuine certitudes and growing in them. He states that 
such errors should induce us to reason with more circumspection. He wrote, 
"Errors in reasoning are lessons and warnings not to give up reasoning, 
but to reason with greater caution." 246 
243GA, p. 229 
245 Ibid., p. 234. 
244Ibid., p. 231. 
246Ibid., p. 230. 
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Schematic of Certitudes 
I. A. Correct Reasoning II. A. Erroneous*Reasoning 
B. True Conclusion B. False Conclusion 
c. Simple Assent c. Simple Assent 
D. Complex Assent--Reflection D. Complex Assent--
Reflection 
E. True Certitude regarding E. False Certitude I. B. regarding II.B. 
III. A. No Reasoning IV. A. No Reasoning 
B. True Proposition B. False Proposition 
c. Simple Assent c. Simple Assent 
D. Complex Assent--Reflection D. Complex Assent--
Reflection 
E. Pseudo 11 Certitude 11 regarding E. False 11 Certitude 11 II I B. Right by accident. regarding IV.B. 
*Erroneous reasoning means that either the premises are false or the 
logical process is incorrect. This may be due to biased antecedent 
probabilities, i.e. prejudicial expectations. 
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He believed that as man proceeds through life he will ~continue to 
acquire more certitudes in spite of occasional errors. In substance he 
is stating that 11 the abuse of a process should not prevent its use. 11247 
He compared errors in certitude to clocks that give the wrong 
time. Just as we do not dispense with clocks, but attempt to correct 
them, so do we not abandon our quest for certitude. He wrote: 
The sense of certitude may be called the bell of the intellect; 
and that it strikes when it should not is a proof that the 
clock is out of order, no proof that the bell will be untrust-
worthy and useless, when it comes to us adjusted and regulated 
from the hands of the clock-maker.248 
While all this may seem to have deviated from our point at issue, 
it reaJly has not. For the crux of Newman's response to the problem of 
conflicting certitudes is that ordinarily the bell of the intellect, the 
sense of certitude, has a basis in solid reasoning and does strike at the 
correct times. This is a very important point. While Newman grants that 
due to a lack of proper reasoning or an utter neglect of reasoning, 
erroneous certitudes will arise, certitude generally is attained or in any 
case is attainable. Thus it can be stated that certitude~~ general 
rule is correct in each of us. He would admit that if failures to gain 
certitude often happened, a person would always be doubtful about his 
ability to find serenity and finality in certitudes. He wrote: 
If certitude in any matter be the termination of all doubt 
or fear about its truth, and an unconditional conscious 
adherence to it, it carries with it an inward assurance, 
247rbid., p. 232. Usum non tollit abusus. 
248GA, p. 233. 
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strong though implicit, that it shall never fail. Indefect-
ibility almost enters into its very idea, enters into it at 
least so far as this, that its failure, if of frequent 
occurrence, would prove that certitude was after all and in 
fact an impossible act, and that what looked like it was a 
mere extravagance of the intellect. Truth would still be 
truth, but the knowledge of it would be beyond us and un-
attainable.249 
It is of great importance, therefore, to realize that as a general 
rule, certitude does not fail; that failures of what was mistaken for 
certitude are clearly the exception; that the intellect, which is made 
for truth, can attain truth, and, having attained it, can keep it, can 
recognize it, and preserve the recognition. 
F. The Atheist Replies 
But if as Newman has stated there is objective certitude, and as a 
general rule a person can acquire indefectible certitude, would such a 
response be acceptable to an atheist? It would seem that the educated 
atheist 1 s claim to a counter-certitude has not been answered at all by 
all these lengthly explanations 
Is it not possible for the atheist to say to Newman, as a general 
rule your certitudes are correct, but not in regard to God 1 S existence? 
Could not the atheist say to Newman, 11 You possess a great number of 
certitudes about such subjects as your existence, the informations you 
receive from your sense and your memory, your knowledge of the external 
world, your awareness that England is an island, that you shall die, that 
man is a being in progress, but you still lack certitude about God 1 S 
existence? Your certitude about God 1 s existence is supposed, putative and 
false. Show me why your certitude is not provincial, prejudicial and thus 
249 Ibid., p. 221. p. 255. 
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unconvincing.'' 
G. Newman's Answer 
To this segment of the objection Newman could respond that while 
his approach to certitude is personal he has made a sincere effort not 
to be provincial nor prejudicial. He would hope that he was convincing 
about his personal approach to God's existence since this truth is within 
a narrow area in which certitude is readily attainable. In this confined 
area, according to Newman, can be found certitudes about God's existence, 
our own existence, and the existence of the external world. In this area 
Newman would find it impossible to conceive the presence of false certi-
tudes even by way of exception for here the evidence is overwhelming. 
Newman would not expect to be convincing about every certitude, but about 
these and other basic certitudes he would hope to be convincing. 
At this juncture it is important to note that Newman admitted that 
there is a huge area of philosophical exploration in which there are 
opinions, probabilities, convictions, and certitudes. In that vast area 
it is possible at times to be in error about certitudes. In this large 
area it can be said that a person generally attains certitude. But also 
there is a much more constricted area, and within that area are general, 
basic and primary truths for human and divine knowledge. 
He wrote: 
Hence it is that--the province of certitude being so con-
tracted, and that of opinion so large--it is common to call 
probability the guide of life. This saying, vJhen properly ex-
plained, is true; however, we must not suffer ourselves to carry 
a true maxim to an extreme; it is far from true, if we so hold 
it as to forget that without first principles there can be no 
conclusions at all, and that thus probability does in some sense 
presuppose and require the existence of truths which are certain. 
Especially is the maxim untrue, in respect to the other great 
department of knowledge, the spiritual, if taken to support the 
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doctrine, that the first principles and elements of reiigion, 
which are universally received, are mere matter of opinion; 
though in this day, it is too often taken for granted that 
religion is one of those subjects on which truth cannot be 
discovered, and on \-vhich one conclusion is pretty much on a 
level with another. But on the contrary, the initial truths 
of divine knowledge ought to be viewed as parallel to the 
initial truths of secular: as the latter are certain, so too 
are the former.250 
Newman has stated that even probabilities in some sense depend on 
certitudes, and that just as there are certitudes for the secular sciences, 
there are certitudes in the field of religion. What are these initial and 
basic certitudes? He specified what they are: 
It is no proabability that we are constantly receiving the informa-
tions and dictates of sense and memory, of our intellectual 
instincts, of the moral sense, and of the logical faculty. It is 
no probability that we receive the generalizations of science, and 
the great outlines of history. These are certain truths; and from 
them each of us forms his own judgments and directs his own course, 
according to the probabilities which they suggest to him, as the 
navigator applies his observations and his charts for the 
determination of his course. Such is the main view to be taken 
of the separate provinces of probability and certainty in matters 
of this world; and so, as regards the world invisible and future, 
we have a direct and conscious knowledge of our Maker, His 
attributes, His Qrovidences, acts, works, and will, from nature, 
and revelation.2:51 
It will be noted that while Newman concedes that there is a large 
area of probability in philosophy, there still remains that narrow area in 
which along with other truths we have a direct and conscious knowledge of 
the dictates and commands of God in our conscience. It should be recalled 
that for Newman the awareness of God in conscience was as evident to him 
as his own existence and as certain. To deny the existence of God was 
comparable to a denial of his own existence. In his Apologia Pro Vita Sua 
he wrote: 
250GA, p. 237. Cf. p. 240. 2 51 GA , p . 2 3 9 • 
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And if I am asked why I believe in a God I answer that it is 
because I believe in myself, for I feel it impossible to 
believe in my own existence (and of that fact I am quite sure) 
without believing also in the existence of Him, who lives as a 
Personal, All-seeing, All-judging Being in my conscience. Now 
I dare say, I have not expressed myself with philosophical 
correctness, because I have not given myself to the study of 
what metaphysicians have said on the subject; but I think I 
have a strong true meaning in what I say which will stand 
examination.252 
He also stated that God•s existence was for him as evident as the 
external world. He wrote, 11 We may, by means of that induction from 
particular experiences of conscience, have as good a warrant for con-
eluding the Ubiquitous Presence of One Supreme Master, as we have, from 
parallel experience of sense, for assenting to the fact of a multiform 
and vast world material and mental. 11253 He maintained that as we have 
our initial knowledge of the universe through sense, so do we in the 
first instance begin to learn about God•s sanction from conscience which 
is indelible. So great was the evidence for God•s existence that to deny 
the existence of God was comparable to a denial of the external world for 
Newman. 
The atheist may still question whether there is a constricted area 
of certitudes in which the existence of God is found; he may still ques-
tion whether there is such a direct, conscious and certain knowledge of 
God through conscience, but all that NevJman can reply to these objections 
is that he has honestly and accurately related his own experience which 
252Apo., p. 18, p. 198; Cf. p. 241. 
253GA, p. 63. Cf. Mix., p. 261. 
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may or may not be the experience of others. 
Here Newman is illustrating his contention that in the philosophy 
of religion, metaphysics and ethics, egotism is true modesty. He wrote: 
In religious inquiry each of us can speak only for himself, 
and for himself he has a right to speak. His own experiences 
are enough for himself, but he cannot speak for others; he can-
not lay down the law; he can only bring his own experiences to 
the common stock of psychological facts. He knows what has 
satisfied and satisfies himself; if it satisfies him, it is 
likely to satisfy others; if, as he believes and is sure, it is 
true, it will approve itself to others also, for there is but 
one truth. And doubtless he does find in fact, that, allowing 
for the difference of minds and of modes of speech, what con-
vinces him, does convince other also.254 
Newman speaks about his own experiences as the basis for his 
religious inquiry. The objection could be raised is he merely speaking 
about his own emotions and feelings? If his experience is merely 
appetitive it would be singular. No relations could be developed among 
his various experiences. His experience would then become nothing but a 
number of isolated concrete incidents. This, however, is not Newman 1 S 
meaning for experience. It must be recalled that when Newman speaks about 
his experiences he is not only speaking about his sensations and feelings, 
but he is also speaking about a temper of the mind that acknowledges the 
authority of a vast number of intellectual procedures. While the probabi-
lities--the ordered assemblage of concrete instances--are based on 
experience, they are under the direction of the illative sense which has 
an intellectual character. It is not easy to express this activity in 
words, nor to analyze it philosophically, but nevertheless the illative 
254GA, 384-5. For a detailed discussion of this type of emp1r1c1sm 
see pp. 36--46 above. Also note the intellectual aspect of the illative 
sense pp. ·a2-J above. Finally note the relationships between informal 
and formal logic pp.SJ-67, pp. 98-9: above. 
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r 146 sense organizes, correlates, and interprets the confluence of these 
concrete instances. The result is subject to an assent which may or 
may not be given. Whether the mind accepts or rejects this convergence 
of probabilities is the prerogative of the illative sense. Also it 
should be recalled that formal inference acts as a guide and a test for 
natural and informal inferences. Due to these intellectual procedures 
experience as considered by Newman goes beyond the singularity of the 
sensitive and the appetitive; it possesses the attributes of the common 
and the universal, and in that sense can be termed transpersonal. 
H. Newman Admits his Limitations 
Newman realized that he had embarked on an arduous philosophical 
journey. To the best of his ability he has recorded his experiences, his 
feelings, his reasoning processes, and his certitudes. He regretted that 
he was unable to be more helpful to others as they sincerely searched for 
certitude. He lamented the fact that he was unable to present a better 
essay on an aid to certitude. He confessed the great difficulties he had 
in writing his philosophy of certitude, and he expressed distress that his 
investigations were not all that he had hoped they would be. In a letter 
to his close friend Edward Bellasis he wrote: 
Each book took a great deal of time and tried me very much. 
This (my work on certitude), has tried me most of all. I 
have written and rewritten it ·more times that I can count. 
I have now got up to the highest point--! mean, I could not 
do better did I spend a century on it, but then, it may be 
1 bad is the best. ~~55 
255Life~, 2:262. Cf. 2:266, AW, 273. 
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Newman felt that he had made a good beginning in a significant 
field. He did not expect universal acceptance from his readers. He 
realized that there was more to be done. In describing his project he 
said, 11 It is like a military reconnaissance, or a party in undress, or a 
house in Committee; it is a preliminary opening of the ground, which must 
be done at one's ease, if it is done at all. 11256 
Yet, despite his own reservations and acknowledged limitations, 
Newman has described a simple, direct, practical and accessible method 
for acquiring certitude about God's existence, and also for acquiring 
certitude about other basic truths. 
I. Newman's Criterion for Certitude 
The question finally may be raised, what criterion does Newman 
employ that enables him to be certain he is right and the atheist in 
error on the question of God's existence? How is he able to move from 
the many probabilities produced by the real apprehensions of the prompt-
ings in his conscience to an unconditional assent which then is sure it 
has the truth, not the contradictory proposition? 
His criterion is not merely an examination of the inferences and 
the evidences which can lead to a complex assent and an actual certitude. 
Although a critical examination of the natural, informal and formal in-
ferences is required in disputations, as we have seen in the dialogue with 
atheism, there must be·a step beyond the scrutiny of the inferences, 
important though this be, since as we have stated, Newman has claimed that 
256Life., 2:266. Cf. Ibid., 2:273; Idea., p. 474. 
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there is a distinction between the conclusion resulting fro~ an in-
ference and an unconditional assent. 
His faculty for moving from inference to assent, as we have seen 
in Chapter Four, is the illative sense.257 The illative sense is the 
giver of certitude and the norm. The estimation of the evidence in its 
entirety is the function of the illative sense. It is the illative 
sense that enables the individual mind to move from the probabilities, 
which are an ordered assemblage of concrete instances having the special 
quality of strengthening one another, to the unconditional acceptance or 
assent to God 1 S existence. Thus it is not merely through faith, nor 
through opinion, that we affirm that God exists, but through implicit and 
explicit reasoning which is not always easy to express verbally since at 
a certain point language languishes. 
It must be acknowledged that the illative sense functioning also 
in the atheist leads him to assent to the conclusion that there is no God. 
The atheist 1 s and Newman 1 s personal circumstances, experiences, and 
reasons may be analyzed and compared as we have attempted to do in this 
section, but eventually it is the illative sense in each which brings them 
to their respective verdicts. This, as far as I can find out in Newman 1 S 
writings, is his final word on this matter. There is, one must finally 
admit, no other test and therefore no other resolution possible between 
these opposing certitudes. 
257For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 82-91. 
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It is the spontaneous and natural activity of the ill~tive sense 
which is the final court of appeal for all certitudes in the concrete. 
In Chapter Five we have seen that the illative sense can be perfected 
and strengthened through an awareness and fidelity to God 1 s intimations 
in conscience. 258 It should also be acknowledged that if the promptings 
in conscience are rejected the illative sense can regress and be more 
likely to err. However, when speaking about acquiring certitude for 
God 1 S existence, it would be illogical and improper to say that God 
strengthens and perfects the illative sense so that the organon can 
accurately function. This would be begging the question. In effect, we 
would be claiming that the illative sense enables us to have certitude 
that God exists, and God enables the illative sense to be reliable. 
But once the existence of God has been established it is impossible 
to state that the divine commands and dictates communicated through con-
science improve and strengthen the illative sense with regard to ethical 
certitudes and also non-ethical certitudes. 
Newman would maintain that if a person were faithful to God 1 S 
promptings in his conscience he would deepen and perfect his certitudes 
and enlarge the field of his certitudes. His life would not remain 
stagnant in skepticism nor paralyzed by doubts, but with each day there 
would be experiences that would challenge him to reexamine, to change or 
to enhance, to decrease or to expand his certitudes. He would continually 
acquire certitudes which possess the characteristics of rationality, 
serenity and indefectibility. 
The pertinent and unavoidable question to be considered in the next 
25Bsee pp. 113- 20. 
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and concluding chapter is, what is the relevance of Newman's dialogues 
today? Are they dated? Are they simply a work of beauty for the 
scholars in English literature? Can they be of any assistance whatso-
ever in solving contemporary philosophical problems? 
J. Philosophical Summation 
According to Newman there are two reasons why the atheist will not 
assent to God's existence---evil in the world, and the claim that the 
world requires no further explanation. He remarks that because of evil 
in the world God is not infinitely good, and if he is not infinitely good, 
he is not God. To Newman this means that the atheist denies that a 
providential God can draw good out of evil. The atheist also claims that 
the world requires no further explanation. He denies that the sufficient 
reason for the world is God. 
Although Newman sees a value in strict, formal proofs for God's 
existence, he does not answer the atheist with such complexities. He 
chooses the proof from conscience which not only leads us to God, but 
also enables us to understand our duties towards Him through its dictates 
and commands. 
While the atheist also has dictates and commands in his conscience, 
he does not recognize God as their source. For the atheist consicence 
is a mere moral sense; its sanction is not God but merely a self-respect, 
personal dignity, a respect for social customs. This is an instance of 
the problem of conflicting certitudes. 
What is the solution? Objective certitude could be denied, then the 
result would be that both the theist and the atheist could be correct. 
Newman, however, consistently claimed that there were objective certitudes. 
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Could Newman simply say that in the event of conflictipg certi-
tudes one proposition is subjectively and objectively true, while the 
other proposition is only subjectively true? This for Newman would be 
an evasion of the question, since the grave problematic is how can there 
be false certitudes when certitude is indefectible? 
Newman admits that there are false certitudes. If there were no 
false certitudes, then every person would possess the gift of infalli-
bility in all subjects. Certitude can be fallible because of faulty 
reasoning or an utter failure to reason. Such errors in reasoning should 
not cause a person to relinquish reason, but to reason with greater 
caution. Newman compared errors in certitude to clocks that strike at 
the wrong time. Clocks are not abandoned, but adjusted. The crucial 
point about such errors is that they are the exception. As a general 
rule certitude is indefectible. But could the atheist 'respond that he 
could accept the claim that certitude in general is indefectible, but one 
of its exceptions is the certitude about God 1 S existence? 
While Newman admits that there is a large area of philosophy in 
which there are opinions, probabilities, and convictions, God 1 s existence 
is not found in that area. Certitude for God 1 S existence is found within 
a constricted area in which there are general, basic, and primary truths 
for human and divine knowledge. In this area it is impossible to conceive 
of a false certitude. For Newman to deny God 1 s existence VJas tantamount 
to a denial of his own existence and the existence of the external world. 
If the atheist were to deny that there is such a constricted area in 
which some certitudes are readily attainable, Newman could only reply that 
he is relating his own experiences to the best of his ability. 
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A final question may be raised. What is Newman's criterion for 
moving from the many probabilities produced by a reflection on the real 
apprehensions of the promptings in his conscience to the unconditional 
assent to God's existence? It is the illative sense which estimates the 
evidence in its entirety and enables the individual mind to move from the 
probabilities, which are an ordered assemblage of concrete instances 
having the special quality of strengthening one another, to the un-
conditional assent to God's existence. 
It must also be acknowledged that it is the illative sense in the 
atheist that leads him to assert to the conclusion that God does not 
exist. The circumstances, experiences, and the reasons of the theist 
and the atheist may be analyzed and compared, but it is the illative 
sense in each which brings them to their verdicts. 
Once the existence of God has been established it is possible to 
state that the divine communications in conscience improves and 
strengthens the illative sense with regard to the recognition of ethical 
certitudes and certitudes even beyond the field of ethics. In the final 
chapter we shall consider the current relevance of Newman's philosophy. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
It was Newman's intention to respond to Liberalism which holds 
that demonstration or formal logic is the only basis for any certitude, 
and that there is no basis for certitude in religion. Newman has shown 
that the processes of rationcination involve more than formal logic. 
There is also informal and natural logic. It is through this larger 
view of logic that a basis for certitude is found in religion, and such 
a basis can be extended to all fields of knowledge. 
Today the problem of certitude is still with us. In fact it may be 
more of a problem now than in the time of Newman. Today there are 
thinkers who maintain that in religion there can be no certitude, and some 
will even go so far as to accept fideism, and thus really deny the require-
ment of any certitudes for religion. 
Currently too there are still some philosophers who will claim that 
formal logic or demonstration is the only road to certitude, and there are 
still others who accept the-position that certitude can not be found any-
where. For them the only certitude is their ceaseless claim that there 
is no certitude. Thus either positively or negatively all contemporary 
philosophers are concerned with this basic issue of certitude. 
As we have seen Newman answered this philosophy of ''Liberalism~~ 
through his dialogues with Locke, Butler, Aristotle, and the voice of God 
in conscience. 
In these dialogues we noted agreement and disagreement with each 
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philosopher. Newman had the rare ability of entering into the mind of 
a philosopher, understanding the crux of his position, appropriating 
what he could accept, and then rectifying and restating the philoso-
pher 1 s position in accordance with his own views. 
A. Locke 
We noted how Newman in his quest for certitude could agree with 
Locke 1 s direct, immediate, simple, and personal approach to empirical 
truths. But the personal empiricism of Newman meant far more than the 
limited and esoteric experience of Locke. Newman saw the need for study-
ing all of the activities of the living mind. He explored the cognitive 
operations of the whole man. 
Empiricism for Newman meant all of the sensitive, imaginative, and 
intellectual processes; it meant consciousness and conscientiousness. 
This extensive empiricism could not be reduced to how a man ought to 
think on Locke 1 s lofty level, but rather how he actually thought. He 
refused to be manipulated by a priori or authoritarian assumptions. It 
was through his wider empirical investigations that Newman found that 
there was a definite difference between inference and assent. 
Unfortunately in Locke 1 s philosophy and in much of our current 
philosophy, the act of assent is frequently forgotten, ignored, or 
identified with inference. Newman examined both inferences and assents. 
He observed that men could have inferences without assents, and retain 
assents about forgotten inferences. Thus Newman showed that there was a 
difference between inference and assent. He was aware that after a review 
of a number of inferences, we finally seal up our ratiocinational labors 
with a new and distinct act, an assent to a definite conclusion. 
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On this subject he found it necessary to disagree with_ Locke who 
claimed that there were degrees of assent; that each assent was secured 
to an inference, and only with the conscious and verbal expression of 
formal inference could there be the assent of absolute certainty. From 
his own empirical observations Newman knew that the average person, un-
tutored in formal logic, and, in fact, incapable of mastering its 
intricacies and subtle patterns, does validly arrive at certitudes. 
Newman believed that Locke demanded too much from mankind, 
especially from the ordinary person. Philosophy for Nev:rnan was not a 
mere classroom discipline. Although he was at horne in the university and 
cherished the wisdom he found in books, he recognized the need of addi-
tional data--in particular the date acquired through the study of living 
minds. 
He claimed that all of us live with a number of philosophical certi-
tudes produced by the activities of our living minds. While certainty is 
the product of strict formal demonstrations, certitudes are the results 
of informal and natural inferences. The objects of these informal and 
natural inferences are the probabilities and eventually certitude is found 
through a convergence of these probabilities. 
B. Butler 
With Butler, Newman could agree that probabilities are the guide of 
life; but he would not employ the word "probabilities" in the same sense. 
Probabilities according to Newman do not mean propositions which are likely 
to be true. In the concrete they are based on facts, on which a "higher· 
logic" is to be exercised in order to arrive at viable certitudes. This 
"higher logic" is produced by the illative sense. Under the discernment 
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of the illative sense the probabilities are ordered and relaJed so that 
an interpretative certitude is attained, and if this interpretative 
certitude is reflected upon, an actual certitude is discovered. 
It is possible to have a real assent to a truth, but to remain un-
conscious or only semi-conscious of the reasons for the assent. This is 
an interpretative certitude. After a reflection upon the evidences and 
the reasons an actual certitude is attained. With this reflection I can 
not only say that I know, but I know that I know. 
While the results of such mental activity are evident, there is 
an element of mystery in the movements of the unconscious and the semi-
conscious mind. From the operation of the unconscious and the semi-
conscious mind, natural and informal inferences occur, and a basis for 
certitude is found. The results are evident, but how this occurs is 
difficult to state. It should be recalled that Newman was more concerned 
with these mental phenomena in facto esse than in fieri. 
C. Aristotle 
With Aristotle, Newman could agree about the grandeur of formal 
logic, but he also perceived its limitations. While it can be a guide for 
informal and natural inferences, it assumes its premises, and it does not 
present certitude in the concrete. Newman had but little enthusiasm for 
formal, impersonal, and abstract procedures. Although he recognized the 
value of notional apprehensions and assents, he had a persistent predilec-
tion for real apprehensions and assents. He feared that if we become 
immoderately dedicated to abstractions, we may fly too high and become 
oblivious to both the time and place of our departure and to our destiny. 
He was not merely concerned with propositions; his constant concern 
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was with their real objects. This is why he placed such int!nse 
emphasis on experience and feelings which are involved in the probabili-
ties. He wanted to attain certitude in the concrete, in the here and 
now, in the existential objects. 
How can man obtain certitude in the concrete? This was Newman's 
constant concern. Certitude in the concrete is discovered through the 
operation of the illative sense. While Newman compared the illative 
sense to the phronesis· of Aristotle, he goes beyond him. Aristotle 
seemed to limit phronesis to the attainment of ethical certitudes. The 
scope of the illative sense, however, is all fields of knowledge. The 
ultimate court of appeal for any certitude, principle, assumption or con-
clusion is the illative sense. 
The illative sense can move the mind to assent to a false certitude 
but in general it is indefectible. In regard to God's existence and 
basic certitudes Newman excludes any possibility or error. For him to 
deny God's existence was comparable to a denial of his own existence, or 
to a denial of the external world. 
0. Conscience 
But what assurance do we have that the illative sense can produce 
reliable certitudes? Ne~nan at this point avoids the bottomless pit of 
subjectivism, skepticism, and relativism through his consistent emphasis 
on conscience as the crux of human existence. God's voice in conscience 
is the guide and monitor for the illative sense. 
If a person is faithful and honest to the promptings of the voice 
of God in his conscience, his illative sense, which orders a multitude of 
probabilities to form an assent, will be perfected and strengthened, not 
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only in depth but also in extension. God 1 s promptings in conscience can 
encourage and improve the illative sense when it is acting properly, and 
correct it when it is errant. 
It is conscience that informs us of our duty to accept our mental 
powers as God has created them, helps us to arrive at correct ethical 
judgments, and constantly reminds us of our obligation to be open to 
certitudes even in non-ethical areas. To blot out conscience and God from 
philosophy would be to deny a person human dignity in its full sense. It 
would be tantamount to taking the spring from out of the year. 259 
Conscience itself working with the illative sense can receive help 
from dialogues with others, and as it continues to move towards perfec-
tion, it cannot help but live in the expectation of a formal revelation 
from God. 
Conscience continually urges us to retain a reverence for truth, to 
search for any sign of truth and for certitudes, and to accept valid con-
elusions. It constrains us to eschew the inclination to avoid proven con-
elusions. It urges us not to become caught in a stringent system, nor to 
become enclosed in a revolving door of narrow certitudes. New certitudes 
are usually challenging, but they should be examined conscientiously in 
order to attain a more complete and perfect vision of life. 
259While it is true that an atheist can display keen and brilliant 
judgments about some ethical probl8~S, his certitudes will lack the stable 
basis, and the permanence which can only occur when a person is responsive 
to the promptings of God in conscience. On the other hand a religious 
fanatic has an intense devotion to a restricted cause, but he is uncritical 
of his position. He is unreceptive to the voice of God in his conscience 
which would open his mind to new certitudes and enable him to have a more 
complete and integrated view of life. 
r 
L 
b9 
E. The Imperial Mind 
Thus it can be appreciated that among the hallmarks of Newman 1 s 
philosophy are its completeness and consistent balance. His philosophy 
is not limited to thought; it is not limited to existence; it is not 
limited to action; it is not limited to consciousness; it is not limited 
to impressions. It is all of these and more. Newman 1 s philosophy can be 
described as the total man using all of his powers to understand and to 
explain reality in its fullness. It is the total experience of the total 
person. It is the full philosophy of the true, the good, and the 
beautiful. 
Newman 1 s philosophy includes the experiential and the intellectual; 
the activity of man and the activity of God; the importance of language 
and the limits of language; the anchor of the objective and the dynamics 
of the subjective; the nationalism of reason and the realization of the 
imagination; the grandeur of the thought and the need for action; the 
wonders of consciousness and the influences of the semi-conscious and the 
unconscious; the supremacy of conscience and the treasures of traditions; 
the need for stability and the recognition of development; the reverence 
and the security of the old, and the enchantment and the excitement of the 
new. 
In an age of skepticism, insecurity, confusion, frustration, 
randomness and doubt he has presented through his extensive and profound 
philosophy, a path to certitude for God 1 s existence and for the basic 
and crucial values involving our friendship with Him and with others. 
While Newman offers a method for acquiring phil osophi cal certitudes, 
he saw the futility of attempting to construct a complete and closed 
system. He understood the limitations of his work and the need for others 
1 oO 
to continue his investigations. He recognized the need for.a constant 
philosophical development in the here and the now--in the existential 
order. He understood that our lives though built upon reliable and 
solid certitudes, are lives that are always in a dynamic state of growth 
as we are being led on to additional certitudes by the Kindly Light of 
conscience. 
This he expressed when he wrote: 
Lead, Kindly Light, amid the encircling gloom 
Lead Thou me on! 
The night is dark, and I am far from home--
Lead Thou me on! 
Keep Thou my feet; I do not ask to see 
The distant scene--one step enough for me. 
I was not ever thus, nor pray•d that Thou 
Shouldst lead me on. 
I loved to choose and see my path, but now 
Lead Thou me on! 
I loved the garish day, and, spite of fears, 
Pride ruled my will: remember not past years. 
So long Thy power hath blest me, sure it still 
l~i ll 1 ead me on, 
o•er moor and fen, o•er crag and torrent, till 
The night is gone: 
And with the morn those angel faces smile 
Which I have loved long since, and lost awhile. 
June 16, 1833. 260 
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